> From: "Howard J. Van Till" <hvantill@novagate.com>
> To: george murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
> Subject: Re: What does the creation lack?
> Date: Sun, Oct 28, 2001, 5:47 PM
>
> From: george murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
>
> In the approach of process
> theology (P), that limitation is due to
> the very nature of God and God's
> relationship with the world. A more
> traditional kenotic approach (K) sees
> God as indeed able to do all things,
> including miraculous intervention that
> violates the usual pattern of nature,
> but as voluntarily limiting divine
> action to what can be accomplished
> through natural processes. This is the
> scholastic distinction between God's
> "absolute power" and God's "ordinate
> power." The latter is limited while the
> former is not (except by the requirement
> of non-contradiction.) The process
> view, OTOH, amounts to the claim that
> even God's "absolute power" is limited.
>
> I think that's a correct representation of process
> theology, in which supernatural intervention is
> absent as a consequence of the very nature of God
> and the God/world relationship. God is "supreme in
> power," but not omnipotent.
It appears to me that the "not omnipotent" qualification disqualifies P
from being biblical.
> Both of these approaches are
> consistent with the ideas of creation's
> functional integrity and from the
> standpoint of the natural sciences may
> be indistinguishable. But there are some
> important theological differences. In
> K, God's not superseding natural laws is
> due to the fact that God does not choose
> to do so, while with P it's due to the
> fact that God can't do so. K is a view
> of divine action that is modelled on the
> Incarnation and cross, in which Christ
> "emptied" himself, while with P
> Incarnation and cross are examples of a
> general pattern: It's a difference in
> starting points.
>
> I'm not sure about the "examples of a general
> pattern" comment, but it certainly is true that K
> and P represent two quite different concepts of
> God, fundamental concepts on which one's theology
> is constructed.
>
>
> P does not have to answer the
> question "Why does God so limit divine
> action?" because he must in the nature
> of things. K can of course simply fall
> back on "Because he wants to," but can
> also argue that limitation of divine
> action to what is in accord with
> rational laws of nature makes it
> possible for creatures to understand &
> have some control over their world. It
> is seldom noted, OTOH, that P does not
> really explain why there is a rational
> pattern for what takes place in the
> world.
>
> I presume the answer lies in the metaphysics on
> which process thought is founded. Perhaps it might
> also be argued that K does not really demonstrate
> that this particular form of divine
> self-limitation is morally optimal.
>
> It may seem that P has the edge
> when dealing with the theodicy question:
> To put it crudely, bad things happen to
> good people because God can't help it.
> God can't intervene miraculously to
> keep cancer cells from multiplying, &c.
> K, OTOH, has to say that God could
> intervene but chooses not to. That may
> not seem a very attractive answer. This
> impression may be mitigated, however, by
> (a) the argument that this is the price
> that has to be paid for a rational world
> and (b) the claim that not only
> creatures but also God pays this price
> on the cross.
>
> One of my reasons for suggesting that P deserves a
> sympathetic consideration is its handling of the
> theodicy issue. Given traditional
> supernaturalism's difficulty with this matter, I
> still think some exploration of other theological
> systems is in order.
The theodicy issue must be handled within a theology of the cross, as
George proposed, as well as the free will of humans and angels given
them by God.
Peter
> Finally, K is more open to the
> possibility of miraculous intervention
> than P. Howard speaks consistently of
> his view of creation as ruling out
> "form-conferring interventions" but what
> about other kinds (e.g., redemptive)
> interventions? I have said before that
> I don't think it's necessary to insist
> that any given action, up to & including
> the resurrection, must be of such a
> character. OTOH, I wonder if it's wise
> to adopt an approach in which such
> interventions not even possible.
>
> OK, but sympathetic exploration is not adoption.
> One can learn from views without adopting them.
>
> Howard
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