Burgy,
You say that
> On page 36, Griffin asserts that naturalism(sam) is the "fundamental
> ontological belief of the scientific community." I would argue, rather,
> that naturalism(ns) is the "fundamental working assumption of the
> scientific community as it performs science" and that while some may
> indeed believe naturalism(sam) that not all do, and that, in any event,
> that is philosophy, not science and irrelevant to the issue. One's
> beliefs are, of course important, but they can be wrong beliefs; they are
> not (in the Platonic sense) knowledge. I think Griffin's error here is a
> serious one. It is not so much that he is wrong (although I think he is)
> as that he has seized on an irrelevancy.
When I look on page 36 in my copy of Griffin's _Religion and Scientific
Naturalism_ I see something quite different. In the last paragraph, from
which you quote, Griffin is criticizing the common practice of equating of
"theism" with "supernatural interruptionism." _If_ that is what "theism" is
taken to mean, then, says Griffin, "belief in theism, accordingly, would
almost inevitably connote rejection of naturalism(ns), which is the
fundamental ontological belief of the scientific community." Griffin
specifically refers her to naturalism(ns), not naturalism(sam).
By Griffin's definitions, however, naturalism(ns), -- or "minimal
naturalism" -- includes the rejection of "supernatural interruptionism," but
_not_ of "theism." Theism, in Griffin's view, can have a rich concept of
divine action (in both invariant and variable forms) that is an _essential_
factor in all events/processes in the universe without recourse to
supernatural interventions that interrupt the universe's own causal nexus.
I don't think that you and Griffin differ nearly as much on the character of
science as you suggest.
Howard van Till
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