Divine limits

From: Tom Pearson (pearson@panam1.panam.edu)
Date: Wed Sep 05 2001 - 23:17:39 EDT

  • Next message: Tom Pearson: "Divine limits"

    At 08:12 PM 09/04/2001 -0600, John W Burgeson wrote:

    >That is a correct statement, of course. The question unposed by it is, of
    >course, is this: "Is the "traditional doctrine of God" a correct one?"
    >The proponents of both process theology and open theism freely admit that
    >those concepts (metaphors?) of God do not square with tradition, and, of
    >course, argue that tradition has performed the fallacy of misplaced
    >concreteness (a phrase attributed to Alfred North Whitehead) by mistaking
    >images (metaphors) of God for reality.

    The stances taken by both process theology and open theism are themselves
    metaphorically based. The charge of misplaced concreteness only applies if
    you assume (as Whitehead seems to) that metaphors are linguistic figures
    that are entirely distinct from, and mostly irrelevant to, our perception
    of reality. But if metaphors turn out to be the linguistic vehicles for
    our apprehension of reality -- the means by which reality is intelligible
    to us -- then the concreteness of metaphorical images is not misplaced; it
    is the only concreteness possible for human human understanding. When
    David Ray Griffin (whose work you so nicely summarized earlier this summer,
    Burgy) or Schubert Ogden or John Haught speak of God's relationship to
    creation as "divine persuasion," instead of describing that relationship as
    some sort of determinism or predestinarian doctrine, they are invoking a
    metaphorical image as robust as any talk of omnipotence, omniscience, or
    omnibenevolence ever was.

    The great difficulty with open theism, and to a lesser extent with process
    thought, is their near-obsession with human freedom. Human beings must be
    fundamentally described as free (in order, I suspect, to make moral agency
    possible), and all theological constructs are then framed accordingly. I'd
    prefer to start with the traditional theological resources, including the
    orthodox view of God and his attributes, and then see if we can make sense
    of human freedom (or even if there is any such thing).

    >My own position is one of a traditional view. But in studying these other
    >options, I have to admit their arguments are very persuasive. And
    >interesting. Whitehead is not easy reading, however.

    Another thinker who is not easy reading, but whose work is important in
    understanding the kind of language we use in our conversations about
    theology and science, and why that language is so powerful, is Paul
    Ricoeur. He's one of those French phenomenologist-type guys whose thought
    is sometimes akin to cold molasses, but his insights on why we make sense
    of things the way we do are rich and remarkable.

    Tom Pearson
    _________________________________________________________________________
    _________________________________________________________________________

    Thomas D. Pearson
    Department of History & Philosophy
    The University of Texas-Pan American
    Edinburg, Texas
    e-mail: pearson@panam1.panam.edu



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