Hi David,
I can't help here but wonder whether C.S.Lewis' point about moral standards applies here, viz; it's not what we do to others that demonstrates our moral values, but what we object to when others do it to us.
What might the same South Viet officer have said if somebody else had pulled a gun on him, or one of his loved ones? Or what if one of his soldiers had pulled a gun on one a superior in the middle of battle just because he didn't like a command he had been given? Would he have used the language of moral culpability? Or would he have greeted it with the same indifference?
I don't know the answer to such questions, obviously (although I do have my suspicions!), only I think that Lewis' point that at some time every person appeals to morality as if it exists as an absolute is something to be taken into account in our theorizing about morals.
I might add only the observation that often times we find people who we might think are a moral dead zone (e.g. the Nazis at the Nuremburg trials) often argue as though their behaviour were morally justifiable - that they are not really "bad" people, that they did not really act "wrongly". One has to ask, I think, what assumption underlies such a defence.
In all of this I hasten to add that I'm not entirely sure what's even being asserted when people talk about "objective morality" - often the discussion jumps immediately to whether it exists without debating its nature - but I do think appeals of the sort "I really was in the right" (or "you really were in the wrong") is a pretty deep seated human tendency. Perhaps it's all just a language game - but even so one of the rules seems to be "speak as though a universal, objective morality exists" (the other favourite rule being "I get exemptions, you don't")
That might be about the sum total of my contribution to the discussion, I think!
Blessings,
Murray
David Clounch wrote:
> Tom said:
>
> [quote]
> It's not at all clear to me why a "materialist-naturalist" cannot lay
> claim to objective moral values, purposes and meanings in approximately
> the same way. They may not be universal or grounded in an unassailable
> source, but that doesn't disqualify them from being objective.
> [unquote]
>
> I am reminded of 'doc', my friend who was walking along a road in Viet
> Nam. He was arguing with a south viet regular army officer about
> philosophy and life. Doc had asserted there is an objective moral law
> to which we will be held accountable. The army man pulled his 45,
> pointed it at a villager that was in a rice paddy at the side of the
> road. He killed him. He then turns to my friend and says "no there
> isn't". "It doesn't matter that I killed him, and nobody will ever
> punish me for doing so. In reality life is dirt cheap, as I have just
> demonstrated."
>
> I would submit that the vietnamese soldier was correct, except in one
> case. There is an afterlife and a judge. Objectivity will be
> demonstrated to all of us, and it doesn't really matter if we
> acknowledge it today. The only thing acknowledgement could do is
> affect how we live today.
> But materialists deny the afterlife and the judge. So by their
> definition there is no objective moral law. What is it to which they
> are going point to? Can they point to something that would have
> given pause to those kids at Columbine? I don't think materialists can
> possibly believe in anything that would have dissuaded those gunmen.
> Maybe I am wrong. Show me that materialism and nihilism are not lovers
> (and the case where the materialists are taking a lot of drugs doesn't
> count).
>
> Cheers,
> Dave C
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2009 at 11:32 PM, Gregory Arago <gregoryarago@yahoo.ca
> <mailto:gregoryarago@yahoo.ca>> wrote:
>
> hi Tom,
>
> don't think we've met or dialogued before, so just want to first
> say: hello!)
> yes, i'd say you're missing something in your 'analysis'.
>
> first, maybe you could answer a question: is the reality of the Holy
> Spirit 'objective'? if so, then how do you 'know' it? (and please
> feel free to treat this as a rhetorical question and just to answer
> to what is written below)
>
> i think you've missed Schwarzwald's main point about
> materialism-naturalism, by focussing on some particular phrases.
> perhaps you could add what you mean by those 'ideologies' in order
> to meet the point more directly? do you accept the 'reality' of such
> ideologies in the minds/hearts/bodies of people today?
>
> what if we called such values, purposes, meanings, etc.
> as 'extra-natural' or 'extra-material,' 'supra-natural' or
> 'supra-material' instead?
>
> also, it seems the discussion of 'subjective/objective' by Georg
> Simmel might help here (e.g. "On Individuality and Social Forms").
> this might offer new language for your view that 'objective' means
> 'public.' i'd suggest there is much more to speak about than to make
> such an equivocation. it is as a sociologist that i suggest this,
> noting with respect your background in history and philosophy given
> in your 'signature'.
>
> warm regards,
> Gregory
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Thomas Pearson <pearson@utpa.edu <mailto:pearson@utpa.edu>>
> *To:* asa@calvin.edu <mailto:asa@calvin.edu>
> *Sent:* Mon, October 26, 2009 6:58:35 AM
> *Subject:* RE: [asa] Dawkins new book
>
> On Saturday, Ocotber 24, 2209, "Schwarzwald" wrote:
>
>
> > >>For materialist-naturalism, objective moral values, purposes, and
> meanings are not available even potentially.<<<
>
>
>
> I don't see why not -- unless, of course, you have inflated the
> meaning of "objective" to include particulars that don't belong to a
> strict definition of "objective," such as (1) grounded in an
> unassailable source and/or (2) universal in scope and application.
> But neither of those are required in order to achieve objectivity.
> I'm assuming that "objective" means something like "public," or "not
> simply residing in, or justified by, the subjectivity of a
> particular individual."
>
>
>
> > >>And by this I mean, insofar as someone says "Well, perhaps there
> are objective and external/fundamental moral values, purposes, and
> meanings to life and reality", they are rejecting the
> materialist-naturalist worldview. To even search for these things is
> to question or reject the truth of the stated philosophy.<<<
>
>
>
> But why should anyone believe that anything such
> as "external/fundamental moral vlaues, purposes and meanings to life
> and reality" is necessary for something to be objective?
>
>
>
> For example: on our campus, as on most university campuses, we have
> a policy against plagiarism. It is a public, objective policy,
> justified by its connection to other university policies, and to
> roughly similar policies at many other schools. But its objectivity
> is not based on the fact that it has a universal application (it
> doesn't), nor on possession of any sort of "fundamental/external
> values, purposes and meanings to life and reality" (it certainly
> isn't). It is objective because it is a promulgated rubric that
> governs our common life together in this particular community.
>
>
>
> It's not at all clear to me why a "materialist-naturalist" cannot
> lay claim to objective moral values, purposes and meanings in
> approximately the same way. They may not be universal or grounded
> in an unassailable source, but that doesn't disqualify them from
> being objective.
>
>
>
> Am I missing something here?
>
>
>
> Tom Pearson
>
> ______________________________________________
>
> ______________________________________________
>
> Thomas D. Pearson
>
> Department of History & Philosophy
>
> The University of Texas-Pan American
>
> Edinburg, Texas
>
> e-mail: pearson@utpa.edu <mailto:pearson@utpa.edu>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Received on Tue Oct 27 03:09:01 2009
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