What if the Dover school board had wanted to get ID into
the public schools, by proposing that ID be taught in
philosophy classes instead of science classes? Assuming
the motivations otherwise were the same, would ID in
philosophy classes violate the establishment clause?
If so, then a determination that the actions of the school
board violated the establishment clause should be
sufficient, if not then the question of whether or not ID
is science or not seems relevant.
> A. The "endorsement" test under the establishment clause
>looks to the
> relevant public's perception of the government's
>actions: would the public
> percieve a government endorsement of religion.
> B. The "purpose" prong of the Lemon test asks about the
>government's
> motives: did the government intend to promote religion
>or did the policy
> have a valid secular motive.
> C. Neither the question of public perception nor the
>question of government
> intent relate to any external, expert classification of
>a governmental
> policy as "science," "not science," or anything else.
>These are questions of
> subjective perception and motive, to be determined based
>on each case's
> factual setting. They are not questions of ontology or
>ultimate objective
> meaning.
> D. Therefore, the broad question of whether something
>is or is not
> "science" is irrelevant to an establishment clause case.
> Q.E.D.
>
> As
Received on Tue Jan 10 12:00:01 2006
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