Re: Pascal's wager (was ID *does* require a designer! (but it does not need to identify who ...)

From: Stephen E. Jones (sejones@iinet.net.au)
Date: Thu Nov 16 2000 - 21:45:31 EST

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    Reflectorites

    On Tue, 31 Oct 2000 13:58:59 -0600, Chris Cogan wrote:

    [...]

    >SJ>As Pascal pointed out, when two ultimate positions are equally
    >>unresolvable by rational argument *alone* then the truly rational thing to do
    >>is embrace the position that yields the greatest benefit and avoids the
    >>greatest loss:
    >
    >"Let us then examine this point, and let us say: 'Either God is or he
    >is not.' But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot
    >decide this question. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of
    >this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come down
    >heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you
    >choose either, reason cannot prove either wrong. Do not then
    >condemn as wrong those who have made a choice, for you know
    >nothing about it. 'No, but I will condemn them not for having made
    >this particular choice, but any choice, for, although the one who
    >calls heads and the other one are equally at fault, the fact is that
    >they are both at fault: the right thing is not to wager at all.' Yes, but
    >you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed.
    >Which will you choose then? Let us see: since a choice must be
    >made, let us see which offers you the least interest. You have two
    >things to lose: the true and the good; and two things to stake: your
    >reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your
    >nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Since you
    >must necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by
    >choosing one rather than the other. That is one point cleared up.
    >But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved
    >in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you
    >win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing." (Pascal B.,
    >"Pensees," [1670], Penguin, 1966, p.122)

    CC>Stephen's claim is only true (if at all) when there *are* "two ultimate
    >positions that are equally unresolvable by rational argument alone." There
    >are two problems: You have yet to show that your position is ultimate. You
    >are simply *asserting* that it is, probably because you know damn well that
    >it is rationally unsupportable.

    Pascal's argument was not meant to be a full-blown philosophical
    argument for the existence of God:

            "Sometimes Pascal's teaching is classified as voluntarism, the
            implication being that he sets greater store by the will than by the
            intellect .... But this is a caricature. It neglects to mention that the
            idea of the wager was addressed to the sporting men of the day,
            reminding them of a greats game played at infinitely greater odds. It
            does not take into account the fact that Pascal devoted a great deal
            of energy to rational argument." (Brown C., "Philosophy and the
            Christian Faith," 1969, pp.59-60)

    He is simply starting with the self-evident claim that "Either [the Christian]
    God is or he is not."

    CC>"Pascal's Wager" situations rarely occur (if ever) in philosophy.

    So what? Pascal's Wager was not intended to be a philosophical argument
    but a common-sense challenge to his fellow citizens of Port Royal, who
    were renowned gamblers.

    I personally thought of a version of Pascal's Wager ("either Christianity is
    true or it is not...") soon after I became a Christian, long before I heard of
    Pascal's version. It is the sort of everyday, common-sense, practical
    reasoning that ordinary people use in judging the comparative benefits and
    risks of alternative outcomes. It is the sort of reasoning that prudent
    businessmen use in risk management.

    CC>Pascal's entire line of argument in this regard is
    >unsound because it, itself, if it is assumed to be valid, *creates* just
    >such a situation, and one that cannot be resolved by his method.

    Disagree. IMHO it is sound, but simplified for the laymen he addressed it
    to. It could have been fleshed out, but Pascal's Pensees are just outline
    notes that he made which would have been part of a full-blown work on
    apologetics. But Pascal died when he was 39:

            "Blaise Pascal (1623-62). Having come to a personal faith in Christ
            in 1654, Pascal had planned to write a defense of the Christian faith
            entitled L'Apologie de la religion chretienne, but he died of a
            debilitating disease at the age of only 39 years, leaving behind
            hundreds of notes for the work, which were then published
            posthumously as the Pensees." (Craig W.L., "Reasonable Faith,"
            1994, p.52).

    CC>That is,
    >Pascal's argument can be easily inverted to show that one should bet
    >*against* the existence of his God, because there is no apriori reason to
    >assume that *his* God is the one that exists if one does exist.

    This is just the other side of Pascal's wager. Chris, as an atheist, *is*, in
    effect, betting "*against* the existence of his" [Pascal's] "God".

    CC>The one
    >that exists might be one that tortures people for eternity

    See my comments to Susan about God not torturing people. I don't want to
    start two threads on the same topic, so I won't answer this point here.

    CC>for crimes of
    >stupidity such as using "Pascal's Wager" for justifying belief in God.

    No one is using Pascal's Wager "for justifying belief in God." Pascal is
    simply pointing out that those who deny the existence of the Christian God,
    are, in effect, betting their eternal destiny that He doesn't exist.

    CC>Pascal's method of resolving the conflict between two equally good ultimate
    >positions simply does not work. It's yet another excuse for irrational belief.

    Pascal is not proposing a "method of resolving the conflict between two
    equally good ultimate positions". He is simply pointing out that since both
    those who affirm and those who deny that the Christian God exists, cannot
    conclusively prove their position is true, those on each side must therefore,
    in effect, bet their lives on their respective position being true.

    When the Christian and non-Christian dies, if the Christian is wrong, both
    he and the non-Christian have gained nothing and lost nothing. But if the
    Christian is right, he will have gained everything and the non-Christian
    would have lost everything:

            "Pascal's wager. An argument for the rationality of believing in
            God, assuming that no satisfactory evidence is available. Pascal
            argues that the expected value of theistic belief is vastly greater
            than that of unbelief, since if one believes, and commits oneself to a
            life of faith in God etc., and it turns out to be true, then one wins an
            enormous good (Heaven etc.) . But if one believes, and it turns out
            to be false, then one has lost little, if anything. Therefore (unless the
            probability of God's existence is infinitesimal), it is rational to adopt
            theistic belief and the corresponding mode of life." (Mavrodes G.I.,
            "Pascal's wager," in Honderic T., ed., "The Oxford Companion to
            Philosophy," 1995, p.647).

    On Tue, 31 Oct 2000 23:48:17 -0600, Chris Cogan wrote:

    >>RKPascal's Wager urges people to believe in god so as to maximize the
    >>benefits to them
    >>and minimize the risks, as Stephen points out above. In other words, it's
    >>a spiritual
    >>insurance policy against a god who's into threats and punishments.

    On Tue, 31 Oct 2000 23:48:17 -0600, Chris Cogan wrote:

    >RK>Pascal's Wager urges people to believe in god so as to maximize the
    >>benefits to them
    >>and minimize the risks, as Stephen points out above. In other words, it's
    >>a spiritual
    >>insurance policy against a god who's into threats and punishments.

    This is an apt analogy.

    RK>This is surely one
    >>of the most cynical reasons for believing in a supernatural being that I
    >>have ever comeacross.

    Not really. It is just prudent common sense. Like an "insurance policy" is.

    RK>Following this line of reasoning it would be best to profess a
    >>belief in as many different deities as possible, so as to cover all the bases.

    No. Belief in "different deities" is in effect the same as betting that the
    Christian God is does not exist, i.e. that Christianity is not true.

    RK>I'm always surprised when
    >>religionists drag this bit of reasoning out.

    Maybe Ralph should pay a bit more attention to their arguments, instead of
    erecting a straw man?

    >CC>But, if they try to believe in as many as possible, the same reasoning
    >*also* requires them *not* to believe in *any* of them (since, for each
    >supposed God who might favor them for such belief, there would be its
    >negative, who would punish them for belief and reward only atheists, etc.).

    See above. The same goes for Chris. He and Ralph need to try to understand what Pascal
    meant in the 17th century context by:

            "Let us then examine this point, and let us say: 'Either God is or he is not.'" (Pascal B.,
            "Pensees," [1670], 1966, p.122)

    CC>And, what about all the *jealous* Gods (like the one of Christianity)? They
    >must believe in *all* of the jealous Gods, but each *exclusively.*

    See above. Neither Pascal, not me, nor Chris believe that there *are* any
    "*jealous* Gods (like the one of Christianity)".

    Belief in other Gods is therefore just the position that the Christian God
    does not exist.

    CC>It's surprising that Pascal did not grasp that his argument was
    >nonsensical.

    Pascal was a *genius*:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/5/0,5716,114515+1+108317,00.html

    [...]

    ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA

    Pascal, Blaise

    [...]

    b. June 19, 1623, Clermont-Ferrand, Fr.
    d. Aug. 19, 1662, Paris
    French mathematician, physicist, religious philosopher, and master of prose. He
    laid the foundation for the modern theory of probabilities, formulated what
    came to be known as Pascal's law of pressure ....Blaise proved himself no less
    precocious in mathematics. In 1640 he wrote an essay on conic sections, Essai
    pour les coniques, based on his study of the now classical work of Girard
    Desargues on synthetic projective geometry. The young man's work, which
    was highly successful in the world of mathematics, aroused the envy of no less
    a personage than the great French Rationalist and mathematician Ren,
    Descartes. Between 1642 and 1644, Pascal conceived and constructed a
    calculating device to help his father--who in 1639 had been appointed intendant
    (local administrator) at Rouen--in his tax computations. The machine was
    regarded by Pascal's contemporaries as his main claim to fame, and with
    reason, for in a sense it was the first digital calculator
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    So maybe it is *Chris* who does not grasp what Pascal's argument was?

    CC>Stephen's use of it is, sadly, not surprising, because he has
    >almost no critical faculties at all with respect to arguments which, *if*
    >they were sound, would at least appear to support his beliefs. His critical
    >thinking faculties, such as they are, at least on this list, are restricted
    >almost exclusively in their application to arguments that appear to
    >*oppose* his views.

    This is Chris' usual resort to ad hominems when his arguments fail!

    On Wed, 1 Nov 2000 09:55:41 -0000, Richard Wein wrote:

    [...]

    >RW>The reasons I reject Pascal's wager are the following:
    >>
    >>1. My personal assessment is that the likelihood of Stephen's dogma (that
    >>there is a God who will condemn non-believers to eternal torment) being true
    >>is zero.

    Richard has therefore made his wager!

    RW>Why should I believe such an absurd thing?

    Richard *presumes* it is "an absurd thing" because he does not believe the
    Christian God exists. But if he can assume for the sake of argument that
    the Christian God (a God of perfect justice) does exist, what is Richard's
    alternative?

    RW>It's clearly just a
    >>threat which has been added to a religious belief for the purpose of scaring
    >>potential recruits and wavering adherents.

    Not really. First, Christian preachers (and indeed the Bible writers) rarely
    use the threat of Hell for "for the purpose of scaring potential recruits and
    wavering adherents." Preaching the love of God is more effective and long-
    lasting than fear.

    But second, the real issue is not whether "the threat of Hell is sometimes
    used "for the purpose of scaring potential recruits and wavering adherents"
    but whether it is *true*. There is no doubt that the Bible clearly teaches
    that "there is a God who will condemn non-believers to eternal torment".

    RW>Would Stephen accept that the
    >>Earth is flat if I said: "Accept that the Earth is flat or the Boogeyman
    >>will get you"? Does Stephen accept the threats of other religions? No, of
    >>course not.

    Richard is quite right about the "of course not". But I have good *reasons*
    to believe that Christianity is true and therefore "other religions" are false,
    and so I regard their "threats" as just as powerless as "the Boogeyman".

    >RW>2. Stephen's dogma is inconsistent with the major claim of Christianity that
    >>God is good.

    Actually it is not. There is no single "major claim of Christianity". There are
    major *claims* of Christianity that God is *both* infinitely good and
    infinitely just. If man rejects God's goodness then God's justice demands
    that such rejection be punished.

    RW>A being who could condemn people to eternal torment just for
    >>not believing in him, especially when he gives no clear evidence of his
    >>existence, would be utterly evil.

    That would be true if there were "no clear evidence of his existence." But
    the Bible claims that *everyone* is aware that God exists, but they try to
    suppress that truth (see Romans 1:18ff).

    The problem is that atheists like Richard reject all such "evidence"
    including personally attacking those who would help them see it.

    RW>Even if I believed in a god, I would not
    >>believe a dogma that contained such a massive self-contradiction.

    There is no "self-contradiction" at all.

    >RW>3. Belief is not entirely a matter of conscious choice. (Though we can
    >>perhaps consciously influence our beliefs to some extent.) Even if I
    >>was scared enough to want to believe in God, that doesn't mean I would
    >>necessarily be able to do so. And presumably just going through the motions
    >>of worshipping such an evil God would not satisfy him.

    Richard's mistake here is thinking that he is good and that God is "evil".
    The Bible says it is the other way around.

    >RW>4. I don't think that believing Stephen's dogma when it's false is only
    a
    >>"very mild bad". If this is really the only life that I have, I don't want
    >>to waste it on a lie.

    Another of Richard's mistakes is to think that "this this is really the only life
    that I have". But this is his wager, on which he bets his life.

    >RW>I suspect that Stephen and his ilk are very embarrassing to the many
    >>reasonable, respectable Christians in the world who do not resort to
    >>pseudoscience and threats to support their beliefs.

    What Richard calls "reasonable, respectable Christians in the world" are
    presumably also, according to him, massively deluded too.

    Besides, what evidence has Richard got that the majority of Christians do
    not believe what I believe? There are no doubt some liberal Christians (like
    the "bishop below) who don't believe in Hell (or even in Heaven) but
    presumably Richard would agree that they are inconsistent Christians?

    There is no doubt that Jesus and the Apostles taught that "there is a God
    who will condemn non-believers to eternal torment". Therefore, those
    "reasonable, respectable Christians in the world" who deny that are simply
    not being honest with themselves or those unbelievers they are saying it to.

    It would be more honest for them to be like Richard and say they don't
    believe that Christianity is true, than to say that they only believe those
    parts of Christianity they like.

    >RW>I was impressed by a bishop who appeared on a television discussion
    >>programme recently and said straight out that he did not accept the truth of
    >>everything in the Bible, and that he would not want to worship any God who
    >>did all the things attributed to him in the Bible.

    Then why is he still a "bishop"? If Jesus and the Apostles taught that "there
    is a God who will condemn non-believers to eternal torment", and this
    bishop doesn't believe them, then the honest thing for him to do, would be
    to resign his position and become an honest atheist. A bishop who claims
    to be a Christian but does not believe what Christ and the Apostles said is
    IMHO just taking money under false pretences.

    Is Richard more "impressed" by inconsistent hypocrites like Christian
    bishops who don't believe what Christ said but continue to live off the
    `spiritual capital' of Christianity, than by those ordinary Christians who seek
    to be consistent in following what Christ taught?

    Steve

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "Yes, but you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed.
    Which will you choose then? Let us see: since a choice must be made, let
    us see which offers you the least interest. You have two things to lose: the
    true and the good; and two things to stake: your reason and your will, your
    knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to avoid:
    error and wretchedness. Since you must necessarily choose, your reason is
    no more affronted by choosing one rather than the other. That is one point
    cleared up. But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss
    involved in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if
    you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing." (Pascal B.,
    "Pensees," [1670], Krailsheimer A.J., Transl., Penguin: London, Revised
    edition, 1966, p.123)
    Stephen E. Jones | Ph. +61 8 9448 7439 | http://www.iinet.net.au/~sejones
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------



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