From: Glenn Morton (glennmorton@entouch.net)
Date: Thu Jul 03 2003 - 22:12:48 EDT
Hi Howard, Maybe your are right, but at this point am not so sure. You
wrote:
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Howard J. Van Till [mailto:hvantill@chartermi.net]
>Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2003 7:59 PM
>>From: "Glenn Morton" <glennmorton@entouch.net>
>
>> Well, as I understand the possibilities in a multiverse where all
>> possibilities exist, there would be multiple Glenn, as you all
>know me. But
>> there would also be Glenn the rapist, Glenn the genocidal
>maniac, Glenn, the
>> theif, Glenn the rich NY land developer etc.
>
>I don't see the problem yet. Although these "other Glenns" might be
>structurally identical, they are clearly not one and the same
>person. In the
>same way, identical twins might be structurally (nearly) identical but are
>not one and the same person.
The difference between the twins and what I am thinking of is the
indistinguishableness due to quantum. If two objects are in the same
quantum state, they are indistinguishable. Twins are not in the same
quantum state. But if the multiverse occurs because all possible unique
quantum states have been filled, then you have at least two regions in which
all the quantum states are identical. Maybe the easy out is to claim that
those two regions are connected--a form of entanglement on a megascopic
scale.
FYI, I did find an interesting critique of Tegmark's more technical article
by Davies at
http://aca.mq.edu.au/PaulDavies/Multiverse_StanfordUniv_March2003.pdf
He criticizes Tegmark not for first level quantum mistakes but for being
deism!
>
>> What would salvation under such
>> circumstances mean? Who or what is saved? One would end up with
>Glenn the
>> saved and Glenn the damned.
>
>Calling these structurally identical but distinct persons by the same name
>is causing an apparent problem where, as I see it, no problem actually
>exists. Just call them, Glenn1, Glenn2, Glenn3, etc., and deal with their
>fates as any other set of individuals.
Are you suggesting that beings in equivalent quantum states can be
distinguished?
>
>> That is what makes me very uncomfortable about
>> MWH in any form. And I do worry a bit about the advent of
>quantum computers
>> which can perform calculations requiring more particles than there are in
>> the our causally connected universe.
>>
>> It seems to me that MWH is inconsistent with theism.
>
>So far, I don't see a real problem.
I hope I might have made my concerns more clear. If indistinguishable
quantum states can result in distinguishable individuals, then I might agree
with you. But that wasn't my understanding of quantum.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.4 : Thu Jul 03 2003 - 22:13:18 EDT