I've found the ID discussion useful. Just a few thoughts in this
post:
Jim Bell (12 Jan) has:
>>If I understand the logic correctly, once we eliminate
"non-intelligence" and chance as explanations, we really have
only one other direction to explore. Thus, "intelligent
design.">>
It seems to me this leaves intelligent design as an option that
only "wins when all other avenues have been exhausted"
(a) Will this ever be the case? (see below)
(b) Does this not leave ID open to the criticism that it thrives
only in a "God-of-the-gaps" context?
(c) Does it do justice to the philosophical issues involved?
Loren Haarsma (12 Jan) approves many of the points in Jim's post:
>> I agree with you (and Hartwig and Meyer) on the main point:
ID-theory has a place in scientific discussion and scientific
theory-building; it should not be "ruled out of court.">>
I want to come in at this level, not having to argue the point
again, and comment on a later paragraph:
>> Several months ago in this discussion group, Mike Behe argued
for "irreducible complexity" as a criteria for ID. This criteria
is objective and can be defined prior to examining new biological
systems. The only drawback with this criteria is that many
scientist believe that biological evolution CAN produce
irreducibly complex systems.>>
The word "believe" is the focus of my comment: the reductionists
are supremely confident that they can identify mechanisms which
can produce complexity. But their science is essentially
deductive. Their philosophy drives them on to "close the loop"
of cause and effect. This has implications for Loren's next
para:
>> I'd like to see some ID-biology criteria advanced which is
both specific (specific like "irreducible complexity") --- much
more specific than simply "... natural processes could not do it"
--- and generally agreed upon by scientists. I believe this can
be achieved, and it would help advance the discussion. (Perhaps
you will suggest that the lack of a widely agreed-upon criteria
(such as irreducible complexity) is due to wilful blindness on
the part of evolutionists, but I don't want to put words in your
mouth. :-)>>
Is it realistic to ask for these criteria to be "generally
agreed"? Surely this is impossible while naturalism reigns! And
it is not necessary to invoke "wilful blindness" - for these
reductionists are working within a paradigm (so I'll accept a
diagnosis of paradigm-blindness).
Later, on the theme of "Observability and testability", Loren
writes:
>> I wouldn't QUITE say that ID and neo-Darwinism are "in the
same category." IMO, the basic difference is this: neo-Darwinism
must prove that natural mechanisms are adequate to account for
biological history; ID must prove that natural mechanisms are
INadequate. In one sense, ID has a much more difficult task,
since it must exhaustively examine all natural processes to prove
its point. However, if ID succeeds, it will have _convincingly_
shown that intelligence was involved. On the other hand, even
IF neo-Darwinism succeeds, it will NOT have shown that
intelligence was NOT behind the process.>>
But within a reductionist paradigm, ID will never prove that
natural mechanisms are inadequate! From the perspective of ID,
reductionists will never prove that their natural mechanisms are
adequate. (I leave, for the present, the thought that neo-
Darwinism is not inconsistent with intelligence).
If we emphasise more the foundations on which science is built,
then it is possible to say that a science of the natural world
can be built on naturalistic presuppositions, and that a science
of the natural world can be built on ID presuppositions. This
takes ID out of the "god-of-the-gaps" context; it gives freedom
to explore the concept and to develop the science without having
to be so defensive about itself.
A final comment, based on Loren again, on the question as to
whether ID is religion in disguise:
>> But many of the arguments --- both for and against ID --- go
well beyond science and are rather philosophical. If THOSE are
taught in the classroom, they should be labelled as philosophical
arguments.>>
Agree. For me, the implication is that we do this also for
naturalism and all reductionist approaches to life.
Best wishes,
*** From David J. Tyler, CDT Department, Hollings Faculty,
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
Telephone: 0161-247-2636 ***