On Sun, 09 Apr 2000 16:43:07 -0400 George Murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
writes:
> dfsiemensjr@juno.com wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, 8 Apr 2000 11:09:28 -0400 John Burgeson
> <burgy@compuserve.com>
> > writes:
> > > Dave wrote, in the middle of an excelleny (IMHO of course) post,
> > > " The natural outcome is something like process theology, which
> is
> > > not
> > > properly theistic."
> > >
> > > Why is process theology not "properly theistic."
> > >
> > > Would you, perhaps, expand on both what you mean by "process
> > > theology"
> > > and by "properly?"
> > >
> > > In my theology, and it is just my thinking, I see at least the
> real
> > > possibility
> > > of God not being all-powerful, or, at least, deliberately
> limiting
> > > his
> > > powers
> > > both the see and control the future outcome of life on this
> earth.
> > > Is this
> > > process theology, or merely a pale subset of something else?
> > >
> > > Burgy
> >
> > The quick answer is that process theology is panentheistic, which
> is a
> > kind of intermediate between pantheism and theism. It seems to
> insert
> > personality into what is essentially impersonal in Hinduism, for
> example.
> > Basically, process theology places the deity within time or
> restricted by
> > time, so to be as surprised as its (they would say 'his' though I
> think
> > they take away too much personality for that) creatures at what
> comes up
> > in the future. To put it into the vernacular, the deity is winging
> it.
> >
> > A proper theism cannot place God as creator within the universe
> > _simpliciter_. Even deism meets this criterion, the difference
> being that
> > with deism God winds it up and lets it go until he steps in for a
> final
> > judgment, whereas theism insists on God's providential
> care--whether this
> > is separate from creation as is usual in Reformed thought, or
> whether
> > Creator-Providence are merely two aspects of the same divine
> activity as
> > in Lutheran thought. This is one of the places where I think
> Calvinism
> > tacitly bootlegs time in, even while overtly excluding it.
> >
> > It is certain that an almighty Being may limit himself: he did it
> in the
> > incarnation. But I note that it is the Second Person who emptied
> himself
> > to become incarnate, not the Father nor the Spirit. Had the
> Trinity
> > emptied themselves, the providential care of the universe would
> not have
> > been possible. This is obviously crude language, but I find none
> better
> > when faced with the ineffable, the mystery of the Trinity.
> >
> > In another sense, God limited himself in giving us freedom rather
> than
> > making us mere robots programmed to act in certain ways. In other
> words,
> > he neither threw the suicide off the roof nor made Mother Teresa
> care for
> > the hopeless. Both chose their actions, whatever we may note
> further of
> > motivation. This does not mean that God will ever be surprised at
> any of
> > the creatures' actions. Because he is outside of the creation as
> Creator,
> > and absolutely eternal (timeless), all is known to him.
> >
> > In process theology, when one rings the changes, one is faced with
> only
> > two possibilities. Either God and his universe are eternal, or God
> and
> > his universe came into being. The second seems a worse choice than
> the
> > beginning of the universe from the quantum vacuum in an atheistic
> manner.
> > The first seems to run into insuperable problems with the Big
> Bang. In
> > addition, I insist that process theology is constructing a deity
> in the
> > image of man, more sophisticated than the beautiful statues in the
> Greek
> > temples, but an idol nevertheless.
> >
> > Finally, thanks for your kind words about my post.
>
> I suspect that Dave would be surprised if I didn't chime in
> here & in fact he
> seems to have included a pre-emptive strike against something he
> expects me to say.
> So not to disappoint anyone -
> 1) First, what is "a proper theism"? Precisely what is it
> that disqualifies
> panentheism, e.g., from being a member of the class of proper
> theisms?
> 2) Process theism does have some serious problems, notably
> a. a difficulty of adequately formulating process
> trinitarianism, &
> b. the mutual interdependence of God & the world
> which makes it
> impossible to speak of _creatio ex nihilo_.
> 3) Process theism involves divine temporality but is hardly
> unique in doing
> so. Much of the work which has reinvigorated trinitarian theology
> in the past 70 years
> has involved the belief that it is appropriate and even necessary to
> speak of God as
> "having time" and being involved with the world's time. This has
> been accompanied by
> the recognition that there is no good biblical reason to speak of
> God as "timeless", and
> that doing so is part of the heritage of Greek philosophy rather
> than Scripture. It is,
> in fact, an idolization of an ideal - "Stay, you are so beautiful."
> 4) It is taking the Incarnation seriously, & realizing that
> it means that the
> history of Jesus is part of God's history, & thus that God _has_ a
> history, which makes
> it clear that "timelessness" is really incompatible with the
> Christian claim. That one
> who shares the divine nature with the other persons of the Trinity
> can suffer means that
> the Trinity itself is not immune from suffering.
> Dave's argument, "Had the Trinity emptied themselves, the
> providential care of
> the universe would not have been possible", rephrases the
> traditional challenge which
> has always been made to kenotic christologies, for it is the one who
> _did_ "empty
> himself" in whom "all things hold together." I won't attempt to
> give a detailed answer
> to that now, but just note that the arguments assumes that what
> holds all things
> together is power of a controlling sort rather than the type which
> is "made perfect in
> weakness."
> Shalom,
> George
>
In answer to the first question, a 'proper theism' has to be something
beyond deism, if nothing else.
You have added relevant material in your second point.
On the third point, if I were following Greek philosophical thought, I
would deny creation and have God as the shaper of eternal matter. Indeed,
I would make God a part of the universe, something that Whitehead would
appreciate, for he remarked that all philosophy is merely a footnote to
Plato. I appreciate Plato, but go to Hebrew thought in order to profit
from their _unique_ idea, the Creator. So, IMO, you've turned the facts
upside down.
On the fourth point, the "incarnational theology" involved forces God to
be temporal, which is a Greek idea, though they did not explicitly
recognize it, time being so ubiquitous in their thought that it was not
mentioned. This view also insists that God change with the crucifixion. I
contend that this is a faulty view that does not recognize that God is
eternally different because he is the redeemer before the foundation of
the world (and space-time). His love and mercy are not something that
came upon him with the incarnation.
Dave
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sun Apr 09 2000 - 19:31:29 EDT