Re: Virtue Ethics, Deontological Ethics, and Biotechnology

On Saturday, May 13, 2006, D. F. Siemens wrote, regarding Aristotelian virtue ethics:

>>>What we have is a renaming of a subdivision of teleological ethics with /eudaimonia/ as the value prized.<<<

This is certainly the way some moral philosophers have treated Aristotle's ethics -- as a version of consequentialism. But many readers of Aristotle argue that he is not easily classified as a consequentialist, in spite of eudaimonia serving as the goal of ethical practice in his system. The difference, according to these folks, is that Aristotle reduces the role of the moral agent -- or perhaps, the role of individual moral decision-making -- to a secondary activity, one that is parasitic on the primary activity: that of cultivating moral character.

Most teleological systems, such as utilitarianism and perhaps ethical egoism, emphasize moral agency in the form of deliberation and choice. We evaluate different claims to value, and calculate which values are most likely to enhance the good or minimize the bad. But how do we determine what counts as the "good" or the "bad" that these values are supposed to promote? In these teleological systems, it turns out that the "good" or "bad" end states are based on yet other values. But what establishes these "higher values" as the proper ends to be pursued? In this way, it's easy to see that teleological systems are inherently circular.

This is where modern exponents of virtue ethics (like MacIntyre, Bernard Williams and Rosalind Hursthouse) believe they can break the circularity of most teleological ethics. They argue that the acquisition of virtues contributes to the development of character, that character leads to happiness, and that happiness is defined in terms of the essences of human nature. The emphasis is not on human beings as moral agents deliberating about right and wrong, but on human beings as creatures who seek to acquire those virtues that lead to human flourishing. Indeed, Aristotle argues that human deliberation on what is right or wrong is doomed to failure unless it is an activity carried out by those whose character has already been formed by virtue. Not everyone can figure out what is right and wrong; only the virtuous can do so.

Aristotle's ethics (and virtue ethics generally) is an elitist ethics; it is profoundly undemocratic and assumes inequality among persons. I don't find that particuarly objectionable. The bigger problem with virtue ethics is the assumption that there is an identifiable "essential human nature," such that specific moral goods leading to human flourishing can be confidently and consistently articulated. This may be hubris, possibly a result of the absence of a doctrine of sin in Aristotle, and perhaps one more reason that evangelicals have shied away from virtue ethics.

In any event, virtue ethics as portrayed in the contemporary literature is not simply a revised standard version of pedestrian teleological ethics. Whatever its weaknesses, it seeks to establish both teleological and deontological moral proposals on a prior basis of ethical character.

Tom Pearson

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Thomas D. Pearson
Department of History & Philosophy
The University of Texas-Pan American
Edinburg, Texas
e-mail: pearson@utpa.edu
Received on Sat May 13 19:32:16 2006