Re: YEC literature [was Re: RATE Vol. II]

Bob:
A year ago I was faced with the task of responding to a YEC advocate (a
NZ evangelist with a BSc in biochemistry named Lewis Meyer), responding
to an ID advocate, and closing my argument for TE, all within 2000
words, for the booklet published by the Vision Network of New Zealand
titled "In the Beginning; Three Views on Creation and Science, presented
by Meyer, Ian Wishart and myself. What I wrote in response to Meyer
follows between the rows of asterisks. Members of this list have told me
that a couple of my responses (I listed them here a few months ago) to
the "young earth evidences" need improvement -- but you will get the
idea -- *all* of these evidences, which are essentialy those listed in
Sarfati's "Refuting Compromise", can be refuted, one by one.
The Finlay reference is :
Graeme Finlay, God's Books Genetics and Genesis, Telos Publications, 2004.
Meyer's criticisms of Finlay were primed by Don Batten of Answers in
Genesis, Brisbane. The numbered claims were;
1. We do not know much about the genetic mechanisms.
2. It is not generally established that all genetic changes are random.
3. No one saw viruses introducingthe pieces of DNA in question.
4. Similarity does not necessarilty mean that the two similar creatures
have evolved from a common ancestor.
5. Random rearrangement of sections of unused DNA would not give new
usable chunks of information to give creatures new features.
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The dichotomy between ‘operations science’ and ‘theoretical science’ is
a spurious distinction. All science is based on some unprovable
assumptions. But when observations agree with the inferences of models
it is unreasonable to just ignore that fact.

It is a misconception to suppose that one can present pieces of “young
earth evidence” and expect that the truth of a single one of those
claims is sufficient to make the evolutionist position collapse. Science
just does not work like that. In any case, one can point out weaknesses
in each of the evidences given by Lewis Meyer, so I shall do this. I
will respond very briefly. More detailed refutations are available on
the internet, notably at www.talkorigins.org <http://www.talkorigins.org/> .

<>1./Earth’s magnetic field/. Modern electrodynamic theory predicts
rapid reversals but long intervals between the reversals.
2. /Helium in rocks/. Deeper zircons have less helium, less uranium, and
less radiation damage, and thus have much smaller diffusivity than
shallower zircons.
3. /Salt in sea/. This is largely in equilibrium. Excess salt is removed
by deposition in shallow sea beds.
4. /Missing supernova remnants/. Davies and Sarfati are correct about
the frequency of supernovae occurrence in our Galaxy, but they are wrong
about the number of observable SNRs, the typical observed lifetime of
SNRs, the evolutionary timescales involved, the uniformity of SNR
characteristics, and the difficulty of finding SNRs
5. /Short period comets/. Those objects in the Kuiper Belt sufficiently
large to be observed are indeed observed, while those of typical comet
size are too small to be observed at present.
6. /Moon’s recession./ The rate of recession varies as the Earth’s tidal
drag varies, and this has changed as the distribution of the continents
has changed.
7. /Radiohalos/. These were observed, and an explanation proposed for
them, long before Gentry wrote on the subject. Also, the fact that a
thing can form quickly does not imply that it formed a short time ago.
Also, that similar phenomena are found in different places does not
imply that they formed at the same time.
8. /Erosion of continents/. Valid mountain building processes have been
ignored by the YECs.
9. /Spiral galaxies/. Density wave theory leads to predictions that are
in accord with observation.

The arguments put forward by Meyer are typical of YEC arguments. The
YECs latch on to isolated instances where standard science has not yet
produced a good explanation and they ignore all the other evidence.
Their own arguments are ad hoc. They are full of serious faults. Robert
Snow^1 has documented one case study where the faults included (1)
unwarranted extrapolation, (2) exclusion of relevant data, (3) failure
to consider relevant processes or events, (4) failure to correct items
1- 3 even after learning of the problem, (5) loss of contact with the
professional scientific literature, and (6) dependence on secondary
sources. It is the poor standard of their arguments -- not the
supernatural aspect -- that puts the YEC position in disrepute for most
scientists. By insisting on their particular interpretation of Genesis
the YECs have put themselves in a straightjacket that prevents them from
considering properly the bulk of the scientific evidence.

The YECs may be satisfied with the feasibility study of Noah’s ark by
Woodromappe, but with justification most other people regard his
arguments as wildly speculative. The YECs would do better to simply say
that a literal reading of the account of the ark requires a series of
miracles. The flood geology of Whitcomb and Morris leaves unexplained
extensive features of the geological column. Again a series of miracles
is needed. The cosmology of Humphreys is ad hoc. It explains a few
features of the universe while leaving a host of other matters
unexplained. The YECs would do better to simply say that God has created
the universe in a way that it appears to be very old.

YECs (and some IDTs like Johnson) fail to recognize the extraordinary
correlation between the molecular data and the Darwinian model. For
example, all mammals have a gene for making vitamin C except guinea pigs
and primates and us, and these have an inactive “pseudo-gene” at the
appropriate place in their genome. It has been well said (by Terry Gray,
of Calvin College) that we could argue that in God’s inscrutable purpose
he placed that vitamin C synthesis look-alike in the guinea pig or human
DNA or we could admit the more obvious conclusion, that humans and other
primates and guinea pigs share a common ancestor.

In response to Meyer’s detailed attack on Graeme Finlay’s position, I
supply the following information. Meyer’s understanding of mutations is
out of date. It is now known that duplications of genetic material are
common, and these generate spare gene copies in which mutations may
cause functional diversification. Meyer denies that the production of
pseudogenes is random. The same processes damage genes to cause a host
of genetic diseases. Does Meyer ascribe these processes to God’s
deliberate action?

Re Meyer’s numbered points: (1) Meyer is correct, but our ignorance
should not rule out the possibility of authentic understanding. (2)
Chromosomal location indeed affects the frequency and nature of changes,
but we cannot know what will change next or how it will mutate. (3)
Retrotransposons are /still/ active in our DNA, and scientists /are
/learning how they work. Changes in ‘junk’ DNA cause diseases such as
cancer, so it should be obvious that the changes are random. The fact
that many changes now serve useful functions demonstrates an
evolutionary principle: randomly arising genetic changes can be selected
to provide genetic function – the very thing that Meyer dismissed! (4)
That common design features point to a faithful Creator is not in
question. What we must not do is look at natural processes ordained and
upheld by this Creator and insist that they are in some way miraculous.
Science becomes impossible if it is denied that retrotransposons are
naturally occurring agents, or if it is denied that viruses cause
diseases. (5) The argument is invalid. The following are
counter-examples. The genetic region that controls the immune system has
been generated by a series of copying events. Trichromatic vision has
risen from the copying of an ospin gene.

^1 Robert E. Snow, “A critique of the Creation Science movement’, in
Howard J. Van Till /et al/.(eds), Portraits of Creation, Eerdmans, 1990.
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Robert Schneider wrote:

> Randy writes:
>
>> The [RATE II] book is filled with phrases like "could have" or "we
>> might suppose" to reconcile many types of problems. Any attempt to
>> refute these quickly becomes tedious and would inevitably be met with
>> counter-illogic.
>
>
> Bob's comment:
> Randy, I have found this to be the case in virtually every piece of
> YEC literature I have read. Morris, Sr.'s writings are repleat with
> such qualifiers; unfortunately, they get lost when the arguments are
> passed on to listeners in pews and lecture halls. It is one of the
> things that is so maddening about reading YEC literature, as I am
> reminding myself presently: I am preparing to write an annotated essay
> on YEC.
>
> To all of you, a request: what are the most salient points do you
> think one should make in writing an essay that presents and then
> critiques the YEC message? Such feedback would be most helpful
>
> Bob Schneider
>
>

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