Griffin #4
GRIFFIN4.TXT
Griffin Notes -- chapter 2
The Modern Conflict between Religion and Scientific Naturalism. 22 pages
Griffin's theme in this chapter is that Naturalism(sam) is the dominant
scientific worldview. Very dominant. He includes quotations from Russell,
Krutch, Monod, Skinner, Uttal, Wilson, Provine, Strauss, Lamprecht,
Drees, Asimov, Leowintin, and, in a later chapter, Crick, Searle,
Weinberg, and Dawkins, all asserting that worldview. I don't know why he
left out Sagan. He does NOT quote scientific thinkers with opposing
views, and I find that an omission of consequence.
Griffin asserts (page 22) that "...the relation between science and
religion during this period (1700-2000 roughly) has been characterized by
increasing conflict. This has especially been the case since the latter
half of the nineteenth century when the first version of the modern
scientific worldview, which combined a mechanistic doctrine of nature
with a dualistic doctrine of the human being and a supernaturalistic
doctrine of reality as a whole was replaced by the second version, in
which the dualism and supernaturalism were replaced by materialism and
atheism... ."
A page later he argues that "postmodern science," which began emerging in
the 20th century, has, in some circles resulted in, if not harmony, at
least convergence of science and religion. However, he adds, the conflict
relationship is still dominant in mainline circles.
He spends the next 20 pages enlarging on, and defending, these claims.
A few notes on the rest of the chapter:
The problem with ontological dualism is the mind/body interaction
problem.To affirm it, one must affirm supernaturalistic theism. "...all
things are possible to God except the logically impossible... " and "a
few events occur without natural causes, so they must uniquely be
explained by reference to God's causation." But this is necessarily
contradicted by such events as the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 (see my
review of PERILS OF A RESTLESS PLANET on my website at
<www.burgy.50megs.com/perils.htm>. One cannot reconcile the two
assumptions (1) God is all powerful, (2) God is all loving with the dirty
fact "evil exists." So, he argues, Supernaturalistic theism necessarily
led (and leads) to deism and eventually to atheism.
Now since dualism depends on supernaturalism, it too retreated, first to
"epiphenomenism," and then, since epiphenomenism (the mind is real
enough, but it is just a "rider" on the physical body), has no power to
act, to materialism.
On page 36, Griffin asserts that naturalism(sam) is the "fundamental
ontological belief of the scientific community." I would argue, rather,
that naturalism(ns) is the "fundamental working assumption of the
scientific community as it performs science" and that while some may
indeed believe naturalism(sam) that not all do, and that, in any event,
that is philosophy, not science and irrelevant to the issue. One's
beliefs are, of course important, but they can be wrong beliefs; they are
not (in the Platonic sense) knowledge. I think Griffin's error here is a
serious one. It is not so much that he is wrong (although I think he is)
as that he has seized on an irrelevancy.
God, Griffin says, is not a being external to the universe.. I cannot buy
that. I am not sure, however, how to argue against it.
end chapter 2. John Burgeson
Burgy (John Burgeson)
www.burgy.50megs.com
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