Re: ID *does* require a designer! (but it does not need to identify who or what he/it is)

From: Chris Cogan (ccogan@telepath.com)
Date: Tue Oct 31 2000 - 14:58:59 EST

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    >One day Richard may realise that the real problem is not "rational
    >argument" but the ultimate *starting point* which must be *assumed*.
    >
    >Richard assumes there is no God and I assume there is. Neither of us can
    >prove by "rational argument" *alone* whose the ultimate starting point is
    >right.
    >
    >But if my ultimate starting point is right, then all Richard's "rational
    >arguments" after that are *wrong* and vice-versa.
    >
    >The only thing that we can both agree on is that if Richard is right and
    >I am wrong then the consequences for me are trivial-I would have had a full
    >and satisfying life.
    >
    >But OTOH if I am right and Richard is wrong then the consequences are
    >decidedly *non*-trivial for both of us!
    >
    >As Pascal pointed out, when two ultimate positions are equally
    >unresolvable by rational argument *alone* then the truly rational thing to do
    >is embrace the position that yields the greatest benefit and avoids the
    >greatest loss:

    "Let us then examine this point, and let us say: 'Either God is or he
    is not.' But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot
    decide this question. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of
    this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come down
    heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you
    choose either, reason cannot prove either wrong. Do not then
    condemn as wrong those who have made a choice, for you know
    nothing about it. 'No, but I will condemn them not for having made
    this particular choice, but any choice, for, although the one who
    calls heads and the other one are equally at fault, the fact is that
    they are both at fault: the right thing is not to wager at all.' Yes, but
    you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed.
    Which will you choose then? Let us see: since a choice must be
    made, let us see which offers you the least interest. You have two
    things to lose: the true and the good; and two things to stake: your
    reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your
    nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Since you
    must necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by
    choosing one rather than the other. That is one point cleared up.
    But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved
    in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you
    win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing." (Pascal B.,
    "Pensees," [1670], Penguin, 1966, p.122)

    Stephen's claim is only true (if at all) when there *are* "two ultimate
    positions that are equally unresolvable by rational argument alone." There
    are two problems: You have yet to show that your position is ultimate. You
    are simply *asserting* that it is, probably because you know damn well that
    it is rationally unsupportable. "Pascal's Wager" situations rarely occur
    (if ever) in philosophy. Pascal's entire line of argument in this regard is
    unsound because it, itself, if it is assumed to be valid, *creates* just
    such a situation, and one that cannot be resolved by his method. That is,
    Pascal's argument can be easily inverted to show that one should bet
    *against* the existence of his God, because there is no apriori reason to
    assume that *his* God is the one that exists if one does exist. The one
    that exists might be one that tortures people for eternity for crimes of
    stupidity such as using "Pascal's Wager" for justifying belief in God.
    Pascal's method of resolving the conflict between two equally good ultimate
    positions simply does not work. It's yet another excuse for irrational belief.



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