Thanks again, David.
I think I see a little better now how you are applying NOMA. I'm not sure that NOMA is the best expression for what you are trying to say in every case, but if I say in my head "NOMA-like" or "a distinction parallel to the one made by NOMA", I think I can grasp your usage, and see the sense in your points. So I won't quarrel with most of your applications.
I'll make comments on selected bits of your letter, below. Not all of them have to do with NOMA, but you did expand the discussion in certain directions, so I don't think you will object to replies on the new topics.
>> CW: However, I think that those ID people who accept both God and
>> evolution generally don't have such a stop-and-start conception, with God
>> designing some things and not others. I think they see design as
>> permeating the whole march of life, from top to bottom.<
>
> DC: I think that is the theoretical position, but what is in fact argued
> is that some things are designed and some aren't. Why oppose
> evolution if you recognize it as a means of design?
David, I agree with your logic here, but if you look above, you will see that I said: "those ID people who accept both God and evolution", so I was talking about those who do *not* oppose evolution.
>> CW: What you may be doing here is what others often do, which is to conclude
>> that since
>> ID theorists point to certain structures, e.g., flagellum, as designed,
>> they
>> must believe that only certain very complex things were designed, whereas
>> all other things arose entirely naturally. That doesn't follow. The point
>> of making the design argument for a few special cases is to show that
>> *there
>> are at least a few things that could not have arisen without design*. And
>> if there are even a few things like that, then Dawkins, Coyne, etc. are
>> wrong. In other words, you should read ID as saying, not "X is designed
>> but
>> all the rest is undesigned", but rather as saying: "Since AT LEAST X is
>> designed, Dawkins, Coyne, Myers, etc. are wrong."
>
> DC: Which is buying into their NOMA stance (they differ from Gould in
> claiming that the science magisterium is all-encompassing but agree
> that science and religion are exclusive). In reality, since God is
> perfectly capable of working through evolution, Dawkins, Coyne, Myers,
> Johnson, Wells, etc. are wrong. Both Dawkins and ID are looking to
> science as the source of evidence about God, rather than recognizing
> that information about how the heavens go isn't very useful in telling
> us what we need to believe concerning God and what duties he requires
> of us.
We're not communicating here. I was speaking about designed versus
undesigned, not science versus religion or God versus evolution. And I was
making two distinct points: (1) Dawkins says that *all* living systems that
look designed are in fact undesigned. His system of evolution cannot
tolerate even *one* proved counterexample to this claim. ID, on the other hand, argues that it can be shown that at least *some* systems are designed (which does not automatically mean "specially created", and which does not rule out
contingent elements woven throughout the design). That's why, from the ID
point of view, Dawkins is wrong. You don't have to agree with ID's
conclusion about design to recognize that its method of refuting Dawkins is
entirely logical and fitting, given Dawkins's premises. (2) You were saying
that ID believes that God created the designed things but not the undesigned
things, or something to that effect. I was saying that, while that might be
a view held by many ID believers in the pews, it isn't required by the
theory.
I would add that ID doesn't regard "science", but rather "nature", as a
"source of evidence about God", and it doesn't regard nature as the *only*
"source of evidence about God". There are other sources of evidence for
God's existence, e.g., the workings of our conscience, and of course
revelation, the latter of which reveals "what we need to believe concerning
God and what duties he requires of us". Where would you have got the notion
that ID people claim that we could learn "what we need to believe concerning
God and what duties he requires of us" from the study of nature? You're imputing to ID beliefs that are no part of it. On the subject you're addressing, the need for revelation, ID's beliefs are not different from TE's.
> Gould, Dawkins, etc. often have decent
> science backgrounds but usually poor theology backgrounds. I wonder
> why their science and not their theology is targeted.
I agree that the atheist Darwinists usually have poor theology backgrounds.
However, your implication is unjust. Their theology is very frequently targeted by ID people. Almost every day I
get an e-mail from someone telling me about some upcoming debate at some
university or some other place where an ID person is squaring off with a
Darwinian-inspired atheist. Of course, Gould can't be debated because he's
dead, and Dawkins will not debate ID people about either science or
religion. But ID people tackle the atheists' crude theology frequently and with gusto.
> The fundamental problem is that the ID movement has picked the wrong
> battle. ID is not essential to religion, contra Dembski. ID has long
> spent much time attacking TE and attacking evolution, not attacking
> atheism. The TEs are trying to tell ID that they're shooting the
> wrong way, and do not appreciate getting an ID bayonet in response.
> Not to imply that any side has been particularly tactful, gentle,
> etc., but TEs are going to contradict arguments that they perceive to
> be no good. YEC, ID, and "new" atheism often look more at "does this
> argument support my view" than "is this argument sound," whereas I am
> towards the extreme on "is the argument sound?" end. I would also
> note that the anti-ID YEC don't seem to get ID complaints the way TE
> does.
Well, you know that we are not going to agree that the ID movement has picked the wrong battle, as we disagree on the strength of the arguments for the mechanisms (not the fact) of evolution. I think that ID proponents have picked exactly the right battle, i.e., the battle over the adequacy of purely stochastic mechanisms to built novel, complex, integrated machinery. But they *also* engage in the battle you would like them to engage in, as I said above. They (and I'm including not just the big guns but the rank and file here) are constantly publishing blogs and letters to the editor and organizing campus debates and so on against the atheism of Dennett and Hitchens and others, exactly as you would have them do. They haven't shirked their duty in fighting atheism, not one bit. But you TEs are displeased that they also question Darwinism. Well, that's life. Not everyone agrees on everything.
I don't know that Dembski has said that ID is "essential to religion", but I
myself wouldn't say so. It makes it sound as if some complex argument from
nature is necessary to justify religious belief. I don't think Dembski
would say that the average uneducated peasant in some poor country has an
unwarranted religious belief because he hasn't read ID literature. I
suspect that Dembski would mean that ID can be a useful tool in the defense
of theism generally and therefore an aid to religion. Also I suspect that
he means that religion should not be based entirely on a blind leap of faith
but should be in part defensible by means of reasoned observations about the
world. But I don't think he means that Christianity stands or falls on the
proof of design he offers in *No Free Lunch*.
Speaking of bayonets: I have seen agnostic or atheist Darwinists and TEs
tag-team against Christian ID proponents in public settings on more than one
occasion; I have never seen an ID proponent and an agnostic or atheist
Darwinist tag-team against a TE proponent in public debate. Have you?
>> As for me, I think that ID people should concentrate on attacking
>> Dawkins,
>> Coyne, Myers, Eugenie Scott, etc., not attacking TEs.
>
> There is a significant difference between Scott's type, who seem
> well-meaning but often clueless with regard to getting along with
> religion, and Dawkins' anti-religious rant. Both need to be
> addressed, and the way to do so is through the gospel, not through bad
> science which will turn them off promptly.
Well, let's see now... Granted, you TE folk have avoided "bad science" when
dealing with Dawkins, Dennett, Coyne, Myers, etc. Yet it appears that they
are still "turned off" by you. In fact, some of them have expressed
contempt for you. As for Eugenie, she is more diplomatic, but it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that she has contempt for you, too. True,
these people are much less savage to you than they are to ID people, because
you don't disagree with them about Darwinian theory; but they have no use
for your religion, as is shown by the fact that they have attacked Collins's
appointment to a well-deserved government post, precisely because he
publically expresses that religion. So how well is your strategy working
out? What was the plan, to get the atheists to see how reasonable and scientific
you were about evolution, so that they would then listen to you when you
spoke about Christianity? If that was the plan, do you see any evidence
that it has been effective?
> There are some important caveats and differences. First, the
> interventions are rather rare, much rarer than in apocryphal
> literature, legends of saints, pagan myths, etc
There must be over a hundred striking miracles narrated or alluded to in the Bible. If we take your worst-case scenario among ID proponents, i.e., the "jerky evolution" model in which God alternates miracles with natural causes, and if we allow Darwinian processes most of the power that is claimed for them, we can imagine God getting the job done with fewer interventions over a four-billion-year period than the Bible narrates as having happened over a four-thousand-year period. Miracles could have been proportionally rarer in creation than in human history. So if miracles are consistent with God's action provided they are sufficiently rare (which I take it that you are conceding above), God could have used miracles in evolution without any violation of consistency in his behaviour. There must, therefore, be some reason other than numerical excessiveness why miracles in creation are thought of with such distaste.
> Second, the
> intervention seems to be minimized-the axe floats, but must be
> repaired in the ordinary manner; Lazarus is raised but needs to get
> help unwrapping and has to beware of further hazards to his health;
Lazarus is raised from the dead, after a period sufficient to cause his body
to stink, and you speak of "minimized" intervention?
> Archaeology provides a good deal of evidence that the Bible does in
> fact match up with an ancient Near East and Mediterranean background.
> The historical data from several lines of evidence make it completely
> unreasonable to doubt that Jesus was a real person whose teaching
> diverged somewhat from contemporary Judaism, whose teaching and life
> made a big impression on his followers, and who was crucified.
I'm waiting for the punch line. All of this is true, but none of it constitutes historical or
scientific evidence for the Resurrection.
> Obviously, one's presuppositions affect whether one views resurrection
> or a mass delusion as more likely.
The choice for the skeptic is not between resurrection or mass delusion; the
choice for the skeptic is between resurrection and fiction. The skeptic
views fiction as more likely.
> In contrast, the Book of Mormon is
> blatantly completely fictional, with no match whatsoever with
> archaeological evidence, quite apart from being a not entirely
> competent plagarism of the KJV and novels.
Notice how you consider "fiction" an option in the Mormon case, but not in the case of the Resurrection. A rather selective mode of interpretation, no?
That there is more archaeological evidence for Biblical cities than for events recorded in the Book of Mormon is not relevant to the question of resurrection. We are not discussing the truth of falsehood of Mormon teachings, but the possible means of determining the truth or falsehood of the Resurrection. Now, what possible *archaeological* evidence could there be for a resurrection? There is archaeological evidence only when the body stays in the ground, not when it flies the coop.
My point is that accepting the bodily Resurrection cannot be based on evidence, for there is none, except testimony; and the testimony is all found in partisan sources. There isn't a single non-Christian eyewitness report of it in all the literature of antiquity. And even the Christian sources are in many cases narrated by writers who don't claim to have witnessed it themselves. (And the one writer who does clearly claim to have been there -- John -- almost certainly wasn't.) So the testimony we actually have (that of the Gospel writers) is secondhand -- at best. It may be thirdhand, or even further removed. My point in saying all of this is not to cast doubt on the truth of the story, but to point out that its acceptance is based wholly on faith, not on science. People believe it because they already have faith; they don't establish that it is scientifically true, and only because of that adopt a position of faith. (The case would be different if we were eyewitnesses, or even if we could speak to the eyewitnesses. But we are in a thirdhand, fourthhand, or fifthhand position.)
I cannot find a statement on the resurrection in Gould's original article; it would be interesting to know if he explicitly classes historical claims of this sort as belonging to "science" or "religion". And I wonder whether *historical* claims fit into Gould's scheme at all. If they do not, then it's not clear to me how TEs can have any disagreement with Gould (over particular religious claims, anyway).
>> CW: I don't object to these speculative remarks, but you still haven't
>> explained
>> why you used the word "kenotic" to describe Jesus's action of walking on
>> the
>> sea. Nothing you have said in this post or the last shows me that there
>> was
>> anything "kenotic" about it.
>
> DC: Although Jesus presumably could have miraculously surfed into the
> wind
> on a small bit of ice in His capacity as God, it seems quite out of
> keeping with His call to humble obedience. Trudging across the water,
> while still miraculous, is more consistent. I was not describing the
> walking on the sea as kenotic, though the walking rather than
> miraculous creation of some sort of easy ride could be; rather,
> choosing not to be the big luna kahuna (if you get that allusion, I
> can guess how old your kids are) is what I was describing as kenotic.
> Also, I am using the term "kenotic" very loosely as referring to
> voluntarily taking on standard human limitations, not to a formal
> theological system that can tend to lose sight of the divine nature
But he *didn't* display "standard human limitations" in the episode
described. If he had displayed "standard human limitations", we wouldn't
have the story in the first place. Standard human beings don't walk on water. For me, the clearest example of kenosis
("emptying" or "being emptied") is Jesus on the cross -- completely
vulnerable, like any mortal, and utterly unlike God (in power, that is).
I have no idea why you keep talking about surfing into the wind on a bit of
ice. The picture you are painting sounds positively deranged to me. Where
does the story speak of surfing? Why are you trying to prove that Jesus
didn't surf? Who ever said that he surfed? Which of the great Church Fathers or theologians alleged that
Jesus surfed? It's certainly appropriate that this is a story about water,
because it appears that your speculations have gone off the deep end.
Cameron.
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Campbell" <pleuronaia@gmail.com>
To: "asa" <asa@calvin.edu>
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 1:29 PM
Subject: Re: Schools and NOMA (was Re: [asa] Atheist finds God thru Behe's
books....)
>> YECs tend to say "evolution or God", and I agree with you that it doesn't
>> have to be a stark choice. But I'm not sure how that fits into NOMA,
>> unless
>> you mean "origins" fall under theology and "today's operations of nature"
>> fall under "science". I suppose that in that sense one could see YECs as
>> accepting NOMA but redefining the boundaries. But even if that is the
>> case,
>> I am not sure that all YECs would fit under NOMA in other ways. For
>> example, some YECs are cessationists regarding miracles, and others
>> aren't.
>> The ones who still accept miracles -- healings and so on -- would not be
>> strict NOMA supporters, would they? If you accept miraculous healings,
>> then
>> it means that every time a patient recovers who was expected to die,
>> there
>> would be two hypotheses on the table -- natural causes or divine
>> intervention. Not all events would have natural causes. So not just
>> "origins science" but even "operational science" would have to engage in
>> give-and-take with theology to explain particular events. That wouldn't
>> be
>> very NOMA-like, would it?
>
> To me, it is very NOMA-like. A give and take with theology suggests
> that there are areas not under theology.
>
>> Well, it may be that popular ID thinks of some things as designed and
>> some
>> things as non-designed. And it's theoretically possible with ID that
>> evolution could take care of, say, 80% of the changes, via Darwinian and
>> other natural means, with special interventions to design new body plans
>> happening periodically.
>
> In theory, ID would be compatible with 100% of the changes in
> evolution occurring by natural means; this seems to be Denton's
> position, but in practice the DI and the public face of ID are
> absolutely committed to significant gaps in evolution, with Wells even
> attacking intraspecies change.
>
>> However, I think that those ID people who accept both God and evolution
>> generally don't have such a stop-and-start conception, with God designing
>> some things and not others. I think they see design as permeating the
>> whole march of life, from top to bottom.<
>
> I think that is the theoretical position, but what is in fact argued
> is that some things are designed and some aren't. Why oppose
> evolution if you recognize it as a means of design?
>
>> What you may be doing here is what others often do, which is to conclude
>> that since
>> ID theorists point to certain structures, e.g., flagellum, as designed,
>> they
>> must believe that only certain very complex things were designed, whereas
>> all other things arose entirely naturally. That doesn't follow. The point
>> of making the design argument for a few special cases is to show that
>> *there
>> are at least a few things that could not have arisen without design*. And
>> if there are even a few things like that, then Dawkins, Coyne, etc. are
>> wrong. In other words, you should read ID as saying, not "X is designed
>> but
>> all the rest is undesigned", but rather as saying: "Since AT LEAST X is
>> designed, Dawkins, Coyne, Myers, etc. are wrong."
>
> Which is buying into their NOMA stance (they differ from Gould in
> claiming that the science magisterium is all-encompassing but agree
> that science and religion are exclusive). In reality, since God is
> perfectly capable of working through evolution, Dawkins, Coyne, Myers,
> Johnson, Wells, etc. are wrong. Both Dawkins and ID are looking to
> science as the source of evidence about God, rather than recognizing
> that information about how the heavens go isn't very useful in telling
> us what we need to believe concerning God and what duties he requires
> of us.
>
>> But note that even if what you call the popular conception of ID were
>> authentic ID, ID would be freed from the charge of NOMA. If God pops in
>> and
>> out of the natural process, sometimes letting it run by mutation and
>> natural
>> selection alone, other times doing a miracle to speed things along, then
>> the
>> magisteria of theology and natural science would be hopelessly mixed
>> together. That's not NOMA. It might be objectionable for many reasons,
>> but
>> not for being NOMA.
>
> While you couldn't say that the history of life is in one magisterium
> or another, each individual event is being divided up between two
> isolated compartments. That's NOMA-type thinking to me.
>
>> From Gould's point of view, if natural causes are sufficient to explain a
>> phenomenon without reference to God, if phenomena can be adequately
>> treated
>> "as if God did not exist" (to use George's phrase from the Latin), then
>> saying that God is somehow present in natural causes, or concurs with or
>> co-operates with natural causes, is not explanatory in the scientific
>> sense.
>> It is a theological gloss, entirely optional for the scientist qua
>> scientist, as George admits. So, while you may see the dual-track
>> explanation (natural causes and God, without either contradicting the
>> other)
>> as differing from NOMA, Gould would see it as perfectly accommodatable
>> within NOMA. If believing that God co-operates with or concurs with or
>> lies
>> behind or mysteriously sustains natural causes does not interfere with
>> the
>> methods, data or theorizing of science, then it respects science's
>> magisterium. Your view of divine action is thus entirely compatible with
>> NOMA, whereas the stop-and-start view of divine action which you impute
>> to
>> ID people isn't.
>
> No. If God is generally running the physical world by the pattern of
> natural laws, then the physical results of science will not
> significantly differ from what Gould says. But the philosophy of
> science, the ethics behind it, etc. directly contradict the NOMA view.
> The stop and start view that is a commonplace of popular thought
> (neither uniformly present in nor confined to ID) calls for different
> results of science but the same philosophy, that God is in one box and
> "natural" events in another. Gould, Dawkins, etc. often have decent
> science backgrounds but usually poor theology backgrounds. I wonder
> why their science and not their theology is targeted.
>
>> As for me, I think that ID people should concentrate on attacking
>> Dawkins,
>> Coyne, Myers, Eugenie Scott, etc., not attacking TEs.
>
> There is a significant difference between Scott's type, who seem
> well-meaning but often clueless with regard to getting along with
> religion, and Dawkins' anti-religious rant. Both need to be
> addressed, and the way to do so is through the gospel, not through bad
> science which will turn them off promptly.
>
>> But to be fair to ID people, many ID people, having at first attacked
>> only
>> the atheists, have then found themselves blind-sided by TEs. It's like
>> trying to fight the enemy on the battlefield, and feeling a bayonet fixed
>> in
>> your leg from behind, and turning around and finding out it's someone
>> from
>> your own army that's stabbed you. So if TEs don't want ID people to go
>> after them, maybe they should stop publically contradicting every single
>> argument that ID people employ against Dawkins, etc. If they keep on
>> doing
>> that, obviously they are going to make ID people irate, and there is
>> going
>> to be retaliation, and shouts of "Whose side are you on?" That's just
>> basic
>> human nature.
>
> The fundamental problem is that the ID movement has picked the wrong
> battle. ID is not essential to religion, contra Dembski. ID has long
> spent much time attacking TE and attacking evolution, not attacking
> atheism. The TEs are trying to tell ID that they're shooting the
> wrong way, and do not appreciate getting an ID bayonet in response.
> Not to imply that any side has been particularly tactful, gentle,
> etc., but TEs are going to contradict arguments that they perceive to
> be no good. YEC, ID, and "new" atheism often look more at "does this
> argument support my view" than "is this argument sound," whereas I am
> towards the extreme on "is the argument sound?" end. I would also
> note that the anti-ID YEC don't seem to get ID complaints the way TE
> does.
>
>> I don't know what you mean by the "schizophrenia" between secular and
>> sacred. I would guess that you are invoking something like Luther's
>> criticism of monastic life as specially "spiritual", and his endorsement
>> of
>> secular life as a "calling" from God. But pressing that too far is hardly
>> Christian. Every time a minister or priest consecrates a new church, he
>> is
>> affirming a distinction between "secular" and "sacred". And of course the
>> notion of the sacred pervades the Hebrew Bible, especially the Pentateuch
>> and the early Prophets. I certainly agree with you that "secular"
>> callings
>> are just as valid spiritually as holy orders or monastic life, but from
>> my
>> point of view, the problem with modern religion, especially modern
>> Protestantism, is that it has progressively stripped away any sense of
>> the
>> sacred at all.
>
> Yes; recognition of sacred versus secular has its place, but every
> aspect of life falls under the domain of the sacred in another sense.
> Science cannot show the existence of God because He's not something
> you can run experiments on and come up with a model of what patterns
> one should expect with or without God. Rather, if we start out
> knowing God, we can see His hand in everything, including science.
>
>>> As a rule, the distinguishing mark of the Christian approach to
>>> "secular" occupations should be the commitment to quality and high
>>> ethical standards.<<
>
>> There is nothing particularly Christian about those things. Jews, secular
>> humanists, Muslims, etc. can all exhibit such commitments.
>
> Rather, there is nothing uniquely Christian about those things. But
> that is because they all agree about what constitutes good work in the
> particular field, and those who commit to quality and high ethical
> standards also agree that those are important. This basic idea is
> commonplace in the practical exhortations found in most of the New
> Testament epistles. Good work will generally be recognizable as such
> to unbelievers. Christianity ought to be an indicator of quality;
> secular humanism gives no guarentee.
>
>>> God does make extensive use of the
>>> ordinary laws of nature in the running of the universe. You pray for
>>> safe travel on a trip. Very good, but do not do so by closing your
>>> eyes and folding your hands while you are behind the wheel of a moving
>>> vehicle. Rather, you make sure the car is in good working order and
>>> drive carefully. If you are sick, pray and find a good doctor. Was
>>> God less involved in fulfilling the prophecy about where Jesus would
>>> be born because it happened via Augustus' tax and a weary hike instead
>>> of miraculous teleportation?
>>
>> I don't know anyone, IDer or YEC or other, who would deny any of this.
>
> But they do when they claim that metaphysical naturalism entails
> philosophical naturalism. If that were true, we ought to do nothing,
> assuming that the Spirit will make it happen if it should happen.
>
>> I think the point of critics of Darwinian evolution, and of all purely
>> naturalistic accounts of evolution, is not that God *could not* have used
>> natural causes to propel evolution; it is that God *need not* have done
>> so.
>> God could have used any combination of natural and non-natural activity
>> to
>> bring about the process. The criticism that ID people make of TE is not
>> that TE allows that evolution *could have been* wholly natural, but that
>> it
>> *must have been* wholly natural.
>
> That is not the message I hear. What I hear is that evolution must
> not have been wholly natural or else God didn't do it. I fimly agree
> that God need not have used natural means throughout the evolutionary
> process, but I think there are good reasons to think that He probably
> did use natural means as far as the physical process of creating
> different types of organisms is concerned, both from science and from
> theology. For that matter, I would agree with ID that much of the
> opposition to ID, or at least the most vocal component, is an
> unjustified attempt to exclude religion-a NOMA-type approach.
>
>> How can we know that it was wholly
>> natural? Since the Bible does not say *how* God created all the living
>> creatures, but only that he did so, things are left open. And since
>> throughout the rest of the Bible, God clearly employs a mixture of
>> natural
>> events and obvious interventions to get done what he wanted done, it is
>> consistent with the Biblical presentation of God's activity that the
>> creation of life involved a similar mixture.
>
> There are some important caveats and differences. First, the
> interventions are rather rare, much rarer than in apocryphal
> literature, legends of saints, pagan myths, etc., and serve a distinct
> function of pointing to God versus alternatives. Second, the
> intervention seems to be minimized-the axe floats, but must be
> repaired in the ordinary manner; Lazarus is raised but needs to get
> help unwrapping and has to beware of further hazards to his health;
> the gospel works by the Spirit, but comes almost always through the
> preaching or reading of the Word; etc. As ID often admits, their
> approach can't identify the designer. Neither supporters nor
> opponents believe it, but it is true. Miracles aren't just to help
> get through a difficulty. If there is a way to achieve things by
> natural law in the course of evolution, it seems as though God
> probably would do them that way.
>
>> It follows that the preference for pure naturalism in origins is either
>> aesthetic
>> (scientists like the tidiness and smoothness of natural-only
>> explanations,
>> rather than the disorderliness and bumpiness of unpredictable miracles)
>> or
>> theological (certain Christians don't like a God who does miracles).
>
> Not necessarily-it may also be empirical, that it looks like God used
> natural means, or precautionary-claiming that God worked miraculously
> and being proven wrong is judged to be a bigger problem than asserting
> that He didn't and being proved wrong.
>
>> But God is not bound by our aesthetic or theological preferences. So ID
>> people
>> see TE people as given to *a priori* commitments of various kinds, and
>> therefore not very open to alternate explanations.
>
>
> TE people see ID as given to a priori commitments and not open to
> alternate explanations. Probably in both cases there is an element of
> the assumption that unbiased judgement will agree with me. ID seems
> to frequently assume that anyone who doesn't think that the DI does
> great science automatically is saying that everything takes place by
> natural law without exception.
>
>
>> All right; you are saying that Christianity makes an empirical claim
>> which
>> is either true or false. Now, how do we verify or falsify an empirical
>> claim about an event which happened 2,000 years ago and which, in the
>> very
>> nature of the case (unless you accept the Shroud of Turin) will have left
>> no
>> empirical traces? So we are left with testimony. Doesn't this put the
>> investigation out of the hands of "science", and into the hands of
>> "history"? But even if we count history as a science, we have no primary
>> sources, other than the Gospels (which are partisan), for the event, so
>> isn't the event still entirely unverifiable and unfalsifiable? So that it
>> can't even be determined by history? So your concession, while reasonable
>> in principle, is in practice ineffectual: there is no way of seriously
>> testing the claim. It has to be believed on the strength of faith.
>
> Archaeology provides a good deal of evidence that the Bible does in
> fact match up with an ancient Near East and Mediterranean background.
> The historical data from several lines of evidence make it completely
> unreasonable to doubt that Jesus was a real person whose teaching
> diverged somewhat from contemporary Judaism, whose teaching and life
> made a big impression on his followers, and who was crucified.
> Obviously, one's presuppositions affect whether one views resurrection
> or a mass delusion as more likely. In contrast, the Book of Mormon is
> blatantly completely fictional, with no match whatsoever with
> archaeological evidence, quite apart from being a not entirely
> competent plagarism of the KJV and novels.
>
>> But that fits in perfectly with NOMA.<
>
> Only in that NOMA and the fact that there is relatively little outside
> of archaeology that scientifically touches on Christianity both point
> to similar physical results. Again, philosophically they are very
> different.
>
>> Agreed; it does not. But one would expect that at a minimum Christianity
>> would predict that nothing would be discovered in biology that would be
>> incompatible with the idea that God designed living nature (which is the
>> clear teaching of both the Bible and the Christian tradition), even if
>> the
>> means by which the design is executed (wholly naturalistic, wholly
>> miraculous, or some combination) is open for debate. And it is at least
>> plausible that evidence of God's existence might be available from
>> nature,
>> given not only general considerations but Psalm 19, Romans 1, etc. (Peace
>> to George, who seems to depart from many in his interpretation of those
>> passages.) Thus, Christianity might not demand design detectability, but
>> does not rule it out. ID may or may not be a successful venture, but it
>> is
>> a legitimate one from a Christian starting-point.
>
> I don't see how ID is any more different from NOMA on the question of
> Christianity, except when it makes the serious theological error of
> claiming that ID is an essential of Christianity.
>
>> Agreed, but note that if you accept this, then you cannot in principle
>> object to the idea that God might have done things differently in the
>> creation of life, of species, and of man. If it is possible that Jesus
>> broke the normal laws of nature (or as you put it, departed from "the
>> ordinary way in which God runs the universe"), it is possible that God
>> did
>> the same in the unrecorded past; therefore, we cannot be sure that
>> natural
>> causes can entirely explain evolution. We can use natural causes as our
>> working theory; but we cannot say: "Science has proved that only natural
>> causes were operative in evolution", any more than we can say "Science
>> has
>> proved that there are no miracles." Our determination to explain
>> evolutionary events in wholly natural terms is an aesthetic or
>> intellectual
>> preference, maybe a laudable one, but still a preference.
>
> I agree, apart from the caveat above that trying to explain things in
> natural terms can have empirical support as well.
>
>> I don't object to these speculative remarks, but you still haven't
>> explained
>> why you used the word "kenotic" to describe Jesus's action of walking on
>> the
>> sea. Nothing you have said in this post or the last shows me that there
>> was
>> anything "kenotic" about it.
>
> Although Jesus presumably could have miraculously surfed into the wind
> on a small bit of ice in His capacity as God, it seems quite out of
> keeping with His call to humble obedience. Trudging across the water,
> while still miraculous, is more consistent. I was not describing the
> walking on the sea as kenotic, though the walking rather than
> miraculous creation of some sort of easy ride could be; rather,
> choosing not to be the big luna kahuna (if you get that allusion, I
> can guess how old your kids are) is what I was describing as kenotic.
> Also, I am using the term "kenotic" very loosely as referring to
> voluntarily taking on standard human limitations, not to a formal
> theological system that can tend to lose sight of the divine nature.
>
> --
> Dr. David Campbell
> 425 Scientific Collections
> University of Alabama
> "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
>
>
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Received on Sat Oct 24 07:20:27 2009
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