But any such calculation breaks down and is literally nonsensical if
you can't estimate a prior probability. You can't estimate a prior
probability of God existing in any realistic way. It comes down to
your philosophical belief. An atheist will simply make the prior
probability so low that the posterior is also incredibly low.
I had two colleagues that were arguing about the probability of God
existing. One said 10^(-100) and the other said zero. The 10^(-100)
fellow said of the zero fellow; "Now that's what I call faith!"
I would have thought:
Theist: P = 1
Atheist P = 0
Physicist, stupid enough to have lunch with theists and atheists: P=
1x10^-100
God: Q = 0.5 (maybe I'll make something today if I feel like it)
On Fri, Nov 13, 2009 at 4:49 PM, Iain Strachan <igd.strachan@gmail.com>wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 12, 2009 at 8:49 PM, Cameron Wybrow <wybrowc@sympatico.ca>
> wrote:
> > David:
>
> > But the same objections apply in the case of the travel-worn space probe.
> We
> > have no independent knowledge -- knowledge other than the existence of
> the
> > probe itself -- that any other intelligent life exists in the universe,
> so
> > objection (a) above applies. And we have no independent knowledge --
> > knowledge other than what can be inferred from the probe itself -- of
> the
> > nature, habits, motivations, inclinations, etc. of the purported
> designers,
> > so objection (b) applies.
> >
> > In the case of the space probe, our inferences, both of the existence and
> of
> > the character of the purported designers, depend *entirely* upon what we
> can
> > discover from the probe itself. We have no warrant for inferring
> anything
> > else about the designers. Our certainty that such designers exist, that
> > they have certain capacities, etc., springs from a *design inference*
> that
> > *rests entirely upon the very thing whose design status is being
> debated*.
> > So, when the question is asked: "Is this metallic object from outer
> space
> > designed, or only the product of chance and natural laws?", our design
> > inference is made in violation of objections (a) and (b) above. Yet we
> > would feel certain that our design inference was valid, and rightly so.
> Our
> > own practice would show that we do not consider the criteria used to
> reject
> > design inferences (given above) to be sufficient criteria for such
> > rejection.
> >
> > It follows that the TEs on this list should abandon the above-described
> > *general* argument which rules out design inferences from natural objects
> to
> > a designer of natural objects. There remain available to TEs, of course,
> > *particular* objections that *particular* inferences from nature to a
> > designer of nature are invalid, or are made on evidence that is too
> skimpy,
> > and so on. I carry no brief against such *particular* objections. It is
> > the general objection that I reject. In practice, the real-life
> behaviour
> > of everyone on this list negates the objection, which shows that it is
> not a
> > principled objection, but an intellectual *deus ex machina* called up to
> rid
> > TEs of the hard work of having to deal with particular design inferences,
> > one by one.
> >
>
> Sorry, but I'm not convinced. I think you do have independent
> knowledge of the likely nature and inclinations of the designer of the
> spacecraft. That independent knowledge is the existence of us; for we
> design and build space-ships with much the same likely intent as the
> designers of the alien space-ship - namely presumably for the
> exploration of space.
>
> Consider my building example. You say that you know about the
> existence of the Architect (a) for Building A. Building B has similar
> properties to building A (doors, rooms, windows etc), so you infer
> that it also was designed by an Architect (b). You don't know _which_
> Architect, but it is reasonable to assume that it was an Architect
> with similar intentions to the designer of building A.
>
> Likewise the alien space probe. You know that a human space probe was
> designed by an intelligent life form (a) [ a human life form]. If you
> believe life arose naturally on earth, it is reasonable to assume that
> it could arise naturally on another planet, and that therefore the
> alien probe was designed by an alien life-form (b). You can even
> estimate the probability of life arising on another planet.
>
> The problem with just postulating an unspecified "Designer" is that
> you can't estimate the probability of the existence of such a thing.
> With the alien space probe you can estimate the probability (even if
> it is a rough thing like the Drake equation).
>
> Fundamentally, my version of the "independent evidence" objection lies
> in Bayesian statistics. One makes an inference based on a prior
> probability (of existence of said designer), modified to a posterior
> probability, based on the evidence (existence of the watch, statue,
> space probe), to a posterior probability.
>
> But any such calculation breaks down and is literally nonsensical if
> you can't estimate a prior probability. You can't estimate a prior
> probability of God existing in any realistic way. It comes down to
> your philosophical belief. An atheist will simply make the prior
> probability so low that the posterior is also incredibly low.
>
> I had two colleagues that were arguing about the probability of God
> existing. One said 10^(-100) and the other said zero. The 10^(-100)
> fellow said of the zero fellow; "Now that's what I call faith!"
>
> Iain
>
>
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Received on Thu Nov 12 18:54:05 2009
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