Thanks Tom. A reminder to all of us not to become simplistic when
discussing complex issues. I do agree that free will is greatly limited.
But that it exists at all is what is significant. By exercising whatever
portion of free will we each posess, we can each change the universe a tiny
bit--and isn't that awesome???
Bertvan
At 02:09 PM 07/10/1999 -0500, John E. Rylander wrote (regarding the
discussion of materialism, determinism and free will):
>Finally, I think this discussion is importantly but indirectly related to
>creation, evolution, and Christianity.
I agree, John. In that spirit, I'd like to offer a reflection on a couple
of comments from you and Bertvan.
On Friday, July 9, Bertvan wrote:
>I've often talked with people who believed "free will" was an illusion, that
>our actions were the result of physiology and environmental conditioning.
>Until now, all those arguing such a position were admitted materialists and
>atheists. In fact, rejection of free will seems to me the only logical
>conclusion of materialism, determinism and atheism. However I thought
>Christians were supposedly free to choose God or reject him, to choose good
>or evil.
It might be the case that if one starts with a premise grounded in
"materialism, determinism and atheism," that one will reach a conclusion
that "free will" ought to be rejected. But it is a fallacy to assume that
it may then also work the other way around -- that doubts about "free will"
imply a commitment to "materialism, determinism and atheism." It ain't so.
You seem to equate "free will" with some human power to choose (please
correct me if I am wrong). But reducing freedom to choice doesn't appear
to be adequate. If a robber sticks a gun in my side and barks, "Your money
or your life," I may have a choice, but that hardly seems like a suitable
moment to congratulate myself on my freedom. When the doctor comes in and
says "I'm sorry, but you have only six weeks to live," I may choose to
greet that news with faith and fortitude, or with grief and bitterness; but
if I were truly "free," I would have chosen not to get sick in the first
place. It appears that all of our choices are presented under rather
closely constrained sets of circumstances which, well, "determine" the
scope of our choosing. In a common sense sort of way, this is certainly
what I experience when I make a choice. But it's not what most people mean
by "freedom." Maybe that's why, when it comes to accepting or rejecting
God, Jesus pointedly told his disciples, "You have not chosen me, but I
have chosen you" (John 15:16).
The Christian tradition does not endorse the notion that we are free to
"choose good or evil." That presumes our will, or whatever our
choice-making faculty might be, is uncorrupted by sin. Such a position was
rejected by Paul, Augustine, and the bulk of the Reformers. There are some
modern theologies that claim the will is unencumbered by sin, but that's
not the traditional view. These modern theologies are largely concerned
with moral conduct, and so a "free will" seems an indispensible component
of human nature. Which leads me to my second observation.
On Saturday, July 10, John E. Rylander wrote:
>Because determinism says that all of our actions are determined without
>remainder by factors completely beyond our control. It's not possible that
>we be morally responsible for actions that are completely determined by
>things beyond our control.
There seems to be a common presumption among Christians that, when God
created the cosmos, he also created human beings with "free will." He must
have, because without free will, we cannot be held responsible for what we
do; and if we cannot be held responsible for what we do, then we cannot say
that anything we do is genuinely right or wrong; and if we cannot say that
what we do is right or wrong, we cannot form moral judgments or sustain
ethical norms. And moral judgments and ethical norms are what we are
really interested in. And so, we reason backwards, from an initial concern
for moral conduct back to a doctrine of God as Creator, and the way God
must have arranged things at the beginning. As a result (or so it seems to
me), we do one of two things. We discount any idea that the universe is
determined in its character, including even the kind of causal
determination that is implicit in the modern scientific method (as I read
Bertvan, this looks like one aspect of his argument). Or, alternately, we
resign the physical universe to causal determinism, but retain "free will"
as a pure intellectual power. Out in the world things are determined, but
inside our minds we are free. This was Kant's solution. But of course, it
presents us with the awkward problem that moral *conduct* goes on in the
physical world, and so is subject to determinism, and not to "free will."
It also leaves us with a picture of God as a Creator who placed "free will"
in our minds, but left us in moral bondage whenever we try to function in
the external world.
I realize that these comments represent largely philosophical concerns, and
may seem off-center for this list. But I am deeply puzzled by many of the
concepts of "creator" we have foisted off on God in our efforts to satisfy
our desire for a morally orderly cosmos. And I sometimes detect ideas
about God that have been wrought from such an enterprise being imposed on
scientific methodology and practice.
Tom Pearson
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