Thanks for the -very- thoughtful comments. I think you raise some
legitimate concerns in a very considerate way.
>
> It might be the case that if one starts with a premise grounded in
> "materialism, determinism and atheism," that one will reach a conclusion
> that "free will" ought to be rejected. But it is a fallacy to assume that
> it may then also work the other way around -- that doubts about
> "free will"
> imply a commitment to "materialism, determinism and atheism." It
> ain't so.
I agree completely. Many Calvinists are determinists, e.g. And many others
who see (erroneously, I think) the only alternative to determinism wrt
action to be randomness. (That may be the only scientifically viable
alternative, right now anyway; but philosophically other options are open, a
point on which Calvinists agree, at least wrt God.)
> You seem to equate "free will" with some human power to choose (please
> correct me if I am wrong). But reducing freedom to choice doesn't appear
> to be adequate. If a robber sticks a gun in my side and barks,
> "Your money
> or your life," I may have a choice, but that hardly seems like a suitable
> moment to congratulate myself on my freedom. When the doctor comes in and
> says "I'm sorry, but you have only six weeks to live," I may choose to
> greet that news with faith and fortitude, or with grief and
> bitterness; but
> if I were truly "free," I would have chosen not to get sick in the first
> place. It appears that all of our choices are presented under rather
> closely constrained sets of circumstances which, well, "determine" the
> scope of our choosing. In a common sense sort of way, this is certainly
> what I experience when I make a choice. But it's not what most
> people mean
> by "freedom." Maybe that's why, when it comes to accepting or rejecting
> God, Jesus pointedly told his disciples, "You have not chosen me, but I
> have chosen you" (John 15:16).
Versus many existentialists, I agree with you completely that our freedom
(if any, let's say) operates within many strong constraints. I think no
choice of ours is "100% free", that is, pure choice unaffected by anything
else. I don't know how that could be, given that we're embodied creatures
living in this universe.
> The Christian tradition does not endorse the notion that we are free to
> "choose good or evil." That presumes our will, or whatever our
> choice-making faculty might be, is uncorrupted by sin. Such a
> position was
> rejected by Paul, Augustine, and the bulk of the Reformers.
> There are some
> modern theologies that claim the will is unencumbered by sin, but that's
> not the traditional view. These modern theologies are largely concerned
> with moral conduct, and so a "free will" seems an indispensible component
> of human nature. Which leads me to my second observation.
>
I would argue that a will can be encumbered by sin (and other constraints)
and yet retain -some- freedom.
> On Saturday, July 10, John E. Rylander wrote:
>
> >Because determinism says that all of our actions are determined without
> >remainder by factors completely beyond our control. It's not
> possible that
> >we be morally responsible for actions that are completely determined by
> >things beyond our control.
>
> There seems to be a common presumption among Christians that, when God
> created the cosmos, he also created human beings with "free
> will." He must
> have, because without free will, we cannot be held responsible for what we
> do; and if we cannot be held responsible for what we do, then we
> cannot say
> that anything we do is genuinely right or wrong; and if we cannot say that
> what we do is right or wrong, we cannot form moral judgments or sustain
> ethical norms. And moral judgments and ethical norms are what we are
> really interested in. And so, we reason backwards, from an
> initial concern
> for moral conduct back to a doctrine of God as Creator, and the way God
> must have arranged things at the beginning.
I agree that this is often -one- of the reasons people believe in free
choice, the other even more obvious one just being naive but strong personal
experience.
> As a result (or so
> it seems to
> me), we do one of two things. We discount any idea that the universe is
> determined in its character, including even the kind of causal
> determination that is implicit in the modern scientific method (as I read
> Bertvan, this looks like one aspect of his argument).
Just to retain scientific clarity, let's mention again that on the most
common interpretation of quantum mechanics, science is no longer
deterministic, except in a probabilistic, quantum-state sense. (Though a
very distinguished minority of physicists hold to a deterministic
interpretation of quantum mechanics.)
Still, since, again on the most common model, what leads to indeterminism
is not free choice but simple randomness, this doesn't obviously help the
free will advocate, in that it still excludes responsible choice, even while
excluding ultimate determinism as well.
> Or, alternately, we
> resign the physical universe to causal determinism, but retain "free will"
> as a pure intellectual power. Out in the world things are determined, but
> inside our minds we are free. This was Kant's solution. But of
> course, it
> presents us with the awkward problem that moral *conduct* goes on in the
> physical world, and so is subject to determinism, and not to "free will."
> It also leaves us with a picture of God as a Creator who placed
> "free will"
> in our minds, but left us in moral bondage whenever we try to function in
> the external world.
I think these are legitimate concerns. Right now, the idea that the human
mind is reducible to the brain material as we currently understand matter is
more of a methodological assumption than an evidenced conclusion. But while
I think there are extremely grave objections to materialism as the truth
rather than as a methodology (if for a moment we let "materialism" function
as a good enough substitute for "naturalism"), let me also add that I see no
PRACTICALLY, SCIENTIFICALLY better model for the mind right now. Something
else is the truth, but we don't have anywhere nearly good enough a handle on
that truth to turn it into a positive scientific research program, versus a
substantial, even (I think) compelling philosophical critique.
So alethically, i.e., wrt truth, I find a materialistic view of mind sadly
deficient, unless we substantially redefine "mind" or at least
"consciousness", in which case we've simply ducked the issue, or unless we
substantially redefine "materialism" (which I suspect people might do next
century, but that's just sheer speculation).
But pragmatically, i.e., wrt action (I hope you know I'm spelling this out
for others, not you!), I think -science- right now needs to remain
materialistic until something PRACTICALLY better comes along, if ever.
Back to your point: since I don't see current scientific methodological
assumptions as being the last word on the truth of the matter, I do not see
a fundamental problem here.
> I realize that these comments represent largely philosophical
> concerns, and
> may seem off-center for this list. But I am deeply puzzled by many of the
> concepts of "creator" we have foisted off on God in our efforts to satisfy
> our desire for a morally orderly cosmos. And I sometimes detect ideas
> about God that have been wrought from such an enterprise being imposed on
> scientific methodology and practice.
>
> Tom Pearson
As soon as we get complaints, we can take it off list. Until then, we can
continue our quest to impose clarity and rigor on the barbaric masses! :^>
More seriously, -I- at least don't see many methodological or directly
scientific implications in my points here. Indeed, the origin of this
discussion was at least in part the issues relating to methodological versus
metaphysical naturalism (former good, latter bad), along with my wanting to
deal with some of the claims Chris was making about Christianity versus
various aspects of naturalism.
I haven't really discussed the more explicitly doctrinal issues you raised
(e.g., what Paul or various theologians thought) -- not sure I have time
right now, though they're extremely worthy and weighty issues.
Vaguely along these lines, let me mention one more thing: when I say that I
think moral responsibility and freedom are incompatible with determinism,
that it's not possible that one be free and responsible and also completely
determined by factors beyond one's control, I don't mean at all that anyone
who disagrees with me is a fool or anything like that. I mean that I think
there is a contradiction there; but I can -certainly- imagine being wrong.
(But then, I have a vivid imagination. ;^> )
John