>
> I remember when Freudians proved that traumatic childhoods
> produced "damaged" adults. Psychiatrists invariably found what they were
> looking for.
>
Of course, what you mean is that psychologists assumed that EVERY traumatic
childhood ALWAYS produced "damaged" adults. I would dispute that was true,
but it would be a useless arguement. The point is that psychologists have
shown that, all else being equal, a traumatic childhood does have a tendency
to produce "damaged" adults. The connection is not absolute, but it does
exist. Psychology may not be a hard science, but it is not as subjective as
you characterize it.
>
> I accept that bacteria and protists *generally* respond to
> external environmental signals. I wonder if those measurements are
precise
> enough to eliminate all possibility of spontaneity.
>
It would be impossible to eliminate all alternative possibilities, so
scientists concentrate on evidence and probabilities. For example, one
cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that the sun will rise out of the
west tomorrow morning, but all the evidence we have tells us that such an
event is highly improbable. So, is there evidence of spontaneity in the
actions of bacteria and protists? So far, the answer to that question is no.
As such, how probable is it that an anomalous experimental result is due to
spontaneity and not some kind of error? For the time being, that probability
is considered to be insignificant.
>
> Science has discovered
> general causal relationships. Are those relationships absolute?
>
By definition no theory is absolute, but as long as the evidence demonstrates
that the alternative explanations are highly improbable, it will be
considered as close to absolute as it is possible for science to get.
>
> How does science explain the exceptions?
>
Generally by modifying the theory to show that in fact they are not
exceptions.
>
> Kevin:
> >That's just the point, though. Chris' protocol is theoretically
feasible;
> >whether it >will ever be practically feasible is another matter. Being
> >theoretically feasible, >however, there is no _a priori_ reason why we
> >should not expect it to work.
>
> Bertvan:
> There is no _a priori_ reason to expect determinism to be true--or false.
>
But I'm not talking about determinism in this instance. I am talking about
whether a stated protocol is theoretically feasible for investigating a
specific question. Chris' protocol is entirely feasible; whether it will
produce the answer he is looking for is a different question.
>
> Martialists apparently believe every event has a direct, material,
> measurable, predictable cause.
>
The way you have stated it is the belief of philosophical materialism, since
you make no distinction between physical events and non-physical events. On
top of that philosophical naturalism assumes that all events are physical
events; that is, there are no non-physical events. Methodological
materialism/naturalism simply acknowledges that physical events are all that
science can investigate, and that "direct, material, measurable, predictable
causes" are the only way science can explain physical events.
>
> Nothing happens without a cause. Am I correct?
>
Don't you believe that? Even miracles have causes; even free will is a
cause. The question is, what kind of cause is the most probable? If a
rubber ball sitting on a table suddenly jumped straight up in the air, what
would you say is the most probable cause? Some hidden mechanism? The atoms
in the tabletop hitting the ball simultaneously with enough force to move it?
God mischieviously gave it a nudge? The ball just suddenly decided on the
spur of the moment to start bouncing? Most people would assume that even
possibilities two and three were much more probable than possibility four.
Science simply chooses to restrict itself to one narrow set of causes; in
doing so, it is not saying that those are the only possible causes, only that
from the evidence they are the most probable.
>
> Is that a law of nature or a law articulated by man in order to
> condense nature into something comprehensible to the human mind?
>
I would say both. It certainly began as a way to better comprehend nature,
but so far there is no evidence that contradicts it. Just as with the
conservation laws: we cannot prove they are true, but there is no evidence
that contradicts them either.
>
> Or is it a
> claim by science that nothing shall exist which science can't explain.
>
That is a claim of the philosophy of scientism; it is not a fundamental
assumption of science. Science allows for the existence of phenomena that it
cannot explain; it simply chooses not to go looking for them.
>
> Kevin:
> >Again, that's just the point. Science is defined by the method it uses,
> >which is in turn defined by its underlying assumptions. One of those
> >assumptions is methodological determinism. No scientist is required to
> >believe in philosophical determinism (I certainly do not), but to be a
> >working scientist he must accept that one of the assumptions of science
is
> >that specific physical events have specific physical causes that can in
> >principle be investigated and eventually understood. To reject this is
in
> >essence to reject the scientific method.
>
> Bertvan:
> I thought methodological naturalism meant that measurable, physical causes
> were all science could address.
>
Yes, that is correct, which is a more specific way of saying what I said
above.
>
> To state that "specific physical events have specific physical causes that
> can in principle be investigated and eventually understood." is
philosophical
> naturalism.
>
No, it isn't. Philosophical naturalism says that all events are physical
events and that all physical events must have mechanistic causes. What I
said was **specific** physical events. I did not say that the only events
were physical events, nor did I say all physical events. By using the term
specific I was referring to the select group of events that science has
chosen to investigate, and I did not imply that these were the only events
that existed.
>
> You say it is merely an assumption scientists
> must make in order to do science. Why should scientists be forced to make
a
> possibly false assumption?
>
Because there is no evidence to contradict it, and lots of evidence that
suggests it is not false. Besides, scientists make all kinds of assumptions
that may be false in order to have a way of comprehending nature, and they
"codify" it into the scientific method so that all scientific research can be
compared. It can be difficult enough when six labs all do the same
experiment and get six different results, without each lab also using its own
set of fundamental assumptions. It's the same reason why scientists all use
the same nomenclature and the same experimental protocols: it is a way of
standardizing the research so the results can be understood and trusted by
all.
>
> Perhaps scientists could be more productive if
> they weren't forced to make this assumption.
>
I tend to doubt it, considering that one cannot test -- let alone prove -- a
hypothesis that does not assume a specific, measureable, physical cause. It
is difficult enough to demonstrate what motivates people; how in Hades can
you demonstrate a paramecium turned left because it wanted to?
>
> I hope there are some
> scientists who assume there is more to nature than simplistic formulas
which
> appear to explain everything, and who are more interested in the
exceptions.
>
That actually describes the majority of scientists. The fun in science is
pursuing the unknowns, the contradictions, the exceptions, not in rehashing
the same old research done by countless others. It's also easier to make a
name for yourself that way. And you are more likely to get published and
funded.
>
> A scientist who is satisfied with "random mutation and natural selection"
> isn't likely to exert much energy looking for other explanations, is he?
>
That's part of human nature; it has nothing to do with "random mutation and
natural selection". However, there are scientists who are not satisfied and
are looking for other explanations, but they are still looking for natural,
mechanistic explanations rather than metaphysical explanations.
Kevin L. O'Brien