Re: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

 *Although divine action is unnecessary, or rather irrelevant, to scientific
description, the existence or action of God cannot be thereby dismissed on
scientific grounds. Scientific methodology excludes appeals to supernatural
agents simply because it has no way to test for the action of such agents. *
*When someone argues that matter and energy are all there is, he or she is
making a philosophical, not a scientific claim. Such metaphysical naturalism
is a prior commitment by individuals that is then superimposed on the
science.*

Keith, I hear what you're saying here, but IMHO this doesn't go deep
enough. Why is it that much of mainstream science seems to impose that
"prior commitment" of metaphysical naturalism? It's because, IMHO, the
culture of Science (capital "S", institutional Science) often includes an
implicity a-theistic, evidentialist epistemology, not only as a method for
doing "science," but as an overall worldview. In some ways, then, we're
saying the same thing: metaphysical naturalism, or what I called "strong"
MN, is inappropriate.

But if that's so, the value of saying* "MN is descriptive of the fact that
science cannot investigate the supernatural"* seems very limited to me. Who
cares, except for people who have some political or cultural interest in
demarcating "science" from other avenues of inquiry? This is my view: TEs,
as well as ID proponents, should give up the demarcation game. It's
meaningless, except as it plays into the ugly culture wars that are dividing
people and tarnishing the gospel witness. The real issue, IMHO, is a
broader question of epistemology: what counts as knowledge and what is
"true"? TEs, ID-ers, and even YECs, should unite behind a view of knowledge
and truth that includes God rather than squabbling over whether some
particular line of inquiry gets to be called "science" or not.

On 8/19/06, Keith Miller <kbmill@ksu.edu> wrote:
>
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>
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> David Opderbeck wrote:
>
> *However, neither YEC, nor OEC, nor TE hold that MN always covers every
> aspect of everything.*
>
> Thanks David. There's no doubt that the quality of discourse could be
> improved by better defining terms and by not using slogans such as "MN" as
> codewords for the culture war. That said, I'm not sure I'd characterize
> your examples as "MN." Maybe we need to distinguish between "stronger" and
> "weaker" forms of MN?
>
> My understanding of "MN" as ID proponents use that term is that only
> naturalistic explanations are valid ("strong" MN). I think that's very
> different than saying "naturalistic explanations are preferred" ("weaker"
> MN). In the "strong" understanding of MN, if there is no apparent
> naturalistic explanation, it is assumed that one in fact exists and that it
> hasn't yet been discovered, or perhaps is unknowable, although "strong" MN
> often includes a presumption that all natural explanations are in principle
> knowable. So, for example, "strong" MN would hold that the "apparent"
> resurrection of Jesus must be the result of mass hysteria, "swooning," or
> simple fraud. And, "strong" MN would hold that the "apparent" design
> inherent in nature must be attributable entirely to natural causes.
>
>
>
>
> I have not contributed to this thread since I have posted extensively on
> this in the past. However I wanted to respond to this post because I think
> it entirely inappropriate to use the term MN as it is above. The whole
> point of the coining of the term by Paul deVries was to distinguish the
> method of science from philosophical naturalism. MN is descriptive of the
> fact that science cannot investigate the supernatural.
>
> Science does not deny the existence of a Creator -- it is simply silent on
> the existence or action of God. Methodological naturalism is not a
> prescriptive rule or doctrine, it simply describes what empirical inquiry
> is. It is certainly not a statement of the nature of ultimate reality. Science
> does not, and cannot, say that material things are all that exist, or all
> that matter. Some non-theists see God as an unnecessary addition to a
> scientific description of the universe, and therefore extend this to a
> philosophical exclusion. Although divine action is unnecessary, or rather
> irrelevant, to scientific description, the existence or action of God cannot
> be thereby dismissed on scientific grounds. Scientific methodology
> excludes appeals to supernatural agents simply because it has no way to test
> for the action of such agents. When someone argues that matter and energy
> are all there is, he or she is making a philosophical, not a scientific
> claim. Such metaphysical naturalism is a prior commitment by individuals
> that is then superimposed on the science.
>
> Keith
>
>
> Keith B. Miller
>
> Research Assistant Professor
>
> Dept of Geology, Kansas State University
>
> Manhattan, KS 66506-3201
>
> 785-532-2250
>
> http://www-personal.ksu.edu/~kbmill/
>
>
>

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Received on Sat Aug 19 10:46:49 2006