Re: [asa] Dawkins new book

Heya Dave,

It's not a question of being able to certainly demonstrate an objective
truth (I'd point out there are some philosophers who take the position that
things like 'pain' and 'beliefs' don't really exist, or that we are
radically mistaken about them - which is for all practical purposes means
they don't exist) - it's about what's even possible to be true given the
commitments of the worldview. For materialist-naturalism, objective moral
values, purposes, and meanings are not available even potentially. And by
this I mean, insofar as someone says "Well, perhaps there are objective and
external/fundamental moral values, purposes, and meanings to life and
reality", they are rejecting the materialist-naturalist worldview. To even
search for these things is to question or reject the truth of the stated
philosophy.

As for consistency, I'd question that (certainly whether the awareness and
consistency shows up in practice) - but its what the position naturally
entails commitment to that I'm pointing out here. The consistency is a
secondary issue. As with attaining an ethos, consistency is fairly cheap to
come by; a solipsist can manage it. A nihilist can. In fact, a lunatic can.

Finally, I'm not disputing here the idea of 'objective enough facts to fit
into a system' - because, again, I'm not questioning the ability for someone
to develop "an ethos", full stop. Coming up with a set of rules and
standards just isn't all that much of a challenge. Making the set consistent
may be more of a challenge, depending on the desired level of intricacy, but
I'm sure it's still possible. But all the consistency and intricacy possible
won't change what's necessarily intellectually entailed by embracing such a
perspective.

On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 at 3:07 PM, dfsiemensjr <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:

> It's easy to claim objectivity. However, if objectivity were objectively
> demonstrable, everyone would be forced to the same position. It doesn't
> happen. If one gets to ultimate positions, the only test available is
> logical consistency among the assumed principles, which are not provable.
> This is parallel to what we encounter in the Euclidean, Riemannian and
> Lobachevskian geometries, incompatible but equally consistent.
>
> Materialism, to my pain, can be a consistent position. From outside, I can
> point out problems. But those inside do not see them as insuperable, any
> more than the theist finds the objections of atheists relevant.
>
> As to objectivity, is it a fact that pain is undesirable, although a
> smaller level of pain may have to be endured to avoid greater pain? Also, if
> A can inflict pain on B, then Be can inflict pain on A, unless B lacks the
> power of A, when there is still the possibility of revolt or assassination.
> Are such matters not objective enough to fit into a system, whether theistic
> or atheistic? I acknowledge that there is a difference if God is the
> ultimate judge, but this is not necessary for a system as objective as
> possible to human beings.
> Dave (ASA)
>
> On Sat, 24 Oct 2009 01:10:38 -0400 Schwarzwald <schwarzwald@gmail.com>
> writes:
>
> Heya Dave,
>
> As I've said in another thread, I do not deny that one can have a 'well
> worked out system' of ethics. I'm pointing out what that 'system of ethics'
> means once it's denied that there is objective purpose and good/value at
> work in the universe - and it means something radically different to do
> "good" on an atheist-naturalist scheme/ethos [where 'good' means 'acting in
> accordance with given ethical system X'] than "good" means on non-naturalist
> schemes [where 'good' speaks to objective standards that are right or wrong
> regardless of what a human individual happens to subjectively judge, be this
> a theistic system or a non-naturalist 'force'/'reality'.]
>
> Even the claim that these systems can "do remarkably well" are suspect to
> me. Remarkably well? By what standard? Another subjective one? Stalin's
> government, according to some subjective standards, performed remarkably
> well in the "moral" area. And he certainly had a good handle on "social and
> governmental sanctions pushing conformity".
>
> That's not to say I find nothing to admire in someone working out a very
> intricate, balanced, internally consistent system of ethics. Just as, say, I
> can admire a sci-fi or fantasy author writing source material for a
> fictional world that intricately and intensely describes a fictional
> culture's values, beliefs, ethics, etc. In fact, I have to admire them
> almost equivalently - because in the end, they matter about as much in most
> ultimate ways. In fact, the fantasy author may have an edge - at least they
> tend to come up with fun costumes and engaging stories, though I hear the
> conventions are embarrassing.
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2009 at 11:39 PM, dfsiemensjr <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>wrote:
>
>> As a person who has studied and taught ethics, I have to note that one
>> does not have to be a theist to develop a strong ethical approach. For a
>> common basis, pleasure has been often held to be foundational for
>> determining right and wrong. The Mills and Bentham produced a utilitarianism
>> on the basis of the maximum pleasure for the maximum number. This requires,
>> on the opposite side, reducing negative feelings to the greatest extent
>> possible. With social and governmental sanctions pushing conformity, one can
>> do remarkably well in the moral area.
>>
>> A different standard was promoted by Logical Positivism about a half
>> century ago. Right and wrong were determined by the intensity of feeling
>> generated. This was the usual basis of demonstrations on various campuses.
>> It is, for obvious reasons, no longer commonly accepted, but emotion can
>> still trump reason for many. If A can persuade B, C, and a bunch of others
>> to join his mob, he'll claim the moral high ground and cannot be persuaded
>> otherwise.
>>
>> There are other approaches to devising ethical standards without calling
>> in supernatural sources and sanctions. So one may be an atheist and have a
>> well worked out system. I cannot say that this is true of Dawkins, who seems
>> not to have thought matters through carefully.
>> Dave (ASA)
>>
>> On Fri, 23 Oct 2009 16:14:44 -0400 Schwarzwald <schwarzwald@gmail.com>
>> writes:
>>
>> Heya George,
>>
>> I'd have to disagree here, at least in a certain way. You point out,
>> rightly, that evil has no fundamental place in the worldview of Dawkins and
>> therefore there is no moral obligation to respond to it. I'd further add
>> that evil and good are not objective realities for atheists of that (very
>> common) bend - at most they're subjective judgment calls, or the
>> just-so-happens rules of a chosen ethos.
>>
>> But if evil and good aren't objective realities, and if there are no
>> objective moral responsibilities when it comes to good and evil... in what
>> sense are we talking about 'good' and 'evil' anymore? Those words are
>> drained of all their typical meaning. Dawkins' "gut reaction" to what you
>> list may be "negative", it may even be "evil", but they can't be "evil"
>> based on the philosophy he's committed himself to. The gut reaction - his
>> subjective view - is the beginning and end of what "good" and "evil" can
>> really be for him. Ted is right that, for Dawkins regarding good/evil,
>> "there is no such thing."
>>
>> Now, others may respond that Dawkins and others do in fact call certain
>> things "evil" and "bad", or "moral" and "immoral", etc. I'd simply point out
>> that it isn't the mere speaking or writing of the words that matters, but
>> their content - and once those words are qualified to be consistent with the
>> philosophy committed to, they are in essence empty. And if they dig in their
>> heels and argue that they believe that these things are objectively and
>> truly evil or immoral, etc, the they are being inconsistent - and either the
>> philosophy, or the 'truly evil/immoral' judgments, will have to go to
>> correct that.
>>
>> And, just to be a little pedantic myself: That there may be a "gut
>> reaction" of "evil" to things such as genocide, child rape, or Bernie Madoff
>> does nothing to make me think "oh, well, even if they don't believe in evil
>> those things will still be viewed as bad - that much is secure". A person
>> can get over their gut reactions, and the 20th century illustrated just how
>> successful such "getting over" can be even on national levels. The idea (not
>> promoted by you, George, so don't take this as targeting you) that "everyone
>> knows murder, or dishonesty, etc are wrong and will therefore at least act
>> as if these things are truly bad" is painfully naive.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2009 at 1:21 PM, George Murphy <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com>wrote:
>>
>>> Ted -
>>>
>>> A couple of things here. 1st I'll point out pedantically that while
>>> atheists do have a "problem of evil," Bernie is right that they don't have a
>>> "theodicy problem." Theodicy is "justifying God" & those who don't believe
>>> in God can't be concerned about that.
>>>
>>> 2d, I haven't read a great deal of Dawkins & you may well be able to
>>> point out some place where he says literally that there are no such things
>>> as good & evil. But even if he makes that claim in the abstract, I suspect
>>> that his gut reaction to news of genocide, child rape or Bernie Madoff is
>>> that they're evil. The difference is that Christians believe that there is
>>> a reason to say that such things are evil that stems from fundamental
>>> aspects of their worldview & for Dawkins there isn't. (Which in itself
>>> doesn't prove that Christians are right, as Bernie may want to point out but
>>> doesn't have to because I've already done so.) & so there is no moral *
>>> obligation* to respond to
>>> such things - which gets back to the point I made earlier about bases for
>>> ethics. (& again, as Tom Pearson pointed out, this doesn't apply to all
>>> atheists.)
>>>
>>> Shalom
>>> George
>>> http://home.roadrunner.com/~scitheologyglm<http://home.roadrunner.com/%7Escitheologyglm>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: "Ted Davis" <TDavis@messiah.edu>
>>> To: <asa@calvin.edu>; "Bernie Dehler" <bernie.dehler@intel.com>
>>> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 12:42 PM
>>> Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins new book
>>>
>>> >>>> "Dehler, Bernie" <bernie.dehler@intel.com
>>> > 10/23/2009 12:27 PM >>> writes:
>>>
>>> >
>>> > There's an atheist book club meetup that I will likely join, and they
>>> are reviewing Dawkin's latest book "The Greatest Show on Earth." I glanced
>>> at the book the other day. I think most of it looks like evidence for
>>> evolution (what's new?), but I did notice an interesting section on
>>> theodicy. (And yes, it looked like it may be shallow in not bringing forth
>>> and quoting the best arguments from the critics.)
>>> >
>>> > Anyways, Dawkins mentioned that for believers, there's a thing called
>>> 'the problem of evil.' He says 'they even have a name for it- theodicy.'
>>> At first I thought that was kind of patronizing to say 'they even have a
>>> name for it' then as I thought about it more I realized that theodicy was
>>> something only that God believers have to deal with. I know that is
>>> obvious, but it wasn't that clear in my mind before, esp. from seeing it
>>> from the other side now (not as a Christian).
>>> >
>>> > ***
>>> >
>>> > Ted responds abruptly. Hold the phone, Bernie. There is nothing
>>> "obvious" about this, unless you simply fail to think about it for more than
>>> a moment or two. The existence of suffering and evil causes great problems
>>> for all of us, including atheists. I mean great intellectual problems, not
>>> only emotional or existential problems. For the kind of atheist that
>>> Dawkins represents (there are other types of atheism that I am not
>>> including), there simply is no such thing as "good" and "evil," "right" and
>>> "wrong." There is no such thing. Therefore, we have no moral obligation
>>> (please reread these three words half a dozen times before continuing) to do
>>> anything about suffering and what believers call "evil." None. That, I
>>> venture to say, Bernie, is "the problem of evil" in another, equally serious
>>> form: for Dawkins, it's a problem that there is no category of "evil" at
>>> all. Therefore, there is no obligation to respond morally to it. A lot of
>>> unpleasant things happening doe!
>>> >
>>> > s not create a moral obligation to do something. That's a problem,
>>> Bernie. A big one.
>>> >
>>> > Ted
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > To unsubscribe, send a message to
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Received on Sat Oct 24 21:09:44 2009