Terry Gray wrote:
> Here's a question I like to pose to anthropological monists:
> Does our ability to explain the natural world in terms of
> physical/chemical/biological phenomenon mean that God is not present
> and acting? We don't actually see evidence of divine action in the
> world around us, do we? Does the absence of such evidence using
> scientific methods mean that it's not there?
> Similarly, I fail to see how the existence of an immaterial soul is
> affected by our ability to explain various mind function in terms of
> brain and neurophysiological function.
That's a very good question, worthy of a careful answer.
Let me start by saying that, while the evidence pushes me to favor some
version of monism, I remain open to scientific, philosophical, or
theological persuasion in favor of some versions of dualism. Also,
through various readings and conversations, I've even become convinced
that some people who call themselves "non-reductive monists" and others
who call themselves "holistic dualists" actually, when you examine the
details of their beliefs, actually believe almost the same thing.
I'll start by taking Terry's excellent question and modifying it. :-)
An argument similar to Terry's could be made in favor of animism -- the
idea that the phenomena of life are produced by an immaterial _anima_ or
vital principle distinct from matter (paraphrased from Oxford English
Dictionary).
Animism was widely believed throughout most of human history, for very
sensible reasons. But we've discovered that the molecules inside living
cells seem to obey exactly the same laws of nature as molecules outside
living cells. Moreover, as we continue to discover the amazing
biochemical reaction pathways in living cells -- interlocking loops of
upregulation, downregulation, catalysis, etc. -- we are beginning to see
how these biochemical reaction loops can account for all the "special"
properties of cells which we associate with life: homeostasis, maintaining
internal conditions out of equilibrium with the environment, eating,
excreting, metabolism, reaction to external stimuli, reproduction, etc.
Terry asks: should our belief that God is present and acting in this
world be overthrown by our ability to explain so much of the natural world
in terms of physical/chemical/biological phenomenon? There are plenty of
good reasons for a Christian to answer, "No."
Terry then asks: should a belief in an immaterial soul be overthrown by
a scientific ability to explain mind functions in terms of
neurophysiological functions?
I ask: should a belief in animism be overthrown by a scientific ability
to explain "life" functions in terms of biochemical functions? I think
the right answer to this question is, "Yes." Very few scientists today,
of any religious persuasion, believe in animism.
So the new question I would ask is: Is a dualistic conception of the
human soul --- in the face of our apparent ability to explain various mind
functions in terms of neurophysiological functions --- more like belief in
God, or more like belief in animism?
===============
Some theological and hermeneutical considerations:
Various scriptural passages were used in the past to support an
animistic view of life. Could these passages also be understood in
non-animistic ways which still maintain their "essential theological
teachings" (e.g. about God's creation of and concern for living
creatures)? Yes.
Many scriptural passages talk about God being present and acting in the
world. Could these passages also be understood in a way that God is NOT
present and acting in the world, and still maintain their "essential
theological teachings" about God? No.
Various scriptural passages are used to support a dualistic view of the
soul. Could these passages also be understood in a monistic way which
still maintains their "essential theological teachings"? I think yes.
One example:
The "intermediate state" is often seen as an argument in favor of
dualism. I'm not convinced that it is.
Granted: under monism, belief in an intermediate state would require
that God somehow specially "maintains" the person after physical death and
before the resurrection. But consider: our existence right now depends
moment-by-moment upon God sustaining us and the universe. The same is
presumably true of our existence in our resurrection bodies. Is an
intermediate state all that different?
Now consider dualism. What abilities of a person still function, in
some sense, during the intermediate state? We don't know for sure.
Consciousness? Memory? The ability to communicate and interrelate? But
_before_ death, all of those functions rely on a working brain. Before
death, the immaterial soul cannot do those things "on its own" without a
functioning brain. So if an immaterial soul has some of those
capabilities after death, during the intermediate state, then presumably
God must augment (and sustain) those abilities during the intermediate
state. But if so, how is this dualist picture substantially different
from a monist picture of the intermediate state described in the previous
paragraph?
There are other good theological questions which can be raised, and the
merits of dualism versus monism discussed. But let's save that for later.
===============
Some functional considerations:
Several hundred or thousand nerve cells can be grown in a dish. They
will spontaneously create synaptic connections. Scientists are gaining
the ability to control and re-wire those connections so that a dish of
neurons can even be trained to perform some very simple functions (given
certain inputs, produce certain outputs). Would such a dish of cells have
a rudimentary immaterial soul? Would postulating such an immaterial soul
help us understand anything about how the dish of neurons functions, or
the qualities that it has? I don't think so.
A very simple worm has about 600 neurons. (I've forgotten the name of
the species. Sorry. It's been a few years since I read this paper.)
This worm has be micro-sectioned from nose to tail, and the sections
studied under electron microscopes. So we have a good physical map of how
all the neurons are wired together, synapse by synapse. It won't be long
before scientists also understand each synapse neurochemically and
functionally. Then it will be possible to mathematically model the entire
neural network of the worm. Does this worm have a rudimentary immaterial
soul? Would postulating such an immaterial soul help us understand
anything about how the worm functions, or any qualities that the worm has?
How about a more complex worm with several tens of thousands of neurons?
How about an insect with a few million neurons?
How about a simple fish or reptile with tens of millions of neurons?
How about a mouse?
How about a dog?
How about a monkey? Does a monkey have some sort of immaterial soul?
Would postulating such an immaterial soul help us understand anything
about how a monkey functions, or qualities that a monkey has?
If you answer "yes" to the monkey and "no" to the worm, then you know
what I'm going to do next --- I'm going to challenge you to be more
specific about when, at what level of complexity of neural wiring, does a
neurophysiological understanding become inadequate?
If you answer that a monkey does NOT have an immaterial soul, then I
have to ask: what does the immaterial (dualistic) soul of a two-month-old
human infant do, if anything? Is it purely passive at that stage?
What about an adult human soul? Is it passive, simply along for the
ride? Or does it exert causal influence on brain function?
If an immaterial soul is passive --- preserving some essence of a person
but not exerting causal influence on brain function --- then I'm not sure
what dualism has gained over a monistic view of human beings. Under
monism, it is God who preserves the essence of a person.
If an immaterial soul does exert causal influence on brain function,
then new questions are raised which are highly intriguing (and/or highly
frustrating) for a Christian physicist/neuroscientist.
Does the immaterial soul exert causation which would, in principle at
least, be scientifically detectable? Would it, at some particular times,
cause some neurons to fire which otherwise could not possibly have fired?
Or would the causal influence be more subtle, perhaps working within the
levels of quantum uncertainty? Such influence MIGHT be effective in
decision-making and still be scientifically undetectable. But it would
still raise questions: Does an immaterial soul connected to a body, in
any sense, process information and memories "on its own"? Are there
(immaterial) _mechanisms_ behind the functions of the immaterial soul?
Are there "laws of nature" in this immaterial realm as well, causing
potentially recognizable patterns in how the immaterial soul influences
brain function?
It seems to me that a dualist should be willing to face these thorny
questions and at least postulate some hypotheses. As our scientific
ability to study the brain gets more and more precise, these "functional"
questions will eventually become scientifically addressable. As
scientific abilities advance, will the supposed "causal influence" of the
immaterial soul be pushed farther and father back, always just beyond the
limits of scientific detection? At a functional level, is it in the end a
"soul of the gaps"?
Loren Haarsma
Received on Tue Mar 22 14:21:56 2005
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