>>
>> >This is a too-brief exposition of material from a larger essay that I have
>> >not yet typed from my notebook. It is not about ID as such, nor even merely
>> >supernaturalistic ID as such, but it deals with and is relevant to both.
>> >
>> >Problems with Supernaturalism
>> >
>> >I think it would be good to eliminate a lot of the confusion and silliness
>> >from the debate over ID. To promote this goal, I propose that we eliminate
>> >references to supernatural designers and methodologically assume that
>> >*only* naturalistic designers (i.e., aliens, etc.) be considered as
>> >possible intelligent designers. That is, ID proponents should propose
>> >naturalistic designers with sufficient definition to be meaningfully
>> >identified if we happen to run into them, and that ID proponents *drop* the
>> >Rationalistic attempt to define design without respect to the nature of the
>> >designer, in the lame *hope* that somehow, if design is ever discovered, it
>> >can be attributed to a supernatural being.
>>[...]
>>Richard
>>Chris, I fail to see why IDers should accept this suggestion. They claim
>>that they have a method of detecting ID without regard to the nature of the
>>designer, be he natural or supernatural. They are therefore under no
>>obligation to differentiate between natural and supernatural designers. What
>>they *are* under an obligation to do (but have failed to do) are the
>>following:
>>
>>
>>1. Define what they mean by ID.
>>2. Establish that their methods can do what they're claimed to do.
>>3. Cease to claim that mainstream scientists reject ID a priori because they
>>have a philosophical objection to supernatural explanations. (They may have
>>such an objection, but, since ID does not necessarily involve the
>>supernatural, the argument is a non sequitur.)
>
>Chris
>Well, if they would define what they mean by ID in terms that were
>demonstrably sound and empirically testable, that would be fine. But, as
>long as they are trying to sneak supernaturalism in, they can't very well
>do that because supernaturalism has no empirically testable distinguishing
>features. The moment it becomes testable, it's no longer supernaturalistic
>ID. That is, the moment they define ID well enough to make it empirically
>meaningful, it loses any need for a supernatural designer. Mike Gene's
>"Paleyian designer" is a case in point. It supposedly has empirical
>implications, but in taking them on, it loses its supernaturalism. It
>becomes merely *any* being(s) who can design life as we have found it, who
>can manipulate molecules in the right ways.
I guess I don't see why this would be such a problem for ID, Chris. You're
saying that a supernatural agency leaves no empirically testable
distinguishing
features. If any such features are found, it automatically, by definition,
makes
the agency non-supernatural. I agree but I don't see why IDers would feel
compelled to accept such a definition. To paraphrase Steve: ID is about
design, not the designer. Also, I think at least some IDers are banking
on the
idea that, if design is ever validated, most non-scientists (read "the
public") will
equate design with "god did it" and never mind the nuances of ID theory.
ralph
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Oct 17 2000 - 17:36:25 EDT