At 05:42 PM 12/20/2000 -0500, you wrote:
>To: ccogan@telepath.com (Chris Cogan)
>
> >>Bertvan:
> >>Hi Chris. There is exactly the same amount of evidence for the existence of
> >>free will as there is for it's non existence. If free will exists it is
> >>unpredictable until the moment a choice is exercised.
>
> >Chris
> >Why do you make such a claim? What is the evidence for this, other than
> >your arbitrary definition of free will as unpredictable? (Obviously, if you
> >*define* it as such, then, if it exists, it must be unpredictable, so
> >merely defining it that way does not prove anything about facts of reality).
>
>Bertvan:
>To my understanding free will and determinism are opposites. It seems to me
>you are trying to redefine free will as determinism in order to prove it
>doesn't exist. All my evidence for the existence of free will is subjective.
> You belief in determinism is also personal opinion. (You can keep claiming
>free will is really determinism, but I'm not sure what you will accomplish by
>that.)
Chris
I don't have my dictionaries of philosophy handy, but, in this case, even
the ordinary American Heritage will do:
free will n. 1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose
to remain behind of my own free will. 2. The power, attributed especially
to human beings, of making free choices that are unconstrained by external
circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will. [Middle English
fre wil, translation of Late Latin liberum arbitrium : Latin liberum, free
+ Latin arbitrium, will.]
Obviously, in neither definition is there any conflict with determinism. Of
course, the issue is not primarily definitional; it's about facts. It's
about whether determinism is true or not and whether its alleged
implications for what is called free will are real. *IF* your concept of
free will is legitimate, then, yes, I'd deny free will, but then point out
that that had nothing to do with what people *experience* as free will,
since your definition goes beyond the *possible* rational interpretations
of that experience. In other words, I could grant that you are right
definitionally, but then simply point out that *that* concept of free will
is irrelevant to any issue in the real world.
>Bertvan
> >>Recently you
> >>acknowledged that philosophy can never be proved and shouldn't be imposed
> >>upon anyone.
>
>Chris
> >I acknowledged that it should never be imposed on anyone. I did not
> >acknowledge that it cannot be proved, because it can.
>
>Bertvan:
>So far as I know, no philosophy has ever yet been proved to the satisfaction
>of everyone.
Chris
Neither has the Pythagorean theorem. So what?
Bertvan
>Apparently determinism has been proved to your satisfaction. You are aware
>that is a minority philosophy, aren't you?
Chris
I've never considered metaphysical truth to be up to majority vote. I can't
even imagine how this could be relevant. If the majority of people believed
that 2+2=76, would that make it true? Are you aware that your views
regarding intelligent design are minority views?
>Chris
> >I didn't say that free will doesn't exist. I said there's no reason to
> >believe that it's indeterministic. I *do* wish you would quit grossly
> >misrepresenting my views.
>
>Bertvan:
>I apologize for grossly misrepresenting you, but I doubt you'll find many
>philosophers, or anyone else, who would agree to defining free will as
>deterministic. I'm not trying to change your beliefs. I'm merely trying to
>find a vocabulary with which to discuss our different views.
>
>Chris
> >I also claim that any view other than mine on the issue of whether 2+2=4 is
> >true is false. Why do you assume (without evidence, apparently) that this
> >issue is any different in fundamentals? Are you saying that reason applies
> >to mathematics but not to causation, not to the law of identity?
>
>Bertvan:
>What is this "law of identity"? Who articulated it? How was it proved?
>Matter and certain forces seem to have mathematical relationships. So far
>mathematics hasn't proved a very useful tool to describe life IMHO.
Chris
What has mathematics got to do with anything? I was merely using
mathematics as an example. The question, which you did not answer, is:
Are you saying that reason applies to mathematics
but not to causation, not to the law of identity?
More generally, are you saying that reason applies to some things (such as
mathematics) but not to causation?
The law of identity is simply the fact that whatever a thing is, *that's*
what it *is*. It has been "articulated" since Aristotle's day. It wasn't
proved; it is an axiomatic fact, like the fact that something exists. Proof
is not even theoretically possible without assuming it. It's required as an
implicit assumption merely to be *conscious*.
>Bertvan
> >>I do not state that materialism "is
> >>false". I do not state that free will exists. I merely say that IF free
> >>will exists, it is unpredictable.
>
>Chris
> >Again, *why* must it be unpredictable if it exists?
>
>Bertvan:
>Because any action which is the inevitable result of causal factors is not
>free will. No real choice is made.
Chris
How is it not a *real* choice if it is deterministic? For decades now, this
has been a big mystery to me. How is a choice made on the basis of what one
understands the situation to be not a real choice?
Chris
> >I assume you mean *your* imagination? Let us suppose you had some *other*
> >kind of free will. Suppose you are faced with choosing between A and not-A
> >as an action and some other action (or inaction). Suppose, in your
> >understanding, A is what you would rationally choose to do, because all the
> >not-A actions that you can think of mean the deaths of everyone you love.
> >Suppose, for reasons that are not significant here, you are faced with this
> >same kind of choice several times in succession. Mostly, you choose
> >correctly, and everything turns out alright. The lives of those you love
> >are saved.
>
> >But, because you have *indeterministic* free will, you are free to choose
> >some not-A course of action, and, one time, despite knowing how bad it is,
> >your free will leads you to choose a not-A action and all of your loved
> >ones are killed.
>
>Bertvan:
>Your example leaves little room for real choice. As you say "mostly you
>choose correctly and everything turns out alright". (With terms like "choose
>correctly" and "everything turns our alright" you are flirting with giving
>nature moral values.) However, instead of your example, what about a choice
>of saving someone you love at the expense of hundreds who would die? That
>would offer a real choice. (If the answer seems obvious to you, how about
>saving someone you love at the expense of three who would die?)
Chris
How is this example even *slightly* better than mine? Obviously, if two
alternatives are so close to being equal in one's understanding that one
cannot rate one above the other, *then* no real choice is possible, because
one might just as well flip a coin. Free will can be significant only if
there is some significant relative difference in the values involved in the
alternatives. One must be choosing between a higher and a relatively lower
value, or choice becomes essentially meaningless. If it is meaningless, it
simply doesn't *matter* if its deterministic or not. On the other hand, if
the differences in the alternatives are significant, then choice is
meaningful. But then indeterminism would be the *last* thing one would
want; one would want *always* to choose the best course one could see as
available.
So, you get a choice ( :-) ) between free will in cases where it can
*only* lead you to choose wrongly (as far as you are concerned), and
determinism that enables you to always choose correctly (as far as you are
concerned). Which do *you* choose?
That's right. You *don't* choose. You have beliefs, and either you think
they are true, in which case you don't choose them (you believe them
because you think they are true), or you decide they are possibly or likely
false, in which case you *also* don't choose them (you reject them because
you think they are possibly or likely false).
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