I wonder what restrictions define an hypothesis as scientific. For
starters, the "simplicity rule", or Occam's Razor, is only a rule of thumb
to help one assign a collection of data to a single hypothesis when several
alternative hypotheses serve to explain the data. It is really an arbritary
convenience and does not carry any weight as a hard-and-fast rule by which
science is defined. I think that science is defined more simply as a branch
of philosophy that uses empirical evidence to justify belief. Other forms
of philosophy use different ways to justify belief. So, really, the only
"rule" that distinguishes science from other ways of explaining the world is
its empiricism.
Here I think that it is relevant to point out that we can often the same
question in different ways. Thus, one can ask, "how did the universe
originate?" and attempt to find an answer via science (which then represents
an empirically justified belief--accordign to the definition of science I
used above). Alternatively, one can attempt to find an answer to this
question using theology (which represents a different form of belief
justification). It is important to note that the two ways to answer the
question are NOT mutually exclusive regardless what the positivists claim
and regardless what Jim Bell claims. Thus, using my example of a tree
growing from a seed--we can simultaneously understand this in a naturalistic
(empirical) way, and we can understand this as a manifestation of God's
creative power.
>However, it seems to
>me that in the exploration of how wide is the range of hypotheses that don't
>contradict natural data once one sets aside some of the usual restrictions of
>science, there are still some possibilities open for rational consideration in
>this arena of young earth creation. Perhaps others have progressed further in
>such an exploration and have been able to conclude otherwise. If that is the
>case, one might hope that folk would be patient in helping others to
acquire the
>same knowledge as they have. One can't help but suspect, however, that any
>impatience shown on this reflector is not from a lack of willingness to be
>helpful but stems rather from, firstly, a natural reaction to the strident
>behavior of some in the "yec" camp and, secondly, from not having personally
>much desire to participate in sorting out those conclusions resulting from the
>usual restrictions of science. At any rate, those of us who still find some
>value in exploring some of the notions in this area and who limit ourselves to
>polite discourse on this subject, appreciate the interaction with those of you
>who see less of interest in some of the "yec" notions. I for one see no reason
>why one might not have an active interest in exploring both the notions of
>"young" and "old" forms of creation.
There is a contradiction when Norm talks about,
>the range of hypotheses that don't
>contradict natural data once one sets aside some of the usual restrictions of
>science, there are still some possibilities open for rational consideration in
>this arena of young earth creation.
Doesn't the notion of a young earth contradict a good deal of "natural data"?
Steve
__________________________________________________________________________
Steven S. Clark, Ph.D. Phone: (608) 263-9137
Associate Professor FAX: (608) 263-4226
Dept. of Human Oncology and email: ssclark@facstaff.wisc.edu
UW Comprehensive Cancer Ctr
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53792
"Now how does one alter the charge on the niobium ball? 'Well at that
stage', said my friend, 'we spray it with positrons to increase the charge
or with electrons to decrease the charge.' From that day forth I've been
a scientific realist. So far as I'm concerned, if you can spray them then
they are real". Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 1983
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