Here are my notes on chapter 1 of Griffin's book.
Thanks for all the commentary on what I've put up thus far. I can't
comment on all of them -- and you would not want me to, I'm sure! I do
appreciate the dialog. The class ends next Thursday and I still do not
have my head around Griffin's thesis. But while confused, I am not
confused at a much higher level!
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GRIFFIN3.TXT
3. Notes on chapter 1, Science, Religion & Worldview (19 pages)
Whitehead wrote, in 1929, "Philosophy attains its chief importance by
fusing the two, namely religion and science, into one rational scheme of
thought." (pg 5).
Griffin suggests a typology of three ways science and religion can be
related, conflict, independence and possible harmony.
Dawkins and Sagan are typical of conflict; Bultmann and Gould are typical
of independence; Whitehead, Griffin and Barbour are typical of possible
harmony. I am not sure how this typology helps in understanding, however,
for I don't know in which category to put other people, such as Ramm, Van
Till, Plantinga, and others (George Murphy, Loren Haarsma, Ted Davis,
Moorad Alexandrian, Keith Miller, and others on the ASA LISTSERV). My
guess is that all, including me, would claim a slot in the "possible
harmony" camp, but if that is true, the category is impossibly large.
Griffin uses the term "robust theology" often; I am disturbed by that.
The word "robust" has nothing to do with either truth or reality. I have
an atheist friend on Compuserve's RELIGION forum who has a "robust
theology" involving an invisible pink unicorn; it is quite consistent,
quite irrefutable, and, I think, both he and I would call it "robust."
On page 6 Griffin makes the following statement, which shows, I think, an
understanding of science with which I cannot agree; I think it simply
incorrect: "Science ... may show that all events in this world, including
those events in which we make conscious decisions, are fully enmeshed in
a deterministic nexus of causes and effects ... As scientists,
accordingly, we affirm determinism, while as religious persons we affirm
freedom." For me, the statement above does not describe science as I was
trained and now understand. It is the difference between assuming
causality (methodological naturalism) and a scientism that asserts a
final deterministic reality has been identified. The last I regard as a
scientist's "deadly sin." I am unimpressed by the fact that some persons,
much better writers than me, do commit this sin; I cannot follow them.
Even when I was not a Christian, I would not follow them in this regard;
I considered it hubris of a particularly repugnant order.
On page 10, Griffin has an excellent discussion of obscurantism, which he
calls "intellectual original sin." The clergy used to be the chief
offenders, asserting that revelation was a self-sufficient path to truth,
but even by 1925 that position was dominated by scientists, asserting
scientism. Obscurantism has the tendency, found in both forms above, to
formulate philosophical questions in such a way to shut out the
opposition. "The intolerant use of abstractions," says Whitehead, "is the
major vice of the intellect." (pg 10). The task of philosophy,
therefore, is to be the critic of these methods.
Griffin now defines naturalism(ns) as being simply a rejection of
supernatural interventions which interrupt causal relations. He also
defines naturalism(sam) as including:
sensationism
atheism
materialism
determinism
reductionism
no human freedom (free will)
no downward causation from mind to body
vertical causation only, from the simple to the complex
no transcendent source of religious experience
no variable divine influence
no ultimate meaning to life (nihilism)
The "sam" in the definition stands for the basic principles of the above,
sensationism, atheism and materialism. He also observes that other
writers call naturalism(sam) by the names, reductionistic naturalism,
materialistic naturalism and atheistic naturalism. I have been used to
the term "metaphysical naturalism."
He asserts that naturalism(ns) is true, and that naturalism(sam) is
false. I am disturbed by his use of the word "true" above. I can easily
assume it to be true, in any specific scientific experiment. I can even
assume it to be true for every one of my life events, at least for sake
of argument. But I think it is not true for every one of my life events.
Perhaps not any of them.
Griffin argues (pg 15) that naturalism(ns) is all science needs for its
enterprise to continue, and that naturalism(ns) is adequate for religion.
The book is going to argue this thesis. On page 20 he weakens his case
immensely (IMHO) by suggesting that his thesis "depends heavily upon the
evidence from parapsychology." On this page he also writes, "After
reviewing various facts showing that the neo-Darwinian version of
naturalistic evolutionism seems to be almost as far from the truth as
supernaturalistic creationism, ... ." I immediately jumped to that
section to get a preview of his arguments; he identifies 14 attributes of
neo-Darwinism and argues that 10 of them are superfluous. But more on
that later.
end chapter 1 notes
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Burgy (John Burgeson)
www.burgy.50megs.com
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