>Steve Clark writes:
>
><<Analogy and extrapolation can point one in a particular direction--but do
>not constitute empirical evidence for that to which one extrapolates. You
>need to obtain empirical evidence for the extrapolated model rather than
>rely on analogous situations that do not directly address the situation in
>question.>>
>I have a bit of a problem with this rendition. The quest in science is not for
>empirical evidence, it is for explanatory power. This is a very essential
>distinction which, if missed, will lead to false conclusions.
For philosophy in general, I guess one could say that the quest is to
explain things. But this can be accomplished in different ways. Thus,
science differes from other forms of philosophy in that its explanations are
tested empirically. This distinguishes science from other types of philosophy.
>
>Very little in life is built on empirical evidence. Very little in science,
too.
>One uses observation/empiricism in an inductive sense, but then one has to put
>it all back into the mix, which is addressing the question of explanations.
Does
>the evidence fit, or "cohere", with the explanatory web one is constructing?
>Does the explanatory web best account for what is observed?
Here, I think that the distinction between physics and metaphysics is being
ignored. The latter deals with explanation that are not necessarily
tractable to empirical testing like science is. On the other hand, science
is properly viewed from a more limited perspective than Jim presents here.
When atheistic scientists claim that science disproves the existence of God,
they do not acknowledge the differences between physics and metaphysics.
Christians are also guilty of this, but in a different way, when they say
that the existence of God disproves certain scientific claims. When a
scientist tries to learn how a tree arises from a small seed by pulling
carbon from the air, those explanations that can be empirically verified are
the most satisfying. When asking whether there is purpose in this world,
one cannot be limited only by explanations that can be empirically tested.
Furthermore, the growth of the tree does not prove or disprove purpose, and
the reality of purpose is not contrary to the naturalistic explanation of
tree growth.
>Once we understand that, we are not limited by a "need to obtain empirical
>evidence." That, by itself, is one of the false constrictions of naturalism.
But science IS naturalism--empiricism is what distinguishes science from
other forms of philosophy. But this is NOT to say that scientific truth is
the only truth.
Another big difference between scientific (empirical) truth and metaphysical
truth lies in justification of belief (or HOW we know what we know, rather
than what we know). One truth is internally justified while the other
represents externally justified truth. This distinction makes no claim that
one type of truth is more or less justified than another type of truth,
regardless of what the positivists claim.
Dawkins and Sagan fail to make these distinctions between physics and
metaphysics--but so do Johnson and Bell. Either way, the failure to make
the distinctions either unduly promotes or unduly constrains the power of
science.
Steve
__________________________________________________________________________
Steven S. Clark, Ph.D. Phone: (608) 263-9137
Associate Professor FAX: (608) 263-4226
Dept. of Human Oncology and email: ssclark@facstaff.wisc.edu
UW Comprehensive Cancer Ctr
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53792
"Philosophers consistently see the method of science before their eyes,
and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way
science does. This tendency...leads the philosopher into complete
darkness." Ludwig Wittgestein, The Blue Book, 1933
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