Re: Judge Jones sided with the Discovery Institute and ruled against the Dove...

From: David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
Date: Tue Jan 10 2006 - 11:36:30 EST

*Why? If the issue of ID/Evolution being scientific is not relevant how
> come that you advocate reaching two different conclusions based on the
> same behavior and legislative history? Do you see the contradiction here?
*
No, my approach is consistent. My view is that the abstract determination
of whether something meets some definition of "science" is irrelevant under
the establishment clause, period. What matters is the motive to promote
religion and the public perception that religion is being endorsed by
government. Further, these questions of motive and perception, within the
particular factual setting of an individual case, are the only questions a
court should appropriately address under the establishment clause. It is
not the role of the courts to opinion on broad ontological, philosophical,
or metaphysical questions. Scientists of all people should be wary of
courts that seek to define for them what their discipline means or does.

The teaching of evolution with atheistic motives would not be an
establishment clause violation because of the key word, "religion." Atheism
would not likely be considered a "religion" for purposes of the
establishment clause. I've given you a heap of precedent about what
"religion" means in this context, which you have ignored. So, to say it for
the fifth time and to be crystal clear: atheistic motives don't offend the
establishment clause because atheism doesn't fit the definition of a
"religion." It has nothing to do with whether the tool used to promote the
atheistic motives is classified as "science" or not. If you don't like
this, take it up with the courts, to which I've cited you, that have defined
"religion."

*Logic, case
> law all contradict your claims.
> I am still trying to understand your position which I find logically
> flawed and legally unsupported.*
**
One more time for the logically and legally challenged:

A. The "endorsement" test under the establishment clause looks to the
relevant public's perception of the government's actions: would the public
percieve a government endorsement of religion.
B. The "purpose" prong of the Lemon test asks about the government's
motives: did the government intend to promote religion or did the policy
have a valid secular motive.
C. Neither the question of public perception nor the question of government
intent relate to any external, expert classification of a governmental
policy as "science," "not science," or anything else. These are questions of
subjective perception and motive, to be determined based on each case's
factual setting. They are not questions of ontology or ultimate objective
meaning.
D. Therefore, the broad question of whether something is or is not
"science" is irrelevant to an establishment clause case. Q.E.D.

As to the atheist example:

A. The establishment clause prohibits the establishment of "religion."
B. "Religion" is typically defined by courts to mean metaphysical beliefs
coupled with indicia of a "cultus," such as churches, priests, authoritative
leaders, holidays, and the like.
C. Atheism has no indicia of a cultus.
D. Therefore, a court would not likely find that an atheistic motive for
teaching evolution violates the establishment clause; the question whether
evolution is or is not "science" in a broad sense is irrelevant. Q.E.D.

I'd like to see your position outlined in a similar fashion.

On 1/9/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
> David Opderbeck wrote:
>
> > /The simplest way of seeing this is by replacing ID with evolution and
> > > keeping everything else the same. According to David, the court would
> > > have had to rule as it did in the case of ID, rejecting evolution
> > > because of the legislative history of the board./
> > /
> >
> > /Now you're just misrepresenting my position. Go back and read what I
> > said; I said exactly the opposite.
>
>
>>
> >
> >
> > /In addition, people may
> > > consider evolution contrary to their religious beliefs and thus
hostile
> > > to religion. In other words, the effect of such a law may very well be
> > > an endorsement violation, if one fails to take into consideration the
> > > existence of a valid primary secular purpose.
> > /
> > Oh, goodness, now you're confusing the establishment and free exercise
> > clauses.
> >
> Sigh... Just making such claims are hardly convincing David. I may very
> well say the same of you. See how easy it is to 'rebut'?
>
> Let's get back to a valid and primary secular purpose. Would the
> existence or absence of such a purpose make any difference to the
> ruling? Both as to the purpose prong as well as to the endorsement test.
> It's time to confront the example I presented.
>
> Replace ID with evolution, accept the same legislative history where the
> board is either shown to endorse a particular religious proposition or
> shows hostility to a religion. The only difference is that they require
> evolution to be taught.
>
> > > Hope this clarifies.
> >
> > No, it makes things worse. Are you doing this on purpose just to goad
> > the discussion?
>
> Sigh... I notice you still avoid dealing with the obvious. Logic, case
> law all contradict your claims.
> I am still trying to understand your position which I find logically
> flawed and legally unsupported.
>
Received on Tue Jan 10 11:37:20 2006

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