> From: george murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
> To: "Howard J. Van Till" <hvantill@novagate.com>
> Subject: Re: What does the creation lack?
> Date: Sun, Oct 28, 2001, 2:51 PM
>
> "Howard J. Van Till" wrote:
>
> George, in response to Dave:
>
> > Perhaps one thing you're
> missing is that use of the term
> "Providence"
> > in describing Howard's view may be
> misleading. He has expressed some
> > approval of the process theology views
> of Griffin, which differ significantly
> > from traditional doctrines of
> providence in which God is omnipotent.
> In
> > process thought God is "lures" the
> world toward the goals God intends, but
> > one can't say that "all [is] within
> the will of the Almighty. Everything
> > works, and works out, as God intends."
>
> > But probably Howard will want
> to speak for himself on this.
>
> Correct. From the process theology
> perspective, God is "supreme in power"
> but not omnipotent. Not all that happens
> is within God's will. God's
> persuasive action cannot override or
> supersede the action of creatures to
> force a particular outcome.
>
> That does not eliminate the idea of
> God's acting in a way that has the needs
>
> of God's creatures in mind, but it does
> modify it. I'm still evaluating the
> process theology perspective; it is
> strong on a concept of divine action
> that does not entail the standard
> problems of theodicy but other features
> do
> indeed need to be considered.
>
> Though it may seem irreverent, we might
> also approach this issue by asking "What does God
> lack?" That's by way of pointing out a basic
> difference between two ways of understanding a
> limitation of God to action through natural
> processes.
> In the approach of process theology (P),
> that limitation is due to the very nature of God
> and God's relationship with the world. A more
> traditional kenotic approach (K) sees God as
> indeed able to do all things, including miraculous
> intervention that violates the usual pattern of
> nature, but as voluntarily limiting divine action
> to what can be accomplished through natural
> processes. This is the scholastic distinction
> between God's "absolute power" and God's "ordinate
> power." The latter is limited while the former is
> not (except by the requirement of
> non-contradiction.) The process view, OTOH,
> amounts to the claim that even God's "absolute
> power" is limited.
> Both of these approaches are consistent
> with the ideas of creation's functional integrity
> and from the standpoint of the natural sciences
> may be indistinguishable. But there are some
> important theological differences. In K, God's
> not superseding natural laws is due to the fact
> that God does not choose to do so, while with P
> it's due to the fact that God can't do so. K is a
> view of divine action that is modelled on the
> Incarnation and cross, in which Christ "emptied"
> himself, while with P Incarnation and cross are
> examples of a general pattern: It's a difference
> in starting points.
> P does not have to answer the question
> "Why does God so limit divine action?" because he
> must in the nature of things. K can of course
> simply fall back on "Because he wants to," but can
> also argue that limitation of divine action to
> what is in accord with rational laws of nature
> makes it possible for creatures to understand &
> have some control over their world. It is seldom
> noted, OTOH, that P does not really explain why
> there is a rational pattern for what takes place
> in the world.
> It may seem that P has the edge when
> dealing with the theodicy question: To put it
> crudely, bad things happen to good people because
> God can't help it. God can't intervene
> miraculously to keep cancer cells from
> multiplying, &c. K, OTOH, has to say that God
> could intervene but chooses not to. That may not
> seem a very attractive answer. This impression
> may be mitigated, however, by (a) the argument
> that this is the price that has to be paid for a
> rational world and (b) the claim that not only
> creatures but also God pays this price on the
> cross.
To (a), I would add "and free-will creatures".
> Finally, K is more open to the possibility
> of miraculous intervention than P. Howard speaks
> consistently of his view of creation as ruling out
> "form-conferring interventions" but what about
> other kinds (e.g., redemptive) interventions? I
> have said before that I don't think it's necessary
> to insist that any given action, up to & including
> the resurrection, must be of such a character.
> OTOH, I wonder if it's wise to adopt an approach
> in which such interventions not even possible.
> Shalom, George
>
> George L. Murphy
> http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
> "The Science-Theology Interface"
Thank you, George, for this very clear and enlightening description of
the distinction between process theology P and the kenotic approach K! I
understand K to be the biblical theology which I have embraced.
Peter
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