> Greetings Randy:
>
> "I probably should state that last point differently. To me the
> 'specialness' of the universe is based on the fact that it was created by
> God to be my temporary home."
>
> You are of course entitled to your beliefs, but it is still just your
> belief,
Well, it is AT LEAST my belief. If it is also true(whether or not that
truth is scientifically verifiable) then it would be more than "just" my
belief.
>and not one that can be tested scientifically, so it has little
> relevence to the ID debate.
Well, the ID proponents certainly hope to show that this theory IS
testable scientifically, don't they? Isn't that what Dembski's argument is
trying to accomplish(even if you think he fails to do so)?
>Besides, if God makes universes like cats make
> kittens, our universe may not be so special after all.
If you're trying to describe a panentheistic view of God then I would
agree that that view of God does not describe a "special" diety(or even
one that exists at all!).
And it may be considered arrogant by some to claim that YOU are the
reason the universe is special! ;-)
My goodness, e-mail certainly isn't a very nuanced form of communication
is it? Brian also pointed out the egotistical nature of my statement,
which I acknowledge. Let me try this again:
The universe is not special because God made it for ME, but because GOD
made it for all living things(admittedly, I wasn't thinking about all the
other living things when I make that first statement). Looking back, the
word "special" was a word with a lot of theistic baggage and probably not
a good one to introduce into this scientific discussion.
>
> "I was reacting to the statement 'the fine-tuned nature of the constants is
> not unexplainable'. It doesn't seem to me that we can make that definite
> assertion at this point in time."
>
> I was reacting to your apparent belief that "the fine-tuned nature of the
> constants" was inherently unexplainable simply because it had not yet been
> explained.
Which I do not believe and did not mean to imply.
I was trying to point out that just because something has yet to
> be explained doesn't mean it is unexplainable.
I agree.
>My dogmatic phrasing does not invalidate that fact.
>
> "I'm sure the theistic beliefs of the IDers lead them to infer design more
> quickly than other scientists (even other theistic scientists) might. But
> it seems to me that since science has not yet explained the fine-tuned
> nature of the universe's physical constants the field is open for
> non-naturalistic explanations. If at some point in the future this
> explanation is found then the ID argument should be withdrawn. But until
> that happens it seems to me that excluding the ID explanation as at least a
> possibility is arbitrary."
>
> Maybe it is. But as I have already pointed out, the only difference between
> ID theory and the evolution model is that the former claims "a supernatural
> entity did it" while the latter claims "natural mechanistic forces did it."
But, if I've been taking all this in correctly, the ID'ers at least have
an internally consistent theory. That is, a proposed deity who is capable
of creating the constants to be a certain value and has a motive to do so.
Evolutionary theory hasn't yet verified that "natural mechanistic forces"
are capable of setting these physical constants to just the right values
(possibly over many trials). Certainly this verification may eventually
come but, at present, I think I see a difference between the two theories.
> Otherwise, both give the same experimental results. The ID claim is not
> scientifically testable or verifiable; the evolution claim is. Therefore
> science must reject the ID claim on methodological grounds alone.
Besides,
> as I said before, ID is predicated on the assumption that the ultimate
> origin of the universe can never be solved mechanistically simply because no
> one has yet done so.
I've never read any discussion by the ID'ers on this topic but I hope
they would say that the origin of the universe can never be solved
mechanistically because the origin of the universe is personal, not
mechanistic.
This is a logical fallacy, and science also rejects
> logical fallacies, this time on philosophical grounds. For ID theory to be
> a valid scientific mdel, at least criteria have to be met. First, some
> evidence -- that cannot be explained by any other scientific model -- has to
> be put forward to show that such a supernatural entity can and/or does
> exist.
And of course much evidence has been produced to substantiate this
point, much of it philosophical and only some of it cosmological. But from
a naturalistic perspective, would the scientific community have to deny
the existence of any supernatural being, simply on methodological grounds.
The second is that ID has to propose a test that can distinguish
> between supernatural design and natural design.
I agree, although I wonder if we would end up calling it natural
"design".
>
> "I know that science can explain the orbits of the planets because of
> gravity but can science explain why gravity attracts objects to each other
> instead of repelling them?"
>
> I did not say that there were no scientific mysteries left, only that the
> history of science has shown that virtually no phenomenon has ever been
> found not to have a natural explanation. And there have been plenty of
> candidates. The mysteries we have now may be more profound, but I am
> confident that given enough time natural explanations will be found for them
> as well.
I would not be as confident but you would certainly have a more informed
opinion. But what about the human mind? ID theory, and the views of some
philosophers, would lead us to avoid even looking for a mechanistic
explanation for a personal phenomena.
>
> "And this theory is of the 'mathematical what-if' type you described
> earlier?"
>
> The concept of the Planck Era is not a theory, it is a fact. It has been
> established by other models whose validity have been well proven. Tied into
> this is the concept that the four fundamental forces were combined into one
> force. In essence this is also a fact. If this is true, then the physical
> constants were not fixed and could have been changing constantly, even
> wildly. The theory you refer to would be The Theory of Everything, which
> would combine relativity with quantum mechanics. That has not yet been
> accomplished, but when it is it will tell us what happened during the Planck
> Era, including the nature of the physical laws and constants.
In your interaction with Stan you admitted that the statement "the
physical constants were not fixed and could have been changing constantly"
is very-well-informed speculation. Isn't it therefore possible that
science will never be able to explain what happened during the Planck Era?
(I know I keep harping on this but from my perspective the existence of
the universe is the result of a personal decision by God. I therefore
don't expect science to be able to explain it. I expect this to be an
area, like the human mind, in which science reaches it`s epistemological
limitations. I know this research is continuing but from my theistic
perspective I would expect a certain resolution to these questions.)
>
> "And this would also be a 'mathematical what-if'
type of theory?" >
> No, because it is also based on the concept of the Planck Era, a concept we
> know is true.
>
> "And I assume that there's some good reason to believe that the energy and
> mass in the system are actually changing and the experimenter isn't simply
> observing the inability of his equipment to function with the needed
> precision. (These are probably very elementary questions I'm asking. Can
> you recommend a good introductory text to quantum theory?)
>
> This is a good question. For one thing, the instruments that make these
> kinds of measurements are extremely precise, so we know that the energy and
> mass are fluctuating. For another, the uncertainty principle is fundamental
> to quantum theory, is well established mathematically, and makes secondary
> predictions that have been successfully tested. No, there is no error. As
> for books, try _Cosmic Questions_ by Richard Morris. It explains these
> concepts well.
> >
> "Maybe a 'quantum glossary' would be good to go with that introductory text.
> What would be the difference?"
>
> Between "nothing" and "nothingness"? Why, "nothing", of course. Seriously,
> there is no scientific difference between those terms, but if you like
> "nothing" can refer to the classical Newtonian vacuum, whereas "nothingness"
> can refer to the quantum vacuum. The Newtonian vacuum is obvious; the
> quantum vacuum would be basically as I have described it.
>
> "I guess this answers my question above. So how small are these particles?
> And how much noise do they create?"
>
> They can be as small as electrons/positrons; in fact, they usually are. As
> for "noise", that is a scientific term for the random information an
> instrument picks up in addition to the "signal" data. The particles
> themselves don'y make any noise.
Sorry, I should have explained that I understand the term "noise". So,
how much "noise" do these particles make? Is it measure in volts(or
electron volts?)
>
> "I don't understand how you would measure the energy of 'nothingness' but
> that probably goes back to the difference between 'nothingness' and
> 'nothing'."
>
> We wouldn't actually "measure" the energy of that nothingness, because it
> would lie beyond the current limit of our universe. Instead, the models
> should tell us whether it was energetic enough.
>
> "So then, a new universe could appear in our universe? (destroying ours as
> it expanded I suppose)"
>
> Almost certainly not. The nothingness of our universe probably isn't
> energetic enough. Even if it was, however, that other universe would
> probably "pop" through multidimensional space into a place separate from our
> own universe. Just as two electrons cannot inhabit the same physical
> space....
I've got some questions here but I think I'll go read that introductory
text first.
>
> Kevin L. O'Brien
>
Randy Bronson