1. The biblical data, by itself, does not settle which of these two
interpretations is correct - or incorrect (possibly both).
2. The means of distinguishing between the two, or rejecting the two,
depends on observation and interpretation - in the same way science
normally operates.
3. In agreeing to this, we allow each other the latitude to be
influenced by our peculiar understanding of how God operates - while
recognizing that this is an expression of personal perspective, and not
something that follows as a "proper understanding of the God revealed
in the Bible".
[My lead to this was unclear, but I believe the right letters to attach to
the two "interpretations" referred to in statement 1 are PC and TE, though
I am not fully sure I have a good grip on the meaning of these
abbreviations.]
Glenn Morton and Stephen Jones were the only two to respond. Glenn agreed
with all three, and Stephen with the second. Getting these two to agree
on even one statement out of three is pretty good for starters. :-)
In commenting on this matter, Stephen wrote:
"Thanks, Gordon. Your "peacemaker" role is always appreciated!"
Stephen: I assume from this that you see some merit in the process. If
so, perhaps you might be willing to suggest revisions of items 1 and 3
with which you could be comfortable.
To my way of thinking, there are several reasons to engage in this process:
Stephen has suggested one. Since Christians find it easy to disagree,
it's a testimony to the work of Christ among us when we can attain, after
some discussion and reflection, certain common affirmations.
A second value, in my judgment is to allow us to better focus future debate
on what we do NOT commonly affirm. To illustrate this point, let me
refer to Steve Clark's recent comment:
"Christians have had a long standing problem with a mechanistic view of
the world that is perceived to "limit" God's involvement. Evolution
(Darwinian or otherwise) represents a current point of attack for such
sentiment. Just read some of the anti-evolution and anti-science
rhetoric on this reflector that does not distinguish between
methodological naturalism and philosophical naturalism and, instead,
either confuses the two or lumps them together."
Perhaps, Steve, or someone else, might be willing to suggest a fourth
point, that many of us might be able to affirm, which would provide a
means of avoiding this problem (he refers to) in future debates and
discussions. In this regard, I believe many of us CAN agree with the
practice of "methodological naturalism" while rejecting "philosophical
naturalism".
Finally, I invite any who wish to reformulate - even substantially - my
three points. At a minimum, they could certainly read better than they do
now.
Gordie