There are a number of things to comment on in the four messages beginning
with Jim's post. I append abbreviated versions below, with reference to
them. I hope this does not become too confusing.
In I (1) (the first message, where I have put a number), Jim objects to
equating random generators with free will. Glenn responds in II (2) that
he can substitute a "person." Later, II (3) and (4), he says that
"free-will involves unpredictability." I am persuaded that Jim is right,
and that the proposed substitution of a chooser is irrelevant. First, no
one is going to choose enough times to create a gasket. Second, when
people choose, they become predictable by falling into a pattern. This is
why the requirement for randomization turns them to flipping coins,
throwing dice (though there are ways to "educate" both), psuedo-random
number generators, or the IBM tables.
As for unpredictability, consider a moral person who finds a wallet which
contains identification and some cash. What will he/she (to be
politically correct) do? Anyone have any problem with the prediction?
Does that mean the person lacks free will?
Now, I grant that there may be a breaking point. I think it was GBS who,
at a party, asked a young woman if she would live with a man for a
million pounds. She would. "Will you sleep with a man for five pounds?"
"Of course not! What do you think I am?" His reply, "We've already
established that. I was only trying to determine the degree." In other
words, there may be complications to prediction, most obviously in
extreme situations. But generally, predictability is compatible with
human freedom.
Specifically, free will requires only that the individual's choice makes
a difference. The choice does not have to be between A and not-A, for it
may be between A and near-A. Sometimes the moral choice may be between
two goods. Choosing the lesser over the greater is evil, just as is
choosing an evil over a good.
In III (5), Jim notes essentially what I have just written. Then he notes
"irrational and arational" decisions. These can be delimited from
rational decisions from the outside. From within, the distinction is
difficult or even impossible. But there can be complexities. Consider,
for example, a child who knows that a certain action will result in
punishment does the forbidden act. Was this irrational? This may be the
child's way to get parental attention, something he finds outweighs the
painful consequences. It thus may be rational. But, someone objects,
there is another way to get attention without these results. So it looks
irrational. Has the child recognized this alternative? If he hasn't, he
can't be charged with irrationality for not embracing it. What if, in his
view, the cost of this alternative without the pain of punishment is
greater than the cost of misbehaving? Anybody for further complications?
I recall reading of some tribes whose members were psychotic. Were these
individuals irrational? The report indicated that the culture was so
disfunctional that the only way to survive within the tribe was to be
insane. So which term of the three applies to their decisions? The
obvious fact is that their choices were circumscribed in ways that those
of other individuals were not. However, it does not prevent them from
choosing among the available options, the essence of free will.
In III (6), Jim notes his problems with quantum mechanics as explanatory
for human freedom. First, anything which ends up producing a Gaussian (?)
distribution seems to me not to be simply random. Second, such a random
source of consequences cannot provide for morality. If "my" decision just
happens because of whatever quanta do, I am not responsible for it any
more than I am responsible for what happens with something that is
strictly determined. The problem is that people have seen that strict
determinism cannot give rise to moral decisions and have concluded that
indeterminism must be the answer. It isn't. It can't be. What is required
is SELF-determination, which cannot be demonstrated empirically.
I'm sorry, Glenn, but IV (7) doesn't help freedom. Moving toward one of
the dots is neither good, bad nor neutral. And calling on the stock
market for intelligent activity seems preposterous, given the recent
gyrations.
As to Libet _et al._'s experiment, the first problem is a demonstration
that the "potential change" is the decision--IV (8). The further claim
(IV (9)), seems to me to tie to the postmodern notion that everything is
purely subjective. Further, making "free decision" the action of a
"randomizer" is nonsense.
As to IV (10), I earlier encountered the information that playing the
piano on a professional level, at least, requires actions faster than
they can be transmitted by the nerves, even if the trip is just from the
spinal cord rather than from the brain. But this has nothing to do with
freedom or moral decision.
Finally, re IV (11), I'll repeat what I've said before: free will cannot
be non-deterministic or indeterministic. Also, it cannot involve strict
determinism, that is, the doctrine that all human activity is determined
by neural, social, chemical, quantum, or whatever causes. If it's not
self-determination, it isn't free will.
Dave
--I--
From: James W Stark <stark2301@voyager.net>
Date: Sat, 08 Apr 2000 15:02:49 -0400
I'm a little late entering this discussion on free will a preprogrammed
pattern of action. I've been traveling without access to my e-mail.
(1) No one seems to have questioned the validity of Glenn's Sierpinski's
Gasket
as an example of free will. As a mathematician who has used varied
programmed languages to create computer programs, I see no evidence that
any
computer program could ever simulate the free will that humans all
experience. That free will always exists outside the computer in the
human
designer of the program.
No random generator can create this free will. Just because a choice is
unpredictable does not establish human free will. We can not even create
a
program for true randomness. Roger Penrose speaks to this problem of
creating random generators in Shadows of the Mind.
However, everyone seems to agree that the free will that humans do have
is
constrained by programmed decisions both in our brains and by our
environment. Our freedom is bounded by both nature and nurture. Free
will
decisions are not predictable. That is part of the gift of God, who used
God's free will to share it with humans. God knows what range of actions
we
will do because of the fixed constraints. Within those constraints God
lets
us shape our own futures. God chose to limit what God could know for a
reason.
Could it be that our individual and collective purpose in life is to
learn
how to use that freedom?
--II--
From: "glenn morton" <mortongr@flash.net>
To: "James W Stark" <stark2301@voyager.net>, <asa@calvin.edu>
Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2000 16:20:14 -0000
Actually, Dave did raise the question you have about does the gasket say
=
anything about free will. Here was my reply:
********my reply*********
Dave raises some interesting points. I would like to comment on one of =
them.
----- Original Message -----
From: <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2000 5:05 PM
> There is, hoiwever, a more basic problem with the analogy, namely, =
that
> the motion is determined by chance. Whether this is connected to a
> pseudo-random or truly random number generator, it does not represent
> personal choice
(2) It can be due to personal choice. Lets replace the dot with an =
intelligent
agent. The dot has a choice, do the moral thing and move halfway to dot =
1,
do the sinful thing and move halfway to dot 2 or do a neutral thing an =
move
halfway to dot 3. As with all of us in life, we do some moral things, =
some
bad things and some that really don't make a difference (like belching =
in
public). This intelligent agent will now produce a Sierpinski's gasket =
as
surely as the sun will rise tomorrow. So these systems actually =
illustrate
that God could self-limit his knowledge of which choice we will make, =
but
our life will still provide the pattern required to fit into his global
scheme.
*********end of my reply********
The fact that we can't always do good ensures that Burgy's limiting case
=
will never occur--I.e. that we will always chose good. It is also =
impossible to chose pure evil every time. To do that might mean going on
=
a lifelong murder rampage shooting everyone you see. (3) The thing that
is =
similar (as you note below) is that free-will involves unpredictability.
=
The random number generator does create some unpredictability.
Concerning the rest of your note:
You are confusing or =
conflating a few terms. First there is free will. (4) Free will must be =
linked to unpredictability (i.e. randomness). Predictable behavior is =
not free behavior. Secondly, there is intelligent behavior vs. =
non-intelligent behavior. Non-intelligent behavior does not have to be =
predictable and being unpredictable it can be free. Unpredictable =
behavior may or may not be intelligent but it is free behavior. In =
Sierpinski's Gasket, we have a non-intelligent dot moving =
freely(randomly). In Newtonian mechanics we have an unintelligent meteor
=
(since it is dense as a rock it is clearly inintelligent) which moves =
predictably and thus it is not free. We can have an intelligent being =
who is not free to chose(a prisoner or a person falling off of a bridge =
who is constrained to follow a parabolic trajectory). I think you are =
confusing free will with intelligence and one can't do that. Free will =
REQUIRES randomness.
And concerning the nature of God's self-limitation on his knowledge, I =
would add that it appears that this universe is built upon an edifice of
=
probability amplitudes--quantum mechanics--in which the outcome of any =
given microscopic interaction may be unpredictable, but on the whole, =
when lots and lots of them take place, patterns arise from the chaos. An
=
example would be the electron diffraction experiments. If you have one =
slit, no wave behavior of the electron is observed. It is a system with =
perfect certainty--the electron went through the only slit available. =
But with two slits, one can't tell which slit it went through and a =
pattern of wave-like interference develops behind the grating. And in =
this situation, more electrons strike the detector behind the grating IN
=
BETWEEN THE TWO SLITS, not, as would be expected in a deterministic =
world,directly behind each slit! However, in spite of ones uncertainty =
about which slit the electron went through, one can be certain of the =
diffraction pattern amplitude behind the grating. =20
--III--
From: James W Stark <stark2301@voyager.net>
Date: Sun, 09 Apr 2000 11:02:15 -0400
I saw this response after I sent my comment. You did not resolve the
validity question.
The dot can not be replaced by an intelligent agent in the computer. The
dot has no free will. It behaves "randomly" because of a mathematical
equation. An intelligent agent does have free will and can not be
programmed into any computer. The system illustrates nothing that is even
plausible. There is no valid analogy between the choices of a human
agent
and Sierpinski's gasket.
The output from a random generator does not create human free will!!
Because the use of both random numbers and free will appear
unpredictable,
we can not assume that they are related. You apparently choose to
believe
that they are. Many scientist will treat free will as a fixed program so
that they can create a deterministic explanation. That is a extremely
simplified free will. It is not human free will!! (5) Human free will
selects
between the intentions of a human during an evaluation and response.
This
is certainly not random. How predictable that human free will may be
depends on how rational the human is behaving. Humans make many free
will
decisions based on emotional input that overrides cognitive judgment.
Hence, they become irrational or arational. Francis Fukuyama in The
Great
Disruption provides a useful classification of human norms based on a
rational-arational dimension. He is the senior social scientist for the
RAND Corporation.
We have yet to use mathematics to estimate rational decisions, because of
our poor understanding of relationships between values. Evaluating
irrational and arational decisions based on our emotions with mathematics
may be impossible. I choose to see this human free will as a spiritual
force that interacts with our brains. We must use that gift of free will
to
reach out to God for guidance in our decisions. Those intentions become
the
causes for our actions after the act of using human free will. We
foolishly
hide this true free will in our concepts of chance, randomness,
spontaneity,
etc.
God does not have to hide God's free will behind randomness. Your
explanation just shows your preference for a deterministic worldview. We
need to build coherent worldviews. You seem to leave no room for true
spiritual forces that are beyond deterministic models. Deterministic
models
ignore true human free will.
(6) You have more faith in quantum mechanics for spiritual answers than I
do.
Quantum mechanics has a horrendous measurement problem about what does
and
does not exist. Science has assumed that for something to exist it must
be
measured. Quantum mechanics extended that existence to possibilities. At
some point a possibility has to change to an actuality. When that occurs
can not be established. Measurement of spiritual existence can be hidden
in
possibilities. However, any test of its validity can only be done
through
human testimony. There is a measurement barrier between the Universe
that
we can measure and the spiritual realm. We can not scientifically test
for
the existence of a spiritual realm or the existence of God. We can only
use
our human free will to believe or not believe.
One assumption ought to be the existence of a human free will that is
beyond
randomness, chance, or spontaneity. The truth in reality is not
completely
deterministic or programmed. Human free will exists within the
constraints
set by God. Our task is still to learn how to better use that human free
will to build a stable global community.
--IV--
From: "glenn morton" <mortongr@flash.net>
To: "James W Stark" <stark2301@voyager.net>
Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2000 16:02:43 -0000
(7) Like many games, Jim, this game is not restricted to the computer.
One =
can lay out a board on the floor and have a real live person move in =
response to what I suggested(good, bad or neutral deeds) and mark the =
points. Or maybe they could move by a minute by minute tally of the =
stock market. Go half the distance to 1 if the NASD and NYSE are both =
up, half the distance to 2 if there is a mixed result and half the =
distance to 3 if both are down. The stock market is moved by millions of
=
intelligent beings buying and selling stock. If you are going to argue =
that those shareholders have no free will, then we will have to talk =
about what free will means.
It is interesting that you are saying that human free will chooses =
between alternatives. (8) There is a famous experiment by Libet and =
colleagues which has some implications to your claim that human free =
will choses between intentions. =20
"Libet et al. have demonstrated that a 'person's' brain makes a decision
=
to act before the 'person' is aware of having decided to act; that is, =
the brain makes the decision and then informs the person of the =
decision, who (mistakenly) believes he or she actually 'made' the =
decision. In the experiment to show this, a spot rotating on a TV screen
=
at a rate of 2.5 cycles per second is watched by an experimental =
subject. The subject is asked to decide of his or her own free will to =
bend a finger, and note the position of the spot when the decision is =
made. An electrode attached to the head shows that, on average, a =
potential change in the brain occurred 0.35 seconds before the person =
said he or she 'intended ' to act." ~ Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of =
Immortality, (New York: Doubleday, 1994), p. 201
Tipler refers to B. Libet et al, "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in =
Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness Potential). The =
Unconcious Initiation of a Freely Voluntarary act," Brain, =
106(1983):640ff. I would also point you to Deeke, Grotzinger and =
Kornhuber, 1976 "Voluntary finger movements in Man..." Biol.Cybernetics =
23,99ff. Tiper goes on:
(9) "The free decisions of the agents are an irreducible factor in the =
generation of the physical universe and its laws, not merely the =
reverse. This means that, even if the randomizer in the human nervous =
system is apparently merely pseudorandom, we will still have ontological
=
free will if the Omega Point Boundary Condition applies to the actual =
universe. With this boundary condition, the ultimate laws of physics are
=
generated by agents, not vice versa. Thus, under the Omega Point =
Boundary Condition, the laws of physics necessarily have a little =
'vagueness' about them; they cannot determine all decisions of all =
agents." ~ Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality, (New York: =
Doubleday, 1994), p.202-203
But once again, how can we be free when we don't even know what we did?
=
Free will must be tied to randomness. In this way God limited His =
knowledge as well as our knowledge. And because our knowledge is =
limited, He needed to come, in the form of the Messiah, to tell us about
=
Himself.
I would interpret Libet's experiments as follows: We are tied to some =
randomizing agent. We inform this agent of what we want to do in the =
future--bend our finger. Then that agent must act on our account before =
we are informed of his action. The person sitting at the experiment =
already agreed to bend his finger and then delegated the action to the =
randomizer.
(10)
We do this when we throw things, like baseballs:
"One of the fastest loops is from arm sensors to spinal cord and back =
out to arm muscles: it takes 110 milliseconds for feedback corrections =
to be made to an arm movement.
"But dart throwing doesn't take much longer. Thus feedback from =
joints and muscles is wasted--you might use it to help you plan for the =
next time, but your arm is an unguided missile shortly after the throw =
has begun. You must plan perfectly as you 'get set' to throw, create a =
chain of muscle commands, all ready to be executed in exactly the right =
order. The same is true for hammering, which both baboons and =
chimpanzees use effectively to crack open shells. You need something =
like a serial buffer memory in which to load up all the muscle commands =
in the right order and with the right timing relative to one =
another--and then you pump them out blindly, without waiting for any =
feedback." ~ William H. Calvin, "The Unitary Hypothesis: A Common Neural
=
Circuitry for Novel manipulations, Language, Plan-ahead, and Throwing?" =
in K. R. Gibson and T. Ingold, eds., Tools, Language and Cognition in =
Human Evolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp =
230-250, p. 234
(11) I have been arguing all throughout this thread for a
NON-DETERMINISTIC =
model of free will. How on earth can you possibly say that. Have I not =
said over and over that free will must be tied to randomness? That is =
certianly NOT arguing for a deterministic universe, unless your =
definition of deterministic is totally different than any definition I =
have ever heard.
No, you misconstrue what I have faith in. I have faith in God and see =
his hand in quantum. I am interested in how he has used it to give us =
free will. It is not quantum that gives, but God.
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