Re: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

*First, there are many matters where the definitions are not obviously
contradictory, but they have no exemplification. For example, I define
"frfl" as "/Homo sapiens/ with naturally green hair." That involves only
natural phenomena, but no one is looking for frfls. When you get into
explanations which are not natural, I adopt some of them unquestioningly.
That's why I thank God for my food. But prayer is not a scientific concept,
even though the delimitation process is not effective.*

This makes no sense at all and I can't see how it relates to whether the
notion of "strong" and "weak" MN is "incoherent." You could easily apply
the concept of "strong" and "weak" MN to the question of your "frfl." Why
is the frfl's hair green? Strong MN says there must be a naturalistic
explanation. Weak MN says other explanations might be valid if there is no
naturalistic explanation. I'd expect that, given what we know about hair
color, the best explanation for a few isolated frfl's is a non-naturalistic
one: some people decided to dye their hair green. If frfl's are widely
present in the population and after interviewing them we learn most haven't
been dying their hair, maybe there is a strictly naturalistic explanation --
a mutation or something. Why is this a problem?

*As to "compute "non-falsifiable" to 13 places," what kind of drivel are you
presenting? I said nothing about computing. I referred to measurement, if my
memory serves, of the fine constant, recently announced.
*
I'm not "presenting" drivel, I'm responding to it. Your distinction between
"computing" and "measuring" here is just sophistry. You have to do
computations to measure the fine constant. Regardless, "science" no longer
consists of that which can be precisely measured, as you well know, and
that's the point I was making. We can run a current through a device and
continue to extend our measurement of the fine constant (assuming it isn't a
finite number), but we can't do those kinds of experiments in large swathes
of science. I don't think it's particularly problematic that not every
aspect of science is subject to repeatable experiments -- do you?

*As for your tests of philosophy beyond consistency, I can only conclude
that you haven't read many technical philosophy papers.*

Well, I've read a few, and lots of books, but that's neither here nor there
as to the merits of the additional tests I mentioned. I do admire, though,
that you were able to wrap a naked argument from authority and an ad hominem
into a dependent clause of one sentence. That's the kind of thing that
makes this forum so much fun.

*As to whatever you think to draw from Popper, he's passe.*

Well , yeah. And the arguments in POS since Popper only make your
empiricism look sillier.

*But I should perhaps add that consistency has no place in postmodernism in
regard to anything but whatever a postmodern declares to be true.*

Uh... ok. And this is relevant how? Who said anything about
postmodernism? The tests I mentioned fit within a pretty traditional
foundationalist framework. What do you mean by "postmodernism" anyway? The
postmodern epistemology I've read isn't nearly so simplistic as this. I
particlarly like Nancey Murphy's criteria for evaluating competing
truth-claim systems on a non-foundationalist basis. What do you think of
Murphy's criteria? Or was that sort of thing not covered in all those
"technical" papers you've been reading?

On 8/19/06, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> First, there are many matters where the definitions are not obviously
contradictory, but they have no exemplification. For example, I define
"frfl" as "/Homo sapiens/ with naturally green hair." That involves only
natural phenomena, but no one is looking for frfls. When you get into
explanations which are not natural, I adopt some of them unquestioningly.
That's why I thank God for my food. But prayer is not a scientific concept,
even though the delimitation process is not effective.
>
> As to "compute "non-falsifiable" to 13 places," what kind of drivel are
you presenting? I said nothing about computing. I referred to measurement,
if my memory serves, of the fine constant, recently announced. As to
whatever you think to draw from Popper, he's passe.
>
> As for your tests of philosophy beyond consistency, I can only conclude
that you haven't read many technical philosophy papers. But I should perhaps
add that consistency has no place in postmodernism in regard to anything but
whatever a postmodern declares to be true.
> Dave
>
>
> On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 15:33:14 -0400 "David Opderbeck" <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
writes:
>
> By the way, I find the supposed distinction between strict and relaxed MN
relative to science incoherent.
>
> Why? What's incoherent about distinguishing "natural explanations
exclusively" from "natural explanations preferred in the first instance, but
not exclusively?"
>
> Scientific dicta are, at least in principle, subject to empirical test.
When things go well, there is accuracy to 13 places. When there is no
current test, there will be some that deny that a specific theory is
scientific.
>
> Maybe that was so in the 18th Century, but it ain't anymore. Can you
compute "non-falsifiable" to 13 places? Popper came along precisely because
this sort of hyper-empricism doesn't work. And even Popper's program, of
course, has its problems.
>
> In contrast, there is seldom an empirical test for theology or philosophy.
The only empirical refutation I know for a philosophical doctrine was for
Schopenhauer's pessimism. The test for nonscientific studies is essentially
consistency....
>
> Not so. While consistency (or better stated, "logical consistency") is
one test of a philsophy or worldview, other tests include experience (does
it comport with human experience, both of the "outer" world that we observe
and the "inner" world of human consciousness, e.g., moral consciousness) and
practice (does the theory hold up in the laboratory of life). "Consistency"
is thus only a subset of "coherence," which is a richer way of testing a
philosophical position. Maybe philosophical propositions generally can't be
subject to rigorous mathematical tests, but then, since Popper, neither can
large swathes of what we call "science."
>
> On 8/19/06, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > Greg,
> > The fact is that Keith is right. "Science" is not "Wissenschaft" in
normal English usage. It is "Naturwissenschaft". Of course, there are always
those seeking the prestige of science in Christian Science, Science of Mind,
Creation Science, etc. Scientific dicta are, at least in principle, subject
to empirical test. When things go well, there is accuracy to 13 places. When
there is no current test, there will be some that deny that a specific
theory is scientific.
> >
> > In contrast, there is seldom an empirical test for theology or
philosophy. The only empirical refutation I know for a philosophical
doctrine was for Schopenhauer's pessimism. The test for nonscientific
studies is essentially consistency, although there may be special areas
where the interpretation of scriptures is involved. But I note that there is
not complete consistency among those who hold that the Bible is the Word of
God. Like it or not, such philosophies as materialism can be consistent,
along with Hegelian idealism. As one who follows in the footsteps of
Augustine, I reject both. But that does not mean that I can prove the
existence of a deity. Those who think they can overlook the holes in their
argument.
> >
> > I claim scriptural support for this last: Hebrews 11:6. The empirical
evidence against the latter part of the verse is found in doggerel: God's
plan had a hopeful beginning/ But man spoiled his chances by sinning./ We
hope that the story/ Will end in God's glory,/ But at present the other
side's winning.
> >
> > By the way, I find the supposed distinction between strict and relaxed
MN relative to science incoherent.
> > Dave
> >
> >
> > On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 12:35:52 -0400 (EDT) Gregory Arago <
gregoryarago@yahoo.ca> writes:
> >
> > "The whole point of the coining of the term by Paul deVries was to
distinguish the method of science from philosophical naturalism." - Keith
Miller
> >
> > Does anyone else out there ever get the feeling that, in trying so hard
to distinguish 'science' or 'the method of science' from 'mere philosophy,'
the chosen term 'methodological naturalism' is throwing out the baby with
the bath water? Natural philosophy and natural science - are they
really that different today to speak in such exclusivistic terminology?
> >
> > It seems so pragmatic, so equivocal between science is naturalistic,
science is methodological, science is progressing toward perfection, science
is evolving, and science is *not* philosophical. Scientists don't
philosophize!? Kuhn and Popper are therefore passe.
> >
> > "MN is descriptive of the fact that science cannot investigate the
supernatural." - K. Miller
> >
> > Did it ever occur to proponents of (strong) MN that God might not have
wanted us to so thoroughly separate science from our knowledge of/
relationship with Him? Is there nothing scientific, for example, about
theology? Is there no scientific theology?
> >
> > In some people's versions of MN, science is SO silent on the existence
of God, our Creator, that we are left unable to hear.
> >
> > "Some non-theists see God as an unnecessary addition to a scientific
description of the universe, and therefore extend this to a philosophical
exclusion." - K. Miller
> >
> > And some theists perceive God as a necessarily distinct addition to
their scientific description of the universe, therefore extending their
philosophy into a source of exlusion and division.
> >
> > Arago
> >
> > ________________________________
> Now you can have a huge leap forward in email: get the new Yahoo! Mail.
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>

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Received on Sun Aug 20 09:14:31 2006