Re: Philosophy of Science/ID

Bill Hamilton (hamilton@predator.cs.gmr.com)
Thu, 25 Jan 1996 12:40:12 -0500

David Tyler quoted Loren (thanks, David. I had intended to remark on this
earlier and forgot. Too busy I guess) Anyways, Loren said

>LH > "However, ID does not have to WAIT ... in order to enter the
>discussion. If it _uncertain_ whether natural processes are
>adequate or inadequate to explain assembly, ID has a role in the
>discussion. Naturalistic processes for abiogenesis (for example)
>are extremely speculative. The more speculative the naturalistic
>explanations, and the stronger the scientific objections, the
>stronger the case is for adopting the ID-paradigm".

While I most definitely agree that ID doesn't have to wait to be involved
in the discussion, Loren's final sentence makes me a little nervous. What
makes me nervous is the implication that some threshhold exists such that
if our knowledge of a process exceeds that threshhold we count it explained
naturalistically, but if our knowledge is below the threshhold we admit ID.
It seems to me better to admit that our understanding of most natural
processes is imperfect and therefore admit ID from the getgo. In part my
reasoning is based on tactical considerations: among a group of scientists
who are committed to naturalistic explanations, ID would be, at best, a
last resort -- one which they would endeavor at all costs to avoid. Isn't
it better to admit that there are mysteries even in fields that are
considered fairly well-understood, and that the human process of
investigating nature frequently results in at least as many new unanswered
questions as it settles. I don't think there is any danger of filling in
the gaps. Rather, we simply discover more fine gap structure as we
progress, and find it is exqusitely detailed.

Bill Hamilton | Vehicle Systems Research
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