Re: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

David Opderbeck wrote:

> However, neither YEC, nor OEC, nor TE hold that MN always covers
> every aspect of everything.
>
> Thanks David. There's no doubt that the quality of discourse could
> be improved by better defining terms and by not using slogans such
> as "MN" as codewords for the culture war. That said, I'm not sure
> I'd characterize your examples as "MN." Maybe we need to
> distinguish between "stronger" and "weaker" forms of MN?
>
> My understanding of "MN" as ID proponents use that term is that
> only naturalistic explanations are valid ("strong" MN). I think
> that's very different than saying "naturalistic explanations are
> preferred" ("weaker" MN). In the "strong" understanding of MN, if
> there is no apparent naturalistic explanation, it is assumed that
> one in fact exists and that it hasn't yet been discovered, or
> perhaps is unknowable, although "strong" MN often includes a
> presumption that all natural explanations are in principle
> knowable. So, for example, "strong" MN would hold that the
> "apparent" resurrection of Jesus must be the result of mass
> hysteria, "swooning," or simple fraud. And, "strong" MN would hold
> that the "apparent" design inherent in nature must be attributable
> entirely to natural causes.
>

I have not contributed to this thread since I have posted extensively
on this in the past. However I wanted to respond to this post
because I think it entirely inappropriate to use the term MN as it is
above. The whole point of the coining of the term by Paul deVries
was to distinguish the method of science from philosophical
naturalism. MN is descriptive of the fact that science cannot
investigate the supernatural.
Science does not deny the existence of a Creator -- it is simply
silent on the existence or action of God. Methodological naturalism
is not a prescriptive rule or doctrine, it simply describes what
empirical inquiry is. It is certainly not a statement of the nature
of ultimate reality. Science does not, and cannot, say that material
things are all that exist, or all that matter. Some non-theists see
God as an unnecessary addition to a scientific description of the
universe, and therefore extend this to a philosophical exclusion.
Although divine action is unnecessary, or rather irrelevant, to
scientific description, the existence or action of God cannot be
thereby dismissed on scientific grounds. Scientific methodology
excludes appeals to supernatural agents simply because it has no way
to test for the action of such agents. When someone argues that
matter and energy are all there is, he or she is making a
philosophical, not a scientific claim. Such metaphysical naturalism
is a prior commitment by individuals that is then superimposed on the
science.

Keith

Keith B. Miller
Research Assistant Professor
Dept of Geology, Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506-3201
785-532-2250
http://www-personal.ksu.edu/~kbmill/

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Received on Sat Aug 19 10:20:19 2006