From: George Murphy (gmurphy@raex.com)
Date: Fri Oct 17 2003 - 19:44:21 EDT
Brian Harper wrote:
>
> At 05:06 PM 10/16/2003 -0400, George Murphy wrote:
>
> Walter wrote:
>
> > That would be great. However, there are a lot of
> theological issues with evolution that are
> > not as great with other fields of science. The very core
> issue of automatically excluding
> > anything other than natural means raises the question of
> objectivity in the minds of some.
>
> George replied:
>
> MN is, for good or ill, a general rule of procedure
> for most scientists, not
> just those studying evolution.
>
> While what you say is certainly true, it seems to many to be too
> arbitrary. For this reason, I think there is a much better way of
> stating MN than what is commonly seen here.
>
> To justify this let me start by saying that the very name MN suggests
> a methodological principle. This suggests then that MN is best founded
> in the empirical methods of science. With this prelude let me give my
> favorite definition of MN which, interestingly enough, comes from Phil
> Johnson :)
>
> Methodological naturalism is "... the principle that science can study
> only the things that
> are accessible to its instruments and techniques." --Phil Johnson
>
> [The context of this quote is very interesting. For one thing it
> addresses the point raised earlier about whether Phil understands the
> difference between MN and PN. For this reason I've put the context in
> a footnote below.]
>
> IMO, starting with the above definition avoids all kinds of trouble.
> It avoids the seeming arbitrariness of saying that scientists explain
> things only in terms of natural mechanisms. The reason scientists do
> this is now evident. They limit their study to things accessible (in
> principle) to an empirical approach.
>
> Even more important, this approach correctly bases MN as an inherent
> *limitation* of science. And the limitation can be clearly seen to
> apply to all, not just theists. Apparent design (Dawkins) is no more
> accessible to the instruments and techniques of science than
> purposeful design.
>
> Of course, the fact that the definition comes from Phil doesn't hurt
> :).
>
> As an aside. I was still part of the ID group when I first saw a
> definition of MN. In fact it was the above definition (or one like it)
> that I saw. I immediately recognized that I already was a
> methodological naturalist, I just didn't know the name for it :). Of
> course, I am an experimentalist (primarily) and I think MN is more or
> less self evident to experimentalists. Interestingly enough, at that
> time it was not a key part of ID doctrine. No one was arguing how bad
> MN is. this is clear from the context of the quote below. All the
> controversy came later.
......................
I have some problems with this. In the 1st place, while Phil Johnson can use
any language he wishes, I am wary of a statement about science &/or scientific method
which has (IMO) theological warrant from a person who is neither a scientist nor a
theologian. & PJ is neither.
But then to substance. MN of course does have to do with scientific method, but
as stated by PJ it is perilously close to a tautology. In fact, as he says in the
footnote you included, "Of course science can study only what science can study" - which
doesn't say much. & if this definition is accepted, we're left with no "naturalism"
that has much content as an alternative to metaphysical naturalism - which of course
fits very nicely with the Johnsonian attack on "naturalism" in general.
MN - at least as I understand it & use the term - is more than just a statement
about how scientists ought to work. It is also a statement about the world - i.e., that
what happens in the world can be understood in one way in terms of things in the world
and their interactions. I.e., if scientists follow MN as a method they will not
encounter phenomena that in principle they cannot understand. The world can be
understood - in the phrase popularized by Bonhoeffer (it actually comes from Grotius)
/etsi deus non daretur/, "though God were not given."
A few qualifications:
1) I said "what happens in the world can be understood ...", not "the world can
be understood ...". Science cannot tell us why there is a world - i.e., why something &
not nothing. Or, pace string enthusiasts &c, "why this world & not another."
2) Continuing, "can be understood in one way ...". I add the qualification "in
one way" because an explanation in terms of natural processes accessible to science
doesn't preclude an explanation in terms of God's will worked out through those
processes. Similarly, saying that Lincoln died because a bullet entered his brain
doesn't rule out the statement that Lincoln died because Booth wanted revenge for the
South's defeat.
3) I would also add the qualification that MN will work "except for a set of
events of measure zero (& leave it to mathematicians to define the appropriate measure!)
This is because
a. I don't want to rule out all miracles and, while I think that many can be
understood at least by analogy with natural processes I won't say dogmatically that all
can, &
b. I think it likely that Goedel's theorem rules out the possibility of a
literal "theory of everything" - a conclusion that Hawking also seems to have come to
recently.
Shalom,
George
P.S. PN stands for "philosophical naturalism" does it not? I'm not crazy about that
term because lots of philosophies & philosophers have different concepts of nature,
including some in which "supernature" is continually intervening in it. There are
similar problems with "metaphysical naturalism" & besides, its acronym is the same as
that for methodological naturalism. While it's not perfect, I think "ontological
naturalism" (ON) would be best for this concept.
George L. Murphy
gmurphy@raex.com
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
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