Creationism too explains everything in purely creationist terms. Why so surprised that the theory of evolution has explanatary powers?
I like how Christ responded when asked why he spoke in parables, and he answered to both reveal and conceal. God has chosen to remain discrete, in the background, undiscoverable to his enemies. If we could prove God by scientific means that would run counter to how he wishes to remain, in my humble estimation. ID tries to catch God in action and he doesn't operate in a fashion that allows it.
On another subject, but still about the solar system. Here's a test to ask of atheists and agnostics:
Pick a time in early earth history when it was still a molten ball and the sun was only beginning to glow - something like 4 billion years ago. The object is to place a moon in proximity that would provide relected sunlight to the earth. The plan is to strike the primordial earth with a meteorite of exactly the right size, speed, and angle so that it will bounce off the surface of the earth and launch itself into orbit where it will remain perfectly for at least 4 billion years and more. In addition it should be exactly 400 times smaller than the sun and 400 times closer to the earth so that during eclipses the two spheres will be perfectly superimposed. Also put just enough spin on it so that it spins on its axis at the same rate in which it revolves such that only one surface faces the earth continually.
Piece of cake, right? Oh, and do it with purely natural processes. Just allow it to happen. Doing it yourself would be cheating.
~Dick Fischer
Nov 10, 2009 12:09:24 PM,
wybrowc@sympatico.ca wrote:
Iain:
Two points on your reply:
1. Neo-Darwinism also can explain virtually anything. Any evolutionary
change, and its opposite, are equally explicable in neo-Darwinian terms.
The extinction of the ancient moa can be explained in neo-Darwinian terms,
and the survival of the modern ostrich can as well. The development of
flight in bats can be explained in neo-Darwinian terms, and the failure to
develop flight in other mammals can be explained in those terms as well.
And given the apparently arbitrary fact that only one set of land mammals
took to the air (the bats), whereas three groups of mammals (pinnipeds,
sirenians, cetaceans) took to the seas, the relative popularity of the sea
vs. the air can be explained in Darwinian terms. But had it been the
opposite, had there been three groups of flying mammals with different
ancestries, and only one group of aquatic mammals, that, too, would have a
perfectly valid Darwinian explanation. Again, I have seen television
specials on evolution where the scientific narration explains how vastly
superior the "dog design" is to the "cat design" for predation, but both
wild dogs and wild cats survive all over the world. Had cats been wiped out
by the competition from dogs, the neo-Darwinians could explain it in terms
of the arguments given on the television program; but doubtless they have an
explanation why "inferior" cats and "superior" dogs both survive and
flourish as well. The survival of the coelacanth in one small area of the
Indian Ocean can be explained in Darwinian terms, as can the wiping out of
the coelacanth everywhere else. In the human case, selfishness and
aggressiveness can be explained in neo-Darwinian terms, and so can
compassion and altruism. I could multiply such examples at will.
The explanatory terms of neo-Darwinism (mutation and natural selection) are
so malleable, so massageable, that if an inconvenient living form turns up
in an environment where one would not expect it, the theory can handle it.
Hypothetical changes in environmental pressures, hypothetical mutations,
hypothetical increases in the mutation rate, hypothetical genetic
bottlenecks, etc., can be invoked at will. Thus, no matter how many
difficulties pop up, neo-Darwinism never has to be abandoned. One merely
adjusts the hypothetical evolutionary pathways, without surrendering the
theory itself. Thus, neo-Darwinism explains everything and therefore
explains nothing. So if one wishes to attack design notions as being able
to explain anything, that's fine, but the same standard must be applied to
its competitor, i.e., neo-Darwinism.
2. Regarding needing to know something about the designer before being able
to safely infer design, I've used this example before, and it may not be
original with me, because I think I've seen it elsewhere, but here it is:
The first manned spacecraft lands on Mars. The astronauts disembark. They
trek across the reddish soils in search of signs of moisture or microscopic
organic life. Passing by a range of low mountains, they stop abruptly. An
expression of shock crosses their faces. To their left, on the face of a
mountain about a thousand feet in height, there is what appears to be a
sculpture. It is reminiscent of the sculpture on Mt. Rushmore. Five
well-articulated figures, somewhat humanoid in form but different in some
respects (antenna-like organs on the heads, and tentacle-like organs for
arms), stare mutely at them. They immediately draw a design inference.
They say to each other: "Some race of intelligent beings carved these
figures into the side of this mountain." Yet, as the exploration proceeds,
what do they find? They find no trace of the civilization which carved the
figures. No buildings. No tools or machinery for chipping or drilling
stone. No evidence that any intelligent species other than man has ever set
foot on the planet. Several later expeditions confirm these findings: if
there ever were intelligent beings living on Mars, they have long since
become extinct, leaving no trace, or have abandoned the planet, leaving no
trace. Who, then, could have carved these figures?
My question is: Do they need to know who carved the sculpture, to know that
it was the product of intelligent design? Either they can be certain that
it was the product of intelligent design, or they cannot. If they cannot be
certain, then they must contemplate an alternate explanation, one couched in
terms of blind natural forces, acting by law and chance, for the carving out
of the articulated figures from the mountainside. On the other hand, if
they can be certain of design, then they need not do this.
Now according to many of the scientists on this list, it is an explanation
from ignorance to assert intelligent design when we have no independent
knowledge of the existence and properties of the putative designer; it is
"god of the gaps" reasoning, which is dangerous, because a "naturalistic"
explanation may lurk just round the corner, and embarrass the design
theorist when it becomes available. And because we can never be sure when
this may happen, our ASA-list scientists tell us, we must always postulate
"unknown natural causes" in preference to "design" as the explanation. This
is the sacred requirement imposed by methodological naturalism. So our
Martian explorers, having no proof of the existence of an intelligent race
on Mars (or anywhere in the universe for that matter), are *scientifically
duty-bound* to concoct speculations about times when Mars had an
air-and-water environment capable of producing weathering effects on rock,
and explaining how such weathering effects could have carved out such
articulated forms without guidance. Or they must postulate that alternating
heat and cold on a virtually airless and waterless Mars caused the rock face
to crack in just such a manner as to leave articulate sculpture behind --
and then explain why no fallen rocks are found at the base of the structure.
Etc.
But wait. Suppose that our ASA-list scientists are not so wooden and
mechanical as I have made out above. Suppose that they are wise enough to
rank common sense and basic intelligence above the mechanical application of
"methodological naturalism", and that they agree with the most uneducated
janitor or bus driver that the Martian figures were in fact intelligently
designed, and that trying to dream up explanations like weathering and so on
is a complete waste of anyone's time. What follows?
What follows is that design inferences can be reliable even in the complete
absence of: (1) knowledge of the motivations of the designer; (2) knowledge
of the nature or character of the designer (beyond obvious general
characteristics such as intelligence, a degree of power, and a degree of
skill); (3) independent proof -- outside of the phenomenon to be
explained -- that the designer even exists.
Does this sound familiar? ID claims that we can infer design in biological
systems without knowing: (1) What the designer [God if you will] intended
by making these systems; (2) What the designer [God if you will] is like,
other than that he [she, it] is intelligent, and possesses sufficient power
and skill to effect the design; (3) Whether the designer [God if you will]
even exists -- the only evidence being the phenomenon to be explained.
So if you *accept* that the design inference would be legitimate in the
Martian sculpture example, I find it hard to see how you can reject the
design inference in biological examples. No new principle of reasoning is
employed in the biological case. And if you *deny* that the design
inference would be legitimate in the Martian sculpture example, then you are
responsible for sending Martian scientists on a wild goose chase, looking
for chance-and-necessity explanations that will never reveal the true origin
of the sculpture. Which do you choose? Is it a practical certainty that
the Martian sculpture is designed, or not? And if so, why does the
application to biological examples not follow?
Cameron.
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