Methodological Naturalism + Phil on MN and PN (was Re: Falsifiability?.........)

From: Brian Harper (harper.10@osu.edu)
Date: Fri Oct 17 2003 - 15:09:15 EDT

  • Next message: Michael Roberts: "Re: extra stuff in Genesis 1-2"
    At 05:06 PM 10/16/2003 -0400, George Murphy wrote:


    Walter wrote:


    > That would be great. However, there are a lot of theological issues with evolution that are
    > not as great with other fields of science. The very core issue of automatically excluding
    > anything other than natural means raises the question of objectivity in the minds of some.

    George replied:

            MN is, for good or ill, a general rule of procedure for most scientists, not
    just those studying evolution. 

    While what you say is certainly true, it seems to many to be too arbitrary. For this reason, I think there is a much better way of stating MN than what is commonly seen here.

    To justify this let me start by saying that the very name MN suggests a methodological principle. This suggests then that MN is best founded in the empirical methods of science. With this prelude let me give my favorite definition of MN which, interestingly enough, comes from Phil Johnson :)

    Methodological naturalism is "... the principle that science can study only the things that
    are accessible to its instruments and techniques." --Phil Johnson

    [The context of this quote is very interesting. For one thing it addresses the point raised earlier about whether Phil understands the difference between MN and PN. For this reason I've put the context in a footnote below.]

    IMO, starting with the above definition avoids all kinds of trouble. It avoids the seeming arbitrariness of saying that scientists explain things only in terms of natural mechanisms. The reason scientists do this is now evident. They limit their study to things accessible (in principle) to an empirical approach.

    Even more important, this approach correctly bases MN as an inherent *limitation* of science. And the limitation can be clearly seen to apply to all, not just theists. Apparent design (Dawkins) is no more accessible to the instruments and techniques of science than purposeful design.

    Of course, the fact that the definition comes from Phil doesn't hurt :).

    As an aside. I was still part of the ID group when I first saw a definition of MN. In fact it was the above definition (or one like it) that I saw. I immediately recognized that I already was a methodological naturalist, I just didn't know the name for it :). Of course, I am an experimentalist (primarily) and I think MN is more or less self evident to experimentalists. Interestingly enough, at that time it was not a key part of ID doctrine. No one was arguing how bad MN is. this is clear from the context of the quote below. All the controversy came later.

    ========footnote======

    In a March 1992 lecture in Dallas I made the following observation:

    The statement defining the agenda for this Symposium asserts that an a priori commitment to metaphysical naturalism is necessary to support Darwinism. . . . Methodological naturalism -- the principle that science can study only the things that are accessible to its instruments and techniques -- is not in question. Of course science can study only what science can study. Methodological naturalism becomes metaphysical naturalism only when the limitations of science are taken to be limitations upon reality. (From "Darwinism's Rules of Reasoning, in Darwinism: Science or Philosophy? ed. Jon Buell and Virginia Hearn [ Foundation for Thought and Ethics, 1994], pp. 6, 15)

    I would not express the point that way today, but any seeming inconsistency with the views stated in this paper is semantic rather than substantive. The key question raised by the qualifier methodological is this: What is being limited--science or reality? When "methodological naturalism" is combined with a very strong a priori confidence that materialistic theories invoking only unintelligent causes can account for such phenomena as genetic information and human intelligence, the distinction between methodological and metaphysical naturalism tends to collapse. (Example: "Science can study only naturalistic mechanisms; therefore we can be confident that life must have arisen by a naturalistic mechanism, since science continually advances and solves problems of this kind.") That science has its limitations is not in doubt; the question is whether unsound assumptions about reality have been made to permit science to escape those limitations.

    Taken from <Reason in the Balance>, 1995, p212, by Phil Johnson
    ======================================================================


    Brian Harper

    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.4 : Fri Oct 17 2003 - 15:09:26 EDT