> Thanks for the info. My intention was to point out that Popper's
> falsification criterion is not a good argument against evolution science,
> especially if it is used to selectively criticize science from a point of
> view that Popper also criticized on the basis of not being falsifiable. In
> this light, I am not sure of the intent of your response to my original
> post--it almost sounds that, because Popper later deemphasized
> falsifiability, you agree that invoking falsifiability does not provide a
> compelling argument against evolution science. Or did you intend to convey
> something different?
+++++++++++++++++++++
Richard responded:
>Steve:
> Let my try to clarify my point. It DOES seem improper (and inconsistent)
>for someone to slam (macro)evolution because it's thought to be unfalsifiable
>while at the same time advocating a position that is also unfalsifiable.
Even if
>this is all correct, one ends up with two unfalsifiable views. Now on this
>basis, which (if either) is to be rationally preferred? If falsifiability
is the
>ONLY (or the decisive) criterion, then rational preferability is
>precluded. However, if it is recognized (as Popper himself acknowledged) that
>unfalsifiable views may still be rationally criticized, then one can have a
basis
>for rational judgement among competing theories. My position is that, even if
>something is not strictly falsifiable, it is not necessarily beyond rational
>criticism and support.
> On the other hand, this does not categorically abandon the usefulness of
>"falsifiability" as a rational criterion. For this reason, "scientific"
theories
>should seek to be empirically falsifiable (though as Duhem and Quine argue,
one
>may not be able to know whether what is actually falsified on a specific
occasion
>is the "empirical" theory or some methodological or metaphysical
>background assumption). If (macro)evolution is not empirically
>falsifiable, then this IS a significant deficiency, especially if an
>advocate continues to insist on its "empirical facticity." Similarly, I
contend
>that "religious" theories which seek to explain facets of the empirical world
>should also prize falsifiability. (In my opinion this is why
>traditional Christian theism, for example, has a much greater potential for
>rational preferability over religions like Buddhism or Hinduism, or even over
>existential and neo-orthodox Christian theologies.)
> To apply this to many of the posts on our reflector: I believe that the
>TE and the ID theorists should both seek to develop theories which are
>empirically falsifiable. The more falsifiable, the better. But even if they
>can't achieve that difficult goal (given the comprehensive nature of their
>explanatory field), we can still subject such theories to a more general
>criterion of criticizability.
I don't fully agree with all of Richard's points here. First, it is my
experience that Popper's falsification ism is not abused by
antievolutionists invoking it as a rigid standard for rational discourse;
rather, it is abused when they use it as a rigid standard for deciding what
belongs to the realm of science. The demarcation between science and
nonscience is a very thorny issue that is not sufficiently addressed by
falsificationism.
An irony arises here when one realizes that biologists and philosophers
also often invoke falsificationism to argue that creationism is not a
scientific hypothesis. However, at least one secular philosopher disagrees
with this assessment. Eliot Sober, Chairman of the UW Philo Dept, notes
that, on one hand, philosophers may appeal to the imperfection of nature as
being inconsistent with intelligent design, while, on the other hand, argue
that creationism is untestable. Sober correctly points out that it is not
logical to test and find wanting a hypothesis that is, in fact, untestable
(Sober, Philosophy of Biology, Westview Press, 1993).
Creationists succumb to a similar epistemological problem when, on one hand,
they try to prove that the earth is young, the coexistence of dinosaurs and
humans, rapid formation of the Grand Canyon, etc., then claim that evolution
is not falsifiable. It doesn't make sense to try to disprove the central
claims of evolution if evolution cannot be falsified.
I think that these problems point to a misunderstanding of logic and of
science philosophy--especially with regard to the concept of falsification.
According to the Popperian viewpoint, ideas are falsifiable when they make
predictions about the world that can be checked observationally. The claims
of such ideas are, in principle, capable of conflicting with what we can
observe. In contrast, according to Popper, unscientific ideas are
compatible with all possible observations--no matter what we observe, we can
always retain our belief in an unscientific observation. Creationists claim
that this characterizes the way that evolution science is done. In other
words, when data that conflict with the predictions of evolution are
collected, evolutionists simply invoke another naturalistic theory rather
than reject the theory of evolution. Therefore, no matter what
evolutionists observe, they can always retain their belief in evolution.
But, it is important for Christian antievolutionists to notice that the same
criticism can be made of creationism--especially progressive creationism
which essentially is constructed to explain everything that evolution can
explain.
Here, it is important to distinguish between criticism of people vs
criticism of propositions. What this means is that dogmatic evolutionists
or dogmatic creationists can interpret whatever they observe as being
compatible with their pet theories. Dogmatism tells us something about the
people who hold such theories, but it tells us nothing about the
propositions behind those theories.
Finally, I want to point out that it is a naive view of falsification to
expect that whenever we encounter data that are contrary to what is
predicted by the hypothesis being tested, that we must discard the general
concept behind that hypothesis. This is an exceedingly important point to
understand because, while at face value it seems counterintuitive, it does
not violate any rule of logic. The structure of scientific epistemology
acknowledges 1) General Concepts (e.g., Darwinian evolution), 2) Specific
Models (e.g., continuity in the fossil record), and 3) Observations (e.g.,
the discontinuity of the fossil record). Or,
General Concepts + Specific Models -------(predicts)--------> an
Observation
(Darwinian evolution) +
(continuity)----------------//---------------> (discontinuity)
When the predicted observation is not found, then one needs to examine
either the Specific Model and/or the General Concept. Often one can
reasonably make the equation fit simply by changing the specific model and
retaining the general concept. Thus, the prediction of gradual evolution
might be substituted with a prediction of punctuated evolution.
Creationists use a similar epistemology when their specific model of a young
earth fails to predict what is found by isotopic dating techniques. Their
specific model may be changed to include an early neutron flux that
supposedly altered isotopic makeup of rocks.
Science, therefore, often does not directly test the General Concepts.
Rather, it often tests Specific Models and a number of Specific Models can
support any General Concept. So, while the General Concept of Darwinian
evolution may not be falsifiable, it also is not the direct object of
scientific inquiry. The Specific Models of Darwinian evolution are what is
tested by science and these are what need to be falsifiable.
This is why I do not like the argument that evolution is not scientific
because it is not testable.
Cheers,
Steve
____________________________________________________________
Steven S. Clark, Ph.D . Phone: 608/263-9137
Associate Professor FAX: 608/263-4226
Dept. of Human Oncology and Email: ssclark@facstaff.wisc.edu
UW Comprehensive Cancer Center
CSC K4-432
600 Highland Ave.
Madison, WI 53792
"People of that kind are academics, scholars, and that is the nastiest
kind of man I know." -- Blaise Pascal
_____________________________________________________________