Re: How to Think About Naturalism

Stephen Jones (sjones@iinet.net.au)
Wed, 13 Mar 96 21:56:46 EST

Jim

On 07 Mar 96 18:54:10 EST you wrote:

>TI>Is the assumption here that because we can't say the extermination
>of Jews is an absolutely "bad" thing, we must let it occur? That
>does not follow. I admit that this could happen, but claiming
>to have a set of absolute beliefs might not prevent it either.

JB>It does if those beliefs included the absolute, "Thou shalt not
>murder." Naturalists, by definition, cannot affirm such absolutes.
>It would be interesting to hear a naturalist try to make the
>argument, "Killing Jews is a bad thing." If you'd like to try,
>please do. I'd like to see what such an argument looks like.

In fact moral relatavists do have an absolute - it is called moral
relativism! Does Tim believe there are no moral absolutes? Absolutely!
:-)

But the real question is not "Is killing Jews a bad thing?" but "Is
killing humans a bad thing?" Now one might argue that this is not an
absolute because killing in self-defence, or mercy-killing, etc.,
makes killing justified in some circumstances. But this merely
establishes the absolute general principal that killing humans is a
bad thing, even though there may be some special circumstances, that
mitigate its badness.

C.S. Lewis wrote:

"I know that some people say the idea of a Law of Nature or decent
behaviour known to all men is unsound, because different civilizations
and different ages have had quite different moralities. But this is
not true. There have been differences between their moralities, but
these have never amounted to anything like a total difference. If
anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say,
the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and
Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to
each other and to our own....for our present purpose I need only ask
the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean.
Think of a country where people were admired for running away in
battle, or where a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people
who had been kindest to him. You might just as well try to imagine a
country where two and two made five. Men have differed as regards
what people you ought to be unselfish to- whether it was only your own
family, or your fellow countrymen, or every one. But they have always
agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has
never been admired. Men have differed as to whether you should have
one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not
simply have any woman you liked." (Lewis C.S., "Mere Christianity",
Fount: London, 1977 reprint, p17)

TI>However, as you mention above, that does not prevent one from
>judging according to an agreed standard of outcome (or an agreed upon
>set of starting axioms). The theistic moralist claims that this
>agreed upon set of standards comes from an ultimate source. An
>agnostic would question the source but may agree with the theist upon
>a common set of standards.

JB>The first problem is that the "agreement" is not based upon
>anything--it could come from whim, appetite or a bad day at the
>office. Therefore, one may dissent from such "agreements" without
>any moral counter-argument to stop him.

Yes. Besides Tim thinks that the "theistic moralist" is proposing
something different from what the "agnostic" believes. In fact it
isn't - that's the whole point. Both the "theist" and the "agnostic"
believe the central moral teachings of Moses (the ten commandments)
and Jesus ("love your neighbour as yourself". The "theist" and
"agnostic" do mostly agree on the *content* of the moral law, what
they disagree on its its *source*.

JB>The second problem, of course, is that agnostic/atheist who does
>agree is merely borrowing the moral capital of theism, but without
>paying any interest.

I don't disagree, but after reading C.S. Lewis, I would say that the
"agnostic/atheist" agrees with the moral teaching of "theism" because
it is also the moral teaching of the "agnostic/atheist"! The "moral
capital of theism" is in its stewardship of the authoritative record
of the moral law, not in it's monopoly ownership of it. Paul reminds
his readers in that Rom 2:14-15 that "Gentiles (ie. pagans), who do
not have the law" can "do by nature things required by the law..."
and "...they show that the requirements of the law are written on
their hearts..."

TI>Ultimately, the acceptance of moral standards and functional
>criteria are based on personal beliefs, whether one is a theist or a
>"moral relativist".

JB>This is undisputed. The point is that the theist can sustain
>"moral standards" logically. The naturalist cannot. Standards
>cannot exists. That why it is called the naturalistic "fallacy."
>And personal beliefs can be explored for their logical consistency,
>or lack thereof.

I would argue "moral standards" are more than mere "personal beliefs".
They are built-in. We are "hard-wired" with moral natures. Only a
theist can account for this - we were made moral in the image of a
holy God. The "naturalist" cannot rationally account for his "moral
standards", since to him they are just "personal beliefs":

"...Objective morality makes sense if real moral laws or oughts exist
and if normative, moral properties like rightness, goodness, worth,
and dignity exist in acts (the act of honoring one's parents) and
things (persons and animals have worth). If physicalism is true as a
worldview, there are no moral properties or full-blooded oughts.
Physical states just are, and one physical state causes or fails to
cause another physical state. A physical state does not morally
prescribe that another physical state ought to be. If physicalism is
true, oughts are not real moral obligations telling us what one should
do to be in conformity with the moral universe. Rather, "ought"
serves as a mere guide for reaching a socially accepted or
psychologically desired goal (e.g., "If one wants to have pleasure and
avoid pain, then one 'ought' to tell the truth") . Moral imperatives
become grounded in subjective preferences on the same level as a
preference for Burger King over McDonald's." (Moreland J.P., "Scaling
the Secular City", Baker: Grand Rapids MI, 1987, p93)

TI>Nor can the "oughts" of one religion (or set of religious beliefs)
>logically displace those of another religion.

JB>That's not correct. Read, for example, -Truth in Religion- by
>Mortimer Adler. It is quite possible to make reasoned arguments
>about religion and absolute truth, but the poor naturalist cannot
>even enter the discussion!

Tim's argument might be true if all religions were equally valid. But
even he might believe a religion that taught as its highest truth
"love your neigbour as yourself" (Judeo-Christianity) was more true
than one which had temple prostitutes and sacrificed its children to
aidols as did the Canaanites and the Incas.

But leaving that aside, Christianity has a logical reason for claiming
that its "religion" not only can but must "displace those of another
religion" - it's Founder claimed to be God and proved it by dying and
rising again. Atheists might deny that Jesus did rise from the dead,
but they cannot deny that Christians can claim that their "oughts" can
"logically displace those of another religion."

TI>I do not quite understand how moral relativism appears as such
>a boogey-man to some. Is it the idea that without knowable
>moral absolutes, everyone will do exactly as they please with
>complete disregard to others? How long could one expect such
>actions to be tolerated in any society?

JB>Your faith in human society is, I think, a tad naive. I wonder
>what you think of the direction of our own society is, morally
>speaking. Without consensus what society tolerates can just as
>easily be, once again, something as repugnant as genocide. Only the
>theist can tell us why it IS repugnant.

Agreed. The point is that "moral relativism" is as much a
"boogey-man" to the atheist/agnostic as to the theist:

"But the most remarkable thing is this. Whenever you find a man who
says he does not believe in a real Right and Wrong, you will find the
same man going back on this a moment later. He may break his promise
to you, but if you try breaking one to him he will be complaining
'It's not fair' before you can say Jack Robinson. A nation may say
treaties do not matter but then, next minute, they spoil their case by
saying that the particular treaty they want to break was an unfair
one. But if treaties do not matter, and if there is no such thing as
Right and Wrong - in other words, if there is no Law of Nature-what is
the difference between a fair treaty and an unfair one? Have they not
let the cat out of the bag and shown that, whatever they say, they
really know the Law of Nature just like anyone else?' (Lewis C.S.,
"Mere Christianity", Fount: London, 1977 reprint, p18)

JB>And with individuals, it is simply a matter of cost-benefit. If I
>can get away with some action, currently illegal, why not?

Indeed, why not? The eleventh commandment "Thou shalt not get caught!"
is the logical consequence of atheism. Yet most atheists are probably
highly moral people. The point is that they are *inconsistently*
moral, whereas theists can be are *consistently* moral.

TI>Now let me put the shoe on the other foot: I can only hope that
>someone's vision of religious absolutism doesn't lead to hurting
>other people -- And this hope has been betrayed in the past.

JB>Define "hurt." Define "betrayed." In naturalist syntax, of
>course. But if you borrow the moral capital of theism to agree about
>"hurt," then I would share your hope.I would also point out that
>theistic moral arguments have alleviated great pain and suffering,
>and still do.

Yes. Tim claims there are no "oughts" yet in the next breath he uses
them. Why is "religious absolutism" bad? If all is relative, then
"religious absolutism" is just another equally valid belief. And why
is "hurting other people" bad? He has just claimed that we can't
even say that the "extermination" of an entire nation "the Jews" is an
"absolutely `bad' thing", so I can't see how he can claim that simply
"hurting other people" is bad. And what's this about "hope" that "has
been betrayed". What's wrong with betraying people's hopes, if there
are no moral absolutes?

Also, again Tim assumes that all brands of "religious absolutism" are
equal. Christian "religious absolutism" has as its highest principle
"You shall love your neighbour as yourself". If Christianity was in
control and acted according to its highest principle, then this world
would be heaven on Earth, but with atheists in control its rapidly
becoming the opposite!

TI>The simple fact that there is a God does not imply that there
>must be ultimate moral accountability (Heck, it doesn't even mean that
>God is moral).

JB>Once you admit there is a God, the question becomes "What sort of
>God?" It is another inquiry, but one that is consistent with the
>logic employed in answering the first. Suffice to say, I think you
>can get to the moral God quite easily.

Yes. Again Tim assumes that all "Gods" are equal. The God of the
Bible is a "moral God", who demanded that His people be moral:

Lev 19:2 "Speak to the entire assembly of Israel and say to them: 'Be
holy because I, the LORD your God, am holy' "; Mt 5:48 "Be perfect,
therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect."

With a "moral God" like that there *is* "ultimate moral
accountability"! The point is that naturalists believe in their heart
of hearts that they are morally accountable (witness Tim's Freudian
slips above), but they don't know who they are accountable to.
Theists don't have that problem. Theism fits man's moral nature like
a glove fits a hand.

God bless.

Steve

PS: Still plowing though "The Darwin Conspiracy". I didn't realise
that the archaeopteryx was a fraud, instigated by Sir Max! How
wonderful it must be to be a writer of novels. You aren't the author
of Primary Colors by any chance, are you? Ha! Flushed you out! :-)

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