On Mon, 17 Feb 1997 23:32:51 -0500, Brian D Harper wrote:
[...]
>BH>To help you out, I've decided not to reply to any of your
>most recent group of posts except for this one.
>SJ>...Neither Brian, nor anyone else need feel that they have to
>reply to my posts or even read them! They are addressed to the
>Group...
BH>If you reply to one of my posts then I take it as a reply to me
>regardless of how its addressed.
I cannot help how Brian takes my posts to the Group responding to one
of his posts. The point I made is that I do not claim that he has an
obligation to reply to them, since they are not addressed to him. I
am consciously trying to write to the lurkers.
[...]
>SJ>...I will stick to laymen's definitions like "specified
>complexity": "Information in this context means the precise
>determination, or specification, of a sequence of letters...a
>message represents `specified complexity'...The more highly
>specified a thing is, the fewer choices there are about fulfilling
>each instruction...." (Bradley W.L. & Thaxton C.B., "The Creation
>Hypothesis", 1994, p207)
[...]
BH>B&T's statement: "In a random situation, options are unlimited
>and each option is equally probable."
[...]
>SJ>There is nothing wrong with this definition. It is *exactly* what
>"random" means:
>
>"...A random sample is one that allows for equal probability that
>each elementary unit will be chosen...Random numbers are digits
>generated by a process which allows for equal probability that each
>possible number will be the next." (Lapin L., "Statistics for
>Modern Business Decisions", 1973, pp194-195)
BH>I'm curious whether you took a look at the follow-up post that I
>mentioned above. There you will find that the 6 volume <Encyclopedia
>of Mathematics> disagrees with <Statistics for Modern Business
>Decisions>. The equal probability case is a special case.
No doubt there are other definitions of "random", especially in a .
"6 volume <Encyclopedia of Mathematics>"! But "equal probability" is
the core, definition of "random", as can be seen by these separate
examples:
"random mating, in population genetics, condition of unrestricted
mating, such as exists in large natural populations in which,
theoretically, any male can mate with any female." ("random mating",
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984, viii:416)
"random sampling, in geology, method of sampling any population of
values in such a way that any particular value has an equal chance of
being selected" ("random sampling", Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984,
viii:416)
"random walk, stochastic process based on the problem of
determining the probable location of a point subject to random
motions given the probabilities (the same at each step) of moving
some distance in some direction." ("random walk", Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1984, viii:416)
BH>They give a very good example (also used by Yockey
>and by myself in another thread) of tossing a pair of fair die
>and recording the sum. Surely you would agree that this is a
>"random situation". Work it out and you will see that the variious
>random events do not all occur with equal probability.
Brian switches from "random" in an abstract ideal defintional sense
to "random" as a "real world" example of the outcome of "tossing a
pair of fair die". First, there is no such thing "in the real world"
as "a pair of" perfectly "fair die". Second, even if there was a "a
pair of fair die", in a small number of tosses, the result would
not be expected to show "equal probability". But the larger the
number of tosses, the closer the results would approach "equal
probability".
BH>In the real world it seems to me that very few processes involve
>events that occur with equal probability. Usual examples cited
>involve games of chance and even here great care must excercised
>to insure that probabilities really are all equal.
See above. This is just a muddying of the waters by Brian.
Bradley & Thaxton's point that "In a random situation, options are
unlimited and each option is equally probable", is stating a general
principle.
In the "real word" *nothing* works out exactly right - *every*
experimental test fails (presumably because of unknown confounding
variables):
"To show that scientific law, specifically the laws of Newtonian
mechanism, do not describe how phenomena occur, the example of
the pendulum will be used. The law of the pendulum, roughly
expressed, states that the period of the swing is directly proportional
to the square root of the length. But the scientific methods by which
the equation is obtained are based on three remarkable assumptions.
First, the mass of the bob is assumed to be concentrated at a point;
that is, the body is homogeneous. This condition is never met in
actuality. Second, the string must be tensionless. There is no such
string. And third, the pendulum is supposed to swing on an axis
without friction This is impossible. The necessary conclusion
therefore is that the scientific law describes only non-existent
pendulums, and that real pendulums do not move in accordance with
the laws of physics." (Clark G.H., in Henry C.F.H., ed., "Christian
Faith and Modern Theology", 1964, p137-138)
BH>But the real issue here is not a definition of randomness but
>rather whether the real physical process of interest involves
>a random selection from several possibilities all of which occur
>with equal probability.
No. The "the real issue here" *was* "a definition of randomness".
>SJ>Brian appears to be getting mixed up with the *Darwinist-biological*
>definition of random as in "random mutation" (which indeed does not
>mean that "each option is equally probable"), but B&T are not talking
>about "random" as in mutation.
BH>OK, Steve,
>
>(a) specifically what process are they talking about?
>
>(b) do all the events in this process occur with equal probability?
They were not "Specifically...talking about" *any* "process". They
were contrasting an unspecified ideal "random situation" in which
"each option is equally probable." They then gave an example: "In
generating a list of random letters, for instance, there are no
constraints on the choice of letters at each step. The letters are
unspecified." (Bradley W.L. & Thaxton C.B, "The Creation
Hypothesis", 1994, pp207-208). Now I sure that Bradley & Thaxton
would agree that "in the real world", in generating any *real*
"list of random letters" (as in all experiments) there *are* in fact
some "constraints on the choice of letters at each step", but these
are so small as to be able to be ignored in order to illustrate the
principle.
BH>Suppose we take the protein first scenario for the origin of
>life. I seem to remember that Bradley does a probabiliy
>calculation on this somewhere. Anyway, in this situation we have a
>protein forming by chance in the hypothetical primordial soup. Is
>it reasonable to assume that each amino acid adds to a growing
>chain with equal probability? If not, is the scenario still a
>random situation?
As Brian said, this was a "hypothetical primordial soup". It
never existed, so the question is meaningless as far as "the
real world" was concerned.
In any event, whether "each amino acid adds to a growing chain with
equal probability" and is therefore "a random situation" is as
irrelevant to the question of the information content of the genetic
code written in amino acids on that chain, as to the chemical
composition of ink and paper is irrelevant to the information
content of letters written in ink on that paper:
"A better grasp of this subject-matter is provided by the following
illustration: the ink molecules mediating the contents of this book
possess their own chemical architecture, rendering the written
sentences black, legible, and perceptible. This architecture of the
ink molecules exists as a closed system and makes the ink-or the
printer's ink-black. Simultaneously, it also provides a basis for
the superimposed code-form of a language. This written form of
language is based on the architecture of the printer's ink, without
originating from it. The information contained within the molecules
of printer's ink does not in the least provide a basis for the
contents, the coded contents of the completed book, although the
architecture of ink and the architecture of a sentence or of writing
are certainly interdependent. However the chemical constitution of
ink is totally independent of the coded contents of the text in the
book. Information from without has been imposed onto-ink chemistry
and this information belongs to order of the second kind. If water
is poured onto a text written in ink, this text will thus be
modified or partly smudged; but never is fundamentally new
information added to the text in this manner..." (Wilder-Smith,
A.E., "The Natural Sciences Know Nothing of Evolution", 1981,
pp46-47)
>SJ>BTW, Brian, just skipped over the main point which was:
>
>"Information in this context means the precise determination, or
>specification, of a sequence of letters. We said above that a
>message represents `specified complexity.' We are now able to
>understand what specified means. The more highly specified a thing
>is, the fewer choices there are about fulfilling each instruction.
>(Bradley W.L. & Thaxton C.B., in Moreland J.P. ed., "The Creation
>Hypothesis", 1994, p207)
>
>Perhaps he would care to comment on Bradley & Thaxton's
>definition of "specified" = "fewer choices"?
BH>I would really like to but its tough. I'm still slowly reading
>through Dembski's paper, maybe that will help. I want to measure
>something. Given three or four objects can we measure their
>specified complexity accurately enough to rank them in order
>of increasing specified complexity? We have to be able to do
>this or we will not be able to tell if specified complexity
>increases or decreases, is conserved or what.
Agreed. This is a difficult area and Dembski is breaking new ground.
That Brian, who claims a special interest in information theory
cannot objectively define "specified complexity" at this stage,
shows how unreasonable was his demand that I do it.
[...]
>SJ>...The word "information" as defined by information theory does
>not deal with meaning:
>
>"...The assignment of meaning or in biology, specificity, to
>certain particular member of the ensemble lies outside information
>theory." Yockey H.P., Journal of Theoretical Biology, 46, 1974,
>pp371-372)
>
>which is the whole point of "information" in biology and human
>languages. That's why I don't accept Brian's "information theory"
>definition of "information" and prefer to use "specified complexity"
>instead.
BH>Again, I am wondering why you are quoting Yockey when he
>disagrees with you completely.
No. Yockey and I at least agree that "...The assignment of meaning
or in biology, specificity...lies outside information theory."
BH>You claim that information theory is concerned with the
>engineering problem of communicating over a channel. It is true
>that this was the application that Shannon had in mind.
Yes. That's what I said.
BH>This does not mean that it is the only application of
>information theory.
I did not say that it was "the only application of information
theory", but it appears to be the main one. That's why Dembski
writes:
"The fundamental intuition underlying information is not, as is
commonly thought, the transmission of signals across a communication
channel, but rather, the ruling out of possibilities." (Dembski
W.A., "Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information", January 1997,
Indiana, USA)
BH>Nevertheless, you make a very good point that the application of
>information theory to other situations requires some justification.
>Yockey provides this justification by showing that electronic
>communication systems are isomorphic with the genetic information
>system.
Brian has a habit of trying to put words in my mouth, so I have to
be very careful that I do not find myself defending an argument I
did not make. I am not sure that I made this "point", so I cannot
accept Brian's praise. I have no problem with "the application of
information theory to other situations", but it will need to be
expanded if it is to deal with "meaning".
BH>Is it possible to justify in a similarly rigorous fashion the
>appropriateness of natural language as an analogy to biological
>information? Or the notion that specified complexity describes
>biological information. Can this be justified?
>
>For clarification, I am in no way shape or form requiring Steve
>to do this.
Again Brian is trying to put words in my mouth. I cannot see
where I said anything about whether it is "possible to justify in a
similarly rigorous fashion the appropriateness of natural language
as an analogy to biological information".
I did claim that "specified complexity describes biological
information" and Brian was originally "requiring" me to do this".
Now he realises that Demski is only just now attempting to do this,
he realises how unreasonable it was that I do it.
[...]
>SJ>...Information theory is concerned with "the engineering
>problem" of "reproducing at one point either exactly or
>approximately a message selected at another point". It has nothing
>to do with the creation of the meaning in the first place.
>BH>To tie this in with biology we can observe that the genetic
>information processing system can process the information for
>forming a non-functional protein as easily as it can for a
>functional protein.
SJ>I am not so sure that this is compeletely true. Some
>"non-functional proteins" (eg. D-amino acids) may be unable to be
>processed by "the genetic information processing system."
BH>Perhaps someone knowledgeable in molecular biology can help us
>out here. Whether the genetic information system can process
>D-amino acids came up in a dispute between Yockey and Avshalom
>Elitzur in Journal of Theoretical Biology. Here I'll quote
>briefly from Yockey's reply to Elitzur. all "quotations" are from
>Elitzur's paper (JTB 168:429-459, 1994). ...the genetic
>information system is capable of forming D amino acids and placing
>them in specified locations in antibiotics...". Hubert Yockey, JTB
176:349-355, 1995.
This is interesting. Maybe its a special case? My understanding is
that the L-amino based "genetic information system" cannot
normally process D-amino acids, although I have read somewhere that
it can take D-amino acids, and reassemble them as L-amino acids,
so some limited processing is possible. But the fact it does this
would indicate that it is unable to process them further without
converting them.
[...]
BH>...Therefore creationists, who are fond of citing evolution as
>being in violation of the second law of thermodynamics
>(Wilder-Smith, 1981; Gish, 1989), are hoist by their own petard:
>evolution is not based on increasing _order_, it is based on
>increasing _complexity_.
>SJ>I am not aware that "Wilder-Smith" or "Gish" actually say that
>"evolution" is "in violation of the second law of thermodynamics".
>I would invite Brian to post where he or Yockey claims they do. In
>his chapter "Creationist Theory: Popular Evolutionist
>Misunderstandings", Ratzsch says:
>
>"Perhaps the most prevalent of the misconstruals of creationism
>involves the Second Law of Thermodynamics." (Ratzsch D.L., "The
>Battle of Beginnings", 1996, p91)
BH>The references in parenthesis above are:
>
>Wilder-Smith (1981). <The Natural Sciences Know Nothing of Evolution>
I thought this was the "Wilder-Smith (1981)" that Yockey was
referring to. Well I have read *every* instance in the above book
where Wilder-Smith mentions "the second law of thermodynamics" and
nowehere does he say "evolution" is "in violation" of it. He says
that there has to be first a pre-existing energy-conversion
mechanism to build order:
"Summarizing: Raw matter within a closed system, plus a teleonomic
machine, might yield "autoorganization" derived from endogenous
energy. Raw matter within an open system, plus a teleonomic machine
may yield "autoorganization" derived from endogenous and/or
exogenous energy. Within both open and closed systems, however, a
mechanism (machine, teleonomy, know-how) is essential if any
autoorganization is to result." (Wilder-Smith, A.E., "The Natural
Sciences Know Nothing of Evolution", T.W.F.T. Publishers: Costa
Mesa CA, 1981, p66)
BH>Gish, D. T. (1989). In a discussion of the origin of life on
>radio station KKLA, Los Angeles, CA, on 29 June, 1989 with Dr. H.P.
>Yockey, Dr. Gish repeatedly insisted that evolution was in
>contradiction of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in spite of
>my explanation to the contrary.
Gish does not say in any of his books that I have that "evolution"
is "in violation of the second law of thermodynamics". He says much
the same thing as Wilder-Smith above. Here is what Gish said in
1993:
"In order for low entropy complex organized systems to be produced,
at least four conditions must be satisfied:
1. The system must be an open system;
2. All adequate outside supply of energy must be available;
3. An energy conversion system must exist to convert the raw,
uncontrolled energy coming in from the outside to a controlled form
that can be utilized in a constructive way by the system undergoing
change;
4. There must be a control system capable of regulating the activities
of the system undergoing change, such that the changes are progressive
and integrative rather than meaningless and destructive."
(Gish D.T., "Creation Scientists Answer Their Critics", Institute
for Creation Research, El Cajon CA, 1993, p177)
Since Yockey got Wilder-Smith wrong, I assume he misinterpreted what
Gish was trying to say, espcially in the heated atmosphere of a
radio interview.
Ratzch continues his "Creationist Theory: Popular Evolutionist
Misunderstandings" chapter by pointing out the problem is in
creationists ambiguous use of the word "evolution" (which is hardly
their fault alone BTW):
"Creationists nearly unanimously claim that this Second Law poses a
nasty problem for evolution. Unfortunately, exactly what
creationists have in mind here is widely misunderstood.
Creationists are at least partly at fault for that confusion. One
reason is that...most popular creationists use the term evolution
ambiguously-sometimes to refer to the cosmic evolutionary worldview
(or model) and sometimes to refer to the Darwinian biological
theory. Although a coherent position can be extracted from some of
the major creationists (such as Morris, Gish, Wysong and Kofahl),
this ambiguity has rendered some parts of their writings
monumentally unclear. One has to read extremely carefully in order
to see which evolution is being referred to, and some critics of
creationism either have simply not noticed the ambiguity or perhaps
have misjudged which meaning specific creationists have had in mind
in specific passages..." (Ratzsch D.L., "The Battle of Beginnings:
Why Neither Side is Winning the Creation-Evolution Debate",
InterVarsity Press: Downers Grove Ill., 1996, p91)
God bless.
Steve
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