Science and supernatural explanations

lhaarsma@OPAL.TUFTS.EDU
Mon, 08 Apr 1996 17:37:41 -0500 (EST)

ABSTRACT: Science cannot prove that some past event was "supernatural;"
however, it can in principle establish that no known natural mechanisms
could account for that event. In that limited sense, science can address
the supernatural.

-------------------------------

"Science and supernatural explanations" is a recurrent topic in this group
(and in the entire origins debate). Steve Jones and Brian Harper are
currently batting it back and forth under the "Is it soup yet" topic.
Most recently, Brian wrote,

> Supernaturalistic explanations are not ruled out a-priori,
> they're ruled out for very good reasons.
> The methods of science cannot address the supernatural.
> ...
> This places a limitation on science and not on reality.

It may be an exercise in hubris on my part, but I'd like to compose
something which is reasonably brief, clear, and agreeable to as many
people as possible. I'd value some feedback.

-----------------------------------------------------------

When science investigates a puzzling event (either an "origins" event long
ago, or a more recent event such as an unexpected healing), science cannot
determine whether or not that event was supernatural. What _can_ science
do? It can try to determine, to the best of its abilities,
--what the conditions were before the event,
--what the conditions were after the event, and
--what effect known natural mechanisms could have had during the event.

(Note: I use the word "event," but it could also refer to a series of
events spread over time, such as macroevolution.)

As scientists study the initial conditions, final conditions, and
known natural mechanisms, they could reach three possible conclusions:

1) Sound empirical models predict that known natural mechanisms can
account for the event. (*1*)

2) We do not have sound empirical models, but we believe that known
natural mechanisms can account for the event, and future improvements
in empirical knowledge, elegant models, and computing power will
eventually allow us to prove this.

3) No known natural mechanisms could account for this event. (There are
empirically sound reasons for ruling out all known natural
mechanisms.)

Of course, there will be some disagreements in the scientific community,
but it is possible for a great majority of scientists to agree. Most
would agree that the formation of the solar system falls into the first
category. Most would agree that galactic formation, earthquakes, and
zygotic development fall into the second category. A majority of
scientists believe that abiogenesis and macroevolution fall into the
second category, but a noticeable minority believe they belong in the
third. Most agree that the Big Bang is in the third category.

What do scientists do with events in the third category? Individual
scientists could reach (at least) five different conclusions:

A) A supernatural event occurred.
B) Super-human technology brought about the event.
C) An unknown natural mechanism is responsible for the event.
D) A very unlikely (natural) event occurred.
E) A very unlikely (natural) event occurred, but there are many
different causally disconnected universes.

Science _qua_ science cannot distinguish between these possibilities.
Historical, philosophical, and religious arguments are the decisive
factors in each scientist's conclusion.

Note, however, that science _qua_ science DOES play a vital role in
deciding whether an event falls into category 2 (extrapolation of known
mechanisms) or category 3 (no known mechanism). I would also argue that
philosophical and religious arguments can properly play some role in this
debate. This is the realm where scientific data, scientific intuitions,
and philosophical/religious expectations meet in the same arena. For
example, strongly materialistic scientists will work hard to push all
events into category 1 or 2. This effort might lead them to uncover new
natural mechanisms sooner than scientists who don't share their
materialistic philosophy. Alternatively, scientists with strong religious
or philosophical reasons for believing that certain events are
supernatural can marshal scientific arguments to show that those events
belong in category 3 rather than category 2. This effort might lead them
to uncover flaws in proposed naturalistic scenarios sooner than scientists
who don't share their religious beliefs. (*2*)

-------------------------

(*1*) It is worth mentioning again that non-deistic theism asserts that
"category 1" events are just as much dependent upon God's activity as
"category 3" events.

(*2*) Both of these biases could be pushed to the extreme, to the
detriment of science. One could imagine a scientific community so
obsessed with finding naturalistic explanations for "category 2-3" events
that it wastes vast resources on unproductive pursuits which yield no
secondary benefits. One could also imagine a scientific community so
complacent about supernatural explanations (or for that matter,
super-human or many-worlds explanations) that it makes virtually no effort
to find new natural mechanisms for puzzling events. Fortunately, the
present-day scientific community does not seem to fit either extreme.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Don't you believe in science?" | Loren Haarsma
--007 (_The_Man_with_the_Golden_Gun_) | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu