At 07:36 PM 04/08/2000 -0600, David F. Siemens wrote, responding to John
Burgeson's question on process
theology:
>The quick answer is that process theology is panentheistic, which is a
>kind of intermediate between pantheism and theism. It seems to insert
>personality into what is essentially impersonal in Hinduism, for example.
This is Charles Hartshorne's version of process thought (or something very
close to it), since Hartshorne is the only process thinker I know who
explicitly adopts panentheism. The most common form of panentheism argues
that the created universe is "inside" God, interior to his Being. This is
why, for panentheists, God cannot be outside of time, since that which
operates under the conditions of temporality (the universe) is an aspect of
God.
But there are other process theologians who don't embrace panentheism,
including two of the more notable ones, Schubert Ogden and John B. Cobb,
Jr. Ogden and Cobb emphasize (as did George Murphy earlier today) the
Christological locus of process theology, and address the question of
immutablity rather than the question of timelessness. God in Christ was
subject to change, most obviously the change associated with death -- so
there goes immutability. And if the author of Philippians expresses it
properly, then God "emptied himself" when he assumed human identity, a
pretty terrifying thought for those who prefer to worship an immutable
deity. This is Ogden's, and Cobb's, point of departure for the development
of their process models. God, like the cosmos, is in the process of
becoming, and is not (yet) fully actualized being. If you want to track
the historical tajectory here, draw a line from Plato to Giordano Bruno to
Spinoza to Hegel, and the next dot you'll see is Whitehead, followed
closely by Hartshorne.
There are some excellent short pieces that say all this a lot better than I
have. For Hartshorne, his chapter titled, "The Formally Possible
Doctrines of God," from *Man's Vision of God*, is the place to start. John
B. Cobb, Jr. has two helpful articles, "A Whiteheadian Doctrine of God,"
and "A Whiteheadian Christology," both of them brief and powerful, in my
judgment. Schubert Ogeden wrote an essay called, "Toward a New Theism,"
that captures a non-Hartshorne view of process theology as well as anything
I know. All of these, fortunately, have been gathered in one anthology
(*Process Philosophy and Christian Thought*, edited by Brown, James and
Reeves: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971) that is, unfortunately, out of print. But
there's probably a copy in a good college library.
>A proper theism cannot place God as creator within the universe
>_simpliciter_. Even deism meets this criterion, the difference being that
>with deism God winds it up and lets it go until he steps in for a final
>judgment, whereas theism insists on God's providential care--whether this
>is separate from creation as is usual in Reformed thought, or whether
>Creator-Providence are merely two aspects of the same divine activity as
>in Lutheran thought.
OK, here's the real reason for this post. I'm a lifelong Lutheran, and I
don't recognize any of this. Throughout our history (there are a few
exceptions), Lutherans have developed the habit of averting our gaze from
the sort of theological attention to creation (and to a Creator-God) that
normally engage other Christians. For us, the Christian story begins with
Christ crucified, not with creation. And "Providence" is a term that
Lutherans just don't use; there are only handful of passing references to
the concept in our voluminous Confessions. When Lutherans talk about
"divine activity," we mean the cross and resurrection, and not much else.
Can you say more about what you meant by this, Dave?
>Had the Trinity
>emptied themselves, the providential care of the universe would not have
>been possible.
Right. But the Trinity was "emptied," so such providence was not possible.
Remember -- this is a Lutheran talking, and Lutherans theologically are
largely indifferent to the notion of providence.
>In another sense, God limited himself in giving us freedom rather than
>making us mere robots programmed to act in certain ways.
One last question. I've never understood the claim that God could "limit
himself." What does this mean? That God's power could limit his power?
That his omnipotence trumps his omnipotence? This seems. . .well,
incoherent to me. I can only assume that you aren't speaking literally,
but analogically, as when human beings curb their appetites, or defer some
pleasure for the sake of a greater good. But even as an analogy, this
seems to miss the mark. Do we really want to say that God is possessed of
a psyche analogous to the human psyche? This whole idea of God "limiting
himself" seems to me to sink into logical incoherence. What am I missing
here?
Tom Pearson
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
Thomas D. Pearson
Department of History & Philosophy
The University of Texas-Pan American
Edinburg, Texas
e-mail: pearson@panam1.panam.edu
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