[...]
[continued]
>>JR>This would explain
>>>why published IDers consider it very important to reject methodological
>>>naturalism
>SJ>IDers "reject methodological naturalism" as begging the whole question,
>>especially in the area of *origins*. Why should it be assumed by ID that
>>there is no God (or at least that He hasn't intervened supernaturally)?
>>This would only make sense if ID knew in advance that there is no God
>>or that he hasn't intervened supernaturally!
JR>As we discussed a year or two ago in painful depth with no resolution :^I,
>most scientists (as opposed to PJ) would see your comments as a bit of a
>caricature, I think.
No doubt that I would have said then as I say now, that since "most
scientists" are methodological naturalists, I would not really be surprised if
they did see my comments as a caricature.
MNs would probably *have* to see it as a "caricature" because to take the
question seriously would mean they would have to answer it, which John
here doesn't do.
JR>Remember: methodological naturalism is a limitation on science, not on
>reality generally.
If MN *was* just a "limitation on science" it might not be such a problem.
I would still think that theistic realism would be a better approach to
reality.
But in practice MNs do not recognise that there *is* any "limitation on
science". Thus they apply MN consistently to areas where Christians claim
that God acted supernaturally, namely the Biblical miracles, and where
most theists would maintain that God *may* have acted supernaturally,
namely *origins*.
If God *really did* act supernaturally, then MN is a flawed research
program, and Theistic Realism/ID would be a better one.
JR>The main arguments for it are not at all necessarily atheological in nature,
>as you may know. Obviously, atheists see methodological naturalism as a
>natural implication of metaphysical naturalism, but B's implying A by no
>means suggests that A implies B.
Atheists are metaphysical naturalists so they are consistent
methodological naturalists. Christian theists are not metaphysical
naturalists, so they cannot consistently be methodological naturalists. At
some point they must make an arbitrary limitation on MN, eg. the Biblical
miracles. It would be better for them to be Theistic Realists, then they can
be consistent all the time.
JR>As a quickie overview for others (you're familiar with this, Steve, though
>it doesn't make sense to you, I take it), the reasons Christian and other
>scientists almost always support methodological naturalism are basically
>these:
>
>Reasons for methodological naturalism (i.e., roughly, the belief that
>science should limit itself to explanations in terms of natural, not
>supernatural, forces, objects, and events.)
>
>(1) Natural science is by definition the study of natural, not the
>supernatural, world. (Versus theology, or metaphysics, e.g.)
ID would disagree with this question-begging "definition". A better
definition is that: science is "a search for truth, no holds barred." (Ratzsch
D.L., "The Battle of Beginnings", 1996, p168).
Besides, materialistic-naturalistic science *does* make claims about the
"supernatural...world" and "theology" namely it is imaginary.
>(2) We cannot mathematically model God, which would be necessary to
>incorporate Him into scientific theories (at least if they're to have
>rigor).
Science cannot mathematically macroevolution, but that is still regarded as
scientific. Besides, Bill Demski's "The Design Inference" shows how ID
could be placed on a mathematical foundation.
>(3) The track record of scientific theories that have violated
>methodological naturalism is very poor.
The track record of *all* scientific theories is very poor! The ones we have
today are what's left after innumerable failed theories.
John doesn't say what exactly these failed non-MN theories were.
But that non-MN theories might have failed in the past is no reason why
they can't learn from their mistakes and do better in the future.
BTW, I find John's choice of words "violated methodological naturalism"
interesting. It sounds like he really thinks that MN is an inviolable law of
nature! How does one actually *violate* methodological naturalism?
JR>NB that none of these even remotely imply metaphysical naturalism, nor do
>they imply that strong belief in God is irrational, unrealistic, naive, or
>other criticisms commonly associated with atheology. These express
>limitations on science, not limitations on reason, faith, or reality.
Disagree. MN *does* "imply metaphysical naturalism" especially in the
case of *origins* and when applied to the Biblical miracles. If there really is
a God like the Biblical God, who has created and sustains the universe, and
who has intervened repeatedly at strategic points in human history, then a
better research program is Theistic Realism, which is able to investigate if
God really has intervened in natural history
JR>(As I recall, the arguments above rolled off you like water off a duck last
>time I presented them, and I was not able to get a clear understanding as to
>why.
John makes it sound like I didn't explain my reasons "why" I found his
arguments for MN unconvincing. The problem is that John just *ignored*
my reasons "why"! My arguments "rolled off" *John* "like water off a
duck"
The real problem is metaphysical. John has already let slip that he would be
"scared" if Mike Behe were right about irreducible complexity. I suspect
that John would be also "scared" if I was right about MN being wrong!
JR>I think they just seemed pretty absurd to you.
Indeed, John's basic argument that the God of the Bible exists but we must
pretend that he doesn't exist when we do science, does seem "absurd" to
me!
JR>I remember that it
>seemed to me that you accepted something like a Christianized version of
>scientism, the view that if something is real or true or rational, it must
>be captured by science.)
>***
My view is simply that if God is real, then that fact must be factored into science.
To say that God is real, but we must ignore Him when we do science, including
*origins*, does seem to me to be "absurd".
>>JR>focus on irreducible complexity as an objection to evolutionary
>>>theory, etc.
>SJ>Well, since Darwinism claims to have killed off ID:
>>"......." (Dawkins R., "The Blind Watchmaker,"
>>1991, p5);
JR>And of course, -assuming- atheism, or looking at things merely from the
>limited point of view of scientism (versus philosophy/theology, i.e., versus
>reason more broadly construed), Dawkins is right. NOT assuming atheism,
>or going beyond science to reason and faith more broadly construed, his
>assertions are tendentious to say the least.
The fact is that in the *real* scientific world, Dawkins is regarded as *right*:
"Dawkins has achieved enormous acclaim for presenting orthodox neo-Darwinism
persuasively. ...In 1990 Dawkins received the Michael Faraday Award from the
British Royal Society as "the scientist who has done the most to further the public
understanding of science " In 1992 he gave the Royal Institution's Christmas
lectures for young people, televised by the BBC, arguing the same naturalistic
worldview that he presents in The Blind Watchmaker. I mention these accolades to
dispel any illusion that Dawkins's explicitly naturalistic presentation of Darwinism
amounts to a mere personal philosophy. He certainly is promoting metaphysical
naturalism, but, like his American counterpart Carl Sagan (who received the Public
Welfare Medal in 1994 from the National Academy of Sciences for his
contributions to public education), he does so with the wholehearted support of
the scientific establishment of his nation." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the Balance",
1995, p76)
>SJ>and Darwinism has claimed that it would be falsified if it could be shown
>>that a complex organ had arisen not by a gradual, stepwise process:
>>...." (Darwin C., "The Origin of Species," 6th Edition, 1928, reprint, p170)
>>
>>then it makes sense for ID to try to falsify Darwinism in this way:
JR>But it's important to realize that Behe's principle, at least when stated
>the way I've often seen it (that irreducible complexity necessitates
>unevolvability) is -false-, fairly plainly fallacious. IC may imply -more
>circuitous- evolution, but hardly unevolvability; not -in principle-,
>anyway.
Behe has not claim anything as vague as "irreducible complexity
necessitates unevolvability" (whatever that means). He has simply taken up
Darwin's test and claims that he has found examples of IC that refute
*Darwinism* at the molecular level.
>SJ>"...." (Behe M.J., "Darwin's Black Box," 1996, p38)
>>
>>Only if Darwinists want their theory to be beyond scientific
>>testing, should this be resisted by Darwinists (including the theistic variety).
>>JR>(Given that you're more up on this than I, let me ask you: are
>>there any thought leaders in the ID community who explicitly reject Behe's
>>thesis which is [if I understand it] that irreducible complexity necessitates
>>>unevolvability? I'm curious; I hope the answer is yes.)
>SJ>Why should they?
JR>Because it's false, at least as I understand it (IC ->unevolvability). See
>above.
John has split my question off from what immediately followed it, which
gives the false impression that I accepted his premise that "Behe's
thesis...irreducible complexity necessitates unevolvability", which I don't.
Behe's thesis is that "irreducible complexity" refutes *Darwinism* at the
molecular level.
>SJ>This is *precisely* the test of Darwinism
>>that Darwin himself proposed (and his latter day disciple Dawkins)
>>has reaffirmed:
>>
>>"...>(Dawkins R., "The Blind Watchmaker," 1991, p91)
>>
>>To want to preserve something called "evolvability" that is immune from
>>scientific testing, is pseudoscience.
JR>My point is not at all that evolvability should be immune from science.
Maybe John can explained what exactly *is* "unevolvability"?
JR> My point is just that Behe's thesis, which is (again, if I understand it) that
>IC necessitates unevolvability, is false.
See above. This is *not* "Behe's thesis...that IC necessitates unevolvability".
It is Behe's thesis that IC refutes Darwinism at the molecular level.
JR>To criticize a particular disproof of evolution is not to criticize the
>concept of disproving evolution, which is what you're talking about here.
The word "evolution" is so vague, that it is impossible to understand what is the
proposition that John is putting here, let alone "disproving* it.
Maybe he can clarify in what sense he is using the word "evolution" here?
>>JR>P. S. Thanks for listing Hodge's defn.
>SJ>John deleted Hodge's definition,
JR>Actually, no I didn't. You didn't include it in this message.
My apologies to John. Since he mentioned Hodge's definition and it wasn't
there, I assumed he had deleted it. But John was referring to it in another post.
[...]
>>JR>But doesn't his notion include in
>>>part 3 what would ordinarily be meant by fabrication or manufacturing?
>SJ>This is too specific, and if I accepted John's "fabrication or manufacturing"
>>sub-definition, I would no doubt have Howard accuse me of adopting the
>>"artisan metaphor"!
>>
>>A better term for this final stage of design is to call it the *realisation* stage.
JR>That's fine with me.
Good. We *are* making progress!
>>JR>That is, wouldn't accomplishment of either the 1st, or 1st and 2d, or even
>>>(more strangely) the 2d alone, -without- the 3d part would constitute
>>intelligent design in the ordinary sense of the term?
>SJ>ID might agree that the primary meaning of design would be
>>conceptualisation. But it would see no reason to restrict design
>>to only the first one or two stages and leave out the *realisation* of design
>>stage, especially since that is the only way we mere mortals are ever
>>going to see design.
JR>That's fine, an important subject; I just don't think the
>realization/manufacturing/fabrication is what most people think of as "design."
By this final remark John just undoes all the progress that I thought we
were making! Does he really want to resolve this issue, or is he just like
Howard in appearing to want it to go around in circles forever?
First, I just said that "ID might agree that the primary meaning of design
would be conceptualisation. But it would see no reason to restrict
design..." to that primary meaning. So if most people though of design as
the first two conceptual type stages, that would be OK.
Second, I thought we had just agreed that "fabrication or manufacturing"
was "too specific" and "A better term for this final stage of design" was
"realisation" but here John just blithely tacks on
"manufacturing/fabrication" to "realization".
Is John showing here that he still really wants Howard's "artisan metaphor"
stereotype to apply as a pejorative term to ID? If so, then he is showing
that he is not yet a friend of ID.
>>JR>Why not use a dictionary defn:
>>>Design: "...None of the verb defns included the concept of manufacturing
>>>the designed object.)
>SJ>I don't know about Johns's "online dictionary", but the Webster on-line
>>dictionary at: http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary), includes in the
>>definition of "design" [as a noun] "to create, FASHION, EXECUTE, or
>>CONSTRUCT according to plan" (my emphasis):
>>
>>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>Main Entry: 1design
>>[...]
>>1 : to create, fashion, execute, or construct according to plan :
>>[...]
>>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>Note here that the realisation of design is given as the *primary* meaning of
>>"design". In fact, when the verb option is selected, it gives exactly the same
>>definitions as the verb.
JR>Interesting. My MW offline dictionary (i.e., a book) has (2) as the primary
>meaning. (And I'll presume the stuff about nouns and verbs was a series of
>typos, or am I missing something?) I know I'm a fairly sophisticated
>English speaker, and I've never heard "design" to be used to refer to
>fabrication or manufacturing or the broader "realization", but it's a free
>world -- maybe there are folks who do.
Obviously the Webster's Dictionary compilers thought "people used "design" in the
sense of "realisation"!
JR>And certainly designers are -linked
>to- and have a -causal connection with- manufacturing. But design is not
>the sane as realization; unless, I suppose, one is manufacturing a design.
No one is saying that "design is...*the same* as realization". I am claiming
that a complete definition of design *includes* a realisation stage.
JR>The point is just to be clear about the meaning of words. This doesn't
>affect the substance of the discussion at all.
Agreed about "be clear about the meaning of words". But disagree that
"This doesn't affect the substance of the discussion at all." Unless the critics
of ID like Howard (and John?) accept "the meaning of words" that ID uses
the "discussion" will go around in circles forever!
Thanks to John for his input.
Steve
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"The gaps in the record are real, however. The absence of a record of
any important branching is quite phenomenal. Species are usually
static, or nearly so, for long periods, species seldom and genera never
show evolution into new species or genera but replacement of one by
another, and change is more or less abrupt..." (Wesson R.G., "Beyond
Natural Selection," [1991], MIT Press: Cambridge MA, 1994, reprint, p45)
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