Re: Virtue Ethics, Deontological Ethics, and Biotechnology

*Aristotle's ethics (and virtue ethics generally) is an elitist ethics; it
is profoundly undemocratic and assumes inequality among persons.*

Interesting -- why is this? Is this much different than the American
founders' idea that democracy requires an educated and virtuous public?

*This may be hubris, possibly a result of the absence of a doctrine of sin
in Aristotle, and perhaps one more reason that evangelicals have shied away
from virtue ethics.*

As I'm starting to think this through, this is one of my main questions --
how virtue ethics relate to a Christian concept of original sin. But
Acquinas seems to have done it ok. I suspect those of a Reformed persuasion
will find it more difficult, but I'm wondering if a robust concept of common
grace helps.

On 5/13/06, pearson@utpa.edu <pearson@utpa.edu> wrote:
> On Saturday, May 13, 2006, D. F. Siemens wrote, regarding Aristotelian
virtue ethics:
>
> >>>What we have is a renaming of a subdivision of teleological ethics with
/eudaimonia/ as the value prized.<<<
>
> This is certainly the way some moral philosophers have treated Aristotle's
ethics -- as a version of consequentialism. But many readers of Aristotle
argue that he is not easily classified as a consequentialist, in spite of
eudaimonia serving as the goal of ethical practice in his system. The
difference, according to these folks, is that Aristotle reduces the role of
the moral agent -- or perhaps, the role of individual moral decision-making
-- to a secondary activity, one that is parasitic on the primary activity:
that of cultivating moral character.
>
> Most teleological systems, such as utilitarianism and perhaps ethical
egoism, emphasize moral agency in the form of deliberation and choice. We
evaluate different claims to value, and calculate which values are most
likely to enhance the good or minimize the bad. But how do we determine
what counts as the "good" or the "bad" that these values are supposed to
promote? In these teleological systems, it turns out that the "good" or
"bad" end states are based on yet other values. But what establishes these
"higher values" as the proper ends to be pursued? In this way, it's easy to
see that teleological systems are inherently circular.
>
> This is where modern exponents of virtue ethics (like MacIntyre, Bernard
Williams and Rosalind Hursthouse) believe they can break the circularity of
most teleological ethics. They argue that the acquisition of virtues
contributes to the development of character, that character leads to
happiness, and that happiness is defined in terms of the essences of human
nature. The emphasis is not on human beings as moral agents deliberating
about right and wrong, but on human beings as creatures who seek to acquire
those virtues that lead to human flourishing. Indeed, Aristotle argues that
human deliberation on what is right or wrong is doomed to failure unless it
is an activity carried out by those whose character has already been formed
by virtue. Not everyone can figure out what is right and wrong; only the
virtuous can do so.
>
> Aristotle's ethics (and virtue ethics generally) is an elitist ethics; it
is profoundly undemocratic and assumes inequality among persons. I don't
find that particuarly objectionable. The bigger problem with virtue ethics
is the assumption that there is an identifiable "essential human nature,"
such that specific moral goods leading to human flourishing can be
confidently and consistently articulated. This may be hubris, possibly a
result of the absence of a doctrine of sin in Aristotle, and perhaps one
more reason that evangelicals have shied away from virtue ethics.
>
> In any event, virtue ethics as portrayed in the contemporary literature is
not simply a revised standard version of pedestrian teleological
ethics. Whatever its weaknesses, it seeks to establish both teleological
and deontological moral proposals on a prior basis of ethical character.
>
> Tom Pearson
>
> _______________________________________________________________________
> _______________________________________________________________________
>
> Thomas D. Pearson
> Department of History & Philosophy
> The University of Texas-Pan American
> Edinburg, Texas
> e-mail: pearson@utpa.edu
>
>
>
Received on Sat May 13 22:20:09 2006