From: Graham E. Morbey (gmorbey@wlu.ca)
Date: Wed Jul 09 2003 - 20:44:57 EDT
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Note to Svend Robinson
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2003 17:04:14 -0500
From:
To:
The Globe and Mail
Note to Svend Robinson
By MARGARET SOMERVILLE
UPDATED AT 5:50 PM EDT Wednesday, Jul. 9, 2003
Dear Svend,
Your recent article in these pages makes me acutely aware of the
mixed emotions I face in opposing same-sex marriage. You, and many
others, regard such a change as an essential recognition of the
dignity, worth and rights of homosexual people, and opposition to it
as a declaration to the contrary. In writing of the discrimination
suffered by homosexual people, you evoke powerful feelings that we
all must "right the wrongs." But, despite those feelings, I must
challenge your arguments in favour of same-sex marriage.
First, there's a difference between separate-but-equal and
different-but-equal. Separate-but-equal means that two entities are
inherently the same, but are treated as separate. That's
discrimination, and you rightly reject it. Different-but-equal means
that two entities are not inherently the same, but are treated
equally. That's the antithesis of discrimination. Separate-but-equal
is second-class citizenship. Different-but-equal is not.
The question is: Are homosexual and heterosexual unions inherently
the same, in which case they should constitute one group of unions,
or inherently different, but should be treated equally?
The answer depends on which characteristics of the unions we choose
to focus.
If we focus on adult individuals' commitment to each other and
public recognition of that commitment (as the courts have done), we
can conclude that restricting marriage to opposite-sex unions and
having a separate but equal institution for same-sex unions would be
discrimination. If, however, we focus on the inherently procreative
nature of an opposite-sex union and the absence of that feature in a
same-sex union, we can regard the two types of union as different
but equal.
You argue previous changes in marriage are precedents for changing
marriage to include same-sex couples, citing the fact that husbands
once could beat their wives, and interracial marriages and divorce
were illegal. These are not relevant.
Institutions have both inherent and collateral features. Inherent
features define the institution and cannot be changed without
destroying the institution. Collateral features can be changed
without such impact. We rightly recognized that women must be
treated as equal partners with men within marriage. While that
changed the power of husbands over their wives, it simply changed a
collateral feature of marriage. Recognizing same-sex marriage would
change its inherent nature.
As for interracial marriage, it symbolizes the inherently
procreative relationship between a man and a woman and the only
reason for prohibiting it is racial discrimination. Same-sex
marriage expressly negates this symbolism. That is the reason for
denying same-sex partners access to marriage, not their sexual
orientation.
Divorce is not analogous. The issue is not whether opposite-sex
couples attain the ideals of marriage; neither is the issue whether
marriage is a perfect institution.
The issue is whether society needs marriage to institutionalize the
inherently procreative relationship between a man and a woman. I
believe we do, and maintaining it should take priority. You believe
recognizing homosexual people's claims to access to marriage should
come first.
The conflict at the heart of our disagreement -- as is so often true
in ethical dilemmas -- is whether societal needs or individual
rights should prevail. Important as individual rights are, we can do
serious harm in assuming that they should always trump society's
needs.
Sincerely, Margo.
Margaret A. Somerville is Samuel Gale Professor of Law at the McGill
Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law at McGill University.
© 2003 Bell Globemedia Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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