> May I take this in a different direction? We often assume that
> while our non-analytic statements in science are _quantitatively_
> approximate, they are _qualitatively_ exact - i.e., that we're at least
> using the right concepts.
>
I think this is right, which is why quantative expressions in science are
often referred to as "verisimilitudinous" rather than "true"
*simpliciter*.
> E.g., we know the simultaneous position (q) &
> momentum (p) of a particle only approximately, but that the particle
> really has such an exact q & p, _and that God knows what they are_. But
> on a maximal interpretation of the uncertainty principle, this is
> incorrect. q & p are not the types of things which _can_ have exact
> values simultaneously, & I think we have to say that _God_ does not know
> such values. This does not contradict divine omniscience, any more than
> does the statement that God doesn't know the color of truth - because
> truth doesn't have a color.
>
I concur fully. Where there is no truth of the matter, of course even God
cannot know it. Now, whether a maximal interpretation of QM will prove
the best, or whether some final theory will incorporate (as-yet-unknown)
local hidden variables, or will demonstrate nonlocality, remains to be
seen.
Garry