Bloesch wrote at the end:
"My position is much closer to fideism than to rationalism in that I see
faith as determining reason and not vice verse. ...{a big list of people he
likes}...As with many of those mentioned I uphold not a mere fideism but a
trinitarian fideism, one that has its source not in the leap of faith but in
divine revelation. Faith should be understood in this context not as a
venture in the darkness but as an intelligible response to the gift of Jesus
Christ. In contradistinction to radical fideists we do not see a divorce
between faith and reason but have the conversion of reason by faith. The
postion presented here is not an existentialist subjectivism but rather a
biblical evangelicalism that seeks to hold in balance objective revelation
and subjective decision." p. 187.
The problem I see here is with the view of reason (and thereby objective
reality) being totally subject to faith. If Bloesch's view of reason is
that your faith determines what objective reality is, then I have great
trouble with that. A religion which teaches that the sky is purple, can only
exist among peoples who never go outdoors. If one of their members goes out
for a look, their belief will not be able to alter reality. It might alter
their reason in that they deduce that their religion calls blue "purple". Or
they might think that the devil is fooling them into seeing a blue sky but
really it is purple. Or, they might think that they have a disease which
alters their vision, in which case the sky is really purple. If they come
back from their outdoor walk and start teaching that the sky is blue, they
probably have lots of trouble.
A religion which teaches 1. that the geologic column does not exist,
2. salt is volcanic in nature, and 3. that there is no evidence for stars
further out than 6000 light years, 4. that there is no recorded instances of
speciation (as some in Christianity do for each of these) is in the same
position as the purple-sky worshippers. There religion can only exist as
long as no one goes and studies geology or astronomy.
But there was much to recommend here.Bloesch writes:
"Revelation has both an objective and a subjective pole. The former
signifies the disclosure of meaning in the historical events mirrored in the
Bible and also in the biblical testimony itself. The subjective pole refers
to the mystical or inward illumination of the Holy Spirit. It is through the
Spirit of God that we are led into the experience of faith, that we are
empowered to respond to what God has done for us in Christ." p. 70
This quotation seems to imply that Bloesch believes Revelation should leave
footprints in history as well as in the changed lives of the individuals.
Again,
"Faith has a twofold objectivity--history and eternity. Its position is
certain because it points beyond itself to the living God and His infallible
Word." p. 72.
Here Bloesch admits that history is objective. This would imply
verifiability.
Bloesch wrote:
"One may be acquanted with the history of the Bible but still be in the dark
concerning the meaning of the cross for our salvation. The historical norm
by itself is not sufficient topersuade men of the truth of the Gospel. One
may even have a knowledge of the historical Jesus, but this does not
guarantee a recognition of Jesus as the Christ."
I would agree whole-heartedly with this. Knowledge does not necessarily lead
to faith. But one must have knowledge before one can have faith. Romans
10:14 says, "How, then can they call on the one they have not believed in?
And how can they believe in the one of whom they have not heard? And how can
they hear without someone preaching to them?" From this it is clear that
knowledge is necessary but not sufficient for faith. But the position I am
very ineffectively arguing for is that those things which are historical
(objective in Bloesch's terminology) should in principle (a positivist term)
be capable of verification. If they are not then they are not objective.
Thus when Terry Gray wrote:
> I would argue that
>our acceptance of Christianity and the Biblical revelation of who God is
>and what He has done does not depend on our ability to resolve all the
>difficulties.
I would agree. Our acceptance of Christianity does not depend upon our
ability to verify all events or resolve all difficulties. But if we believe
something that is contrary to the data (as mentioned above), then can we in
all seriousness suggest that our belief covers over the objective problem? (I
know Terry would not believe that). This is why I have often used the view
of the world suggested by the Upanishads. If the Bible stated that the earth
rested on the back of a turtle swimming in a cosmic sea, our document would
be contrary to observational evidence and no amount of wishing, believing or
preaching would solve that difficulty. We would have to do what Terry
suggested in his essay on the role of a scientist, change the interpretation
of the scientific data or change the interpretation of the Scripture or, I
would add, look elsewhere for the True revelation from God..
Bloesch wrote:
"Although revelation is anchored in the history and testimony of Scripture,
it does not take place in our lives apart from personal decision and faith.
The foundation of revelation is objective, but its realization is
subjective. ...The experience of faith must always be tested by the
objecctive criterion, the message of the Bible, but the latter must also be
verified by the Spirit illumining us from within." p. 73
If faith is founded in objective history, what are we to say if we find that
our view of history is not supported by the observational data of history?
This is the position I find that all widely accepted views of origins to
occupy. Hugh Ross' view has problems with anthropology. ICR has major
problems with the geology, anthropology, astronomy, and physics. In fact
both of their views of history are contrary to what the data of historical
science says. Ross has less problems, but problems exist nonetheless. Thus,
if revelation is anchored in the history and testimony of Scripture, how can
faith have its full result if the foundational part is in trouble?
Bloesch wrote:
>>Augustine is one who seeks to relate faith and reason very closely but yet
who sees faith as being the more decisive. His motto was "I believe in order
to understan.' Before one can come to a right understanding of God he must
first believe in God's revelation in Jesus Christ. Yet Augustine also held
that before one believes it is necessary to determine what one believes.
Reason therefore also [ has] a role prior to faith." p. 177
If reason says that the revelation is unreasonable (like the turtle in the
cosmic sea) then how is one to come to a belief that the revelation is from
God?