At 01:31 PM 7/25/00 -0400, Steve wrote:
>On Wed, 19 Jul 2000 09:34:28 -0400 "Howard J. Van Till"
><hvantill@novagate.com> writes:
>
> > Please read my chapter in Lamoureux's book. I will be away from my
> > computer for most of the next two weeks, but hope that you will respond
> > to the views I expressed there.
> >
> > Howard Van Till
>
>Dr. Van Till, I did not realize you were part of this list. Seems like
>there are many well-educated persons here.
>This is refreshing compared
>to other lists, but it also makes me feel somewhat out of place. I don't
>quite know what I can say about your views that you haven't already
>probably heard. But since you requested a response, I will add my humble
>two cents to the matter.
>
>I would like to say that I thoroughly enjoyed your chapter. Because of
>my ultra-conservative background, I had a tendency to dismiss TE outright
>without giving it any kind of examination. We tended to look at such
>people as "heretics." But after reading your chapter as well as what
>other TE's had to say in the book, I was pleasantly surprised at your
>theological orthodoxy. I do have a few comments on how you look at
>science through your theological-philosophical framework.
>
>I make a basic distinction between what science "ought" to do and what
>science "can" do. I agree with the mainstream scientific community that
>science should be limited to the study of the natural, material universe.
> This is true partly by sheer definition of "science" and partly by
>convenience and expedience due to our limitations. We humans simply
>cannot deal with the non-natural in a controlled, testable environment
>that science requires. And so, because it make things easier on us,
>science "ought" to seek natural explanations and causes for natural
>phenomena.
>
>But the key, operating word here is "ought." Science strives to
>understand physical phenomena through natural processes, but there is NO
>a priori guarantee that any given phenomenon "can" be explained
>naturally. Because of its stringent requirements of testability,
>repeatability, and verifiability, scientists should seek physical causes,
>but "ought" does not necessarily imply "can." Science is a method with
>its own set of rules for investigation, but it is impossible for this
>method to grant epistemological certainty to the investigator that
>whatever he/she is examining can be fully elucidated through solely
>natural explanations. Such certainty is, by the very nature of the
>process, a posteriori not a priori. It comes only after natural causes
>have been discovered.
>
>Here is my opinion on the essence of naturalism: at its heart is the
>belief that all natural phenomena CAN be explained (not merely ought to
>be explained) by appeal to physical processes and causes. As I already
>said, this idea of science as certainly -- not just possibly --
>explaining all things in the Universe is not due to any guarantee found
>in the scientific method itself. Science's rules of "ought" do not
>automatically provide a self-guarantee that it "can."
>
>This distinction may sound strange to scientists, and they may be
>inclined to dismiss it as just a bunch of semantics. However, it is not
>at all strange to the mathematician. Ask any mathematician if she
>"ought" to answer all number theoretic questions using the standard
>mathematical method of logically deducing theorems from a set of axioms.
>Her answer will be, "Of course." But then ask her if she "can" solve all
>such questions through this method. She will reply, "No way. Kurt Godel
>proved in his incompleteness theorems over 60 years ago that such is not
>possible. Undecidable propositions always exist within any axiomatic
>system that includes simple arithmetic properties."
>
>Therefore, at least in some cases, the difference between "ought" and
>"can" is non-trivial. A particular discipline may have its rules of
>investigation, but this is no guarantee that those rules will ultimately
>answer any given question concerning that discipline. We are thus
>confronted with an odd sort of arrangement: while a field of study
>"ought" to follow a certain method, it is not necessarily true that it
>"can" do so in all instances.
Hi Steve,
Up to this point I agree almost 100%. What you have described, without
actually using the term, is Methodological Naturalism. Further, the other
extreme, where science CAN, often goes by the name Scientism.
Scientism is, I believe, fairly rare (with some really notable and famous
exceptions). There are many philosophical naturalists that recognize the
limits of science and of human reason.
For this reason I think much of what follows is a strawman.
Before I go on, let me ask a question. I really liked your example of
undecidability in mathematics. I have used the same example myself
except that I use Chaitin instead of Godel. Not to slight Godel :), its
just I'm more familiar with Chaitin.
Toward the end of your essay you write about scientific undecidables
fitting more easily into a theistic interpretation. Using undecidability in
mathematics as our analogy, I'm wondering how this can be? Well,
its clear that many will take it that way of course. What I'm questioning
is the logic. Do you think mathematicians should interpret undecidability
theistically? Are undecidable propositions intelligently designed?
Chaitin showed that there are mathematical facts that are true for no
reason. Do we say "There is randomness in mathematics, therefore
God exists." ?
No, undecidable means undecidable. Even if you could show that the
origin of life is undecidable it does give even the slightest argument
in favor of ID. Hey, even Fats Waller understood this point. (see my
sig) :)
Later in your essay you try to defend ID's inability to come up with a
theory. But if they do not, then what does ID have to offer? It cannot
be undecidability, since this has nothing to do with ID. Further,
none of the insurmountable difficulties that you mention wrt the origin of
life have, almost without exception, been discovered by an ID researcher.
Of course, anyone has the right to challenge scientific theories without
introducing their own. But the goals of the ID movement are broader
than that. For example, later you talk about ID supplanting the present
paradigm.
[...]
>To be honest, I do not understand why TE's such as yourself should be so
>opposed to this conclusion. The seven reasons you list in favor of TE do
>not seem to explain TE's vigorous conflict with even the mere possibility
>of undecidables within the scientific method.
I cannot speak for other TE's of course, but I fully expect that there will be
many undecidables in science. I expect though that science may be different
from mathematics in that it may not be possible decide whether something
is undecidable. :)
"It is not certain that all is uncertain, to the glory of skepticism." --
Pascal
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Mechanical Engineering
The Ohio State University
"One never knows, do one?"
-- Fats Waller
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Jul 28 2000 - 11:47:29 EDT