Re: [asa] Where does TE differ from NOMA? (was: Re: Schools and NOMA)

OFFLIST

Just a comment on A here. Gould & Dawkins are significantly different with
regard to their treatment of Christianity. Neither accepted it of course.
But Gould new something about it (though of course he was no theologians) &
could speak of it in reasonably respectful ways. Dawkins of course knows
nothing about it & brags about the fact.

Shalom
George
http://home.roadrunner.com/~scitheologyglm

----- Original Message -----
From: "Murray Hogg" <muzhogg@netspace.net.au>
To: "ASA" <asa@calvin.edu>
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2009 6:14 PM
Subject: Re: [asa] Where does TE differ from NOMA? (was: Re: Schools and
NOMA)

> Hi Cameron,
>
> On A.: I would agree very strongly with the entirety of your discussion.
> There is something quite questionable about discussions of the interaction
> between science and religion when one has not taken the time to study both
> phenomena in detail. So, yes, if Gould (or Dawkins et al) seek to be taken
> seriously in their discussions on science and (Christian) religion, they
> would do well to actually inform themselves of the philosophical,
> historical, and (Christian) theological issues. But perhaps we might say
> of such thinkers that they are hardly so interested in an honest treatment
> of religion as they might pretend, and that their work seems primarily
> intended to advance the cause of scientism rather than to correctly
> understand the legitimate operations of either science or religion.
>
> On B.: My remark "Science isn't a legitimate enterprise because the
> scientist claims so. It is a legitimate enterprise because the Christian
> theologian claims so" has to be taken as a theological claim to which I
> would not expect a secular scientist to assent. And given that TE's by and
> large share the same uncritical philosophical assumptions as their secular
> counterparts, and that they have not, therefore, considered the
> theological question of scientific investigation, I would not expect TE's,
> by-and-large, to see the merit of the claim. Ditto for secular
> governments, courts of law, and university administrations.
>
> That said, however, there is one curious consequence of the claim which
> bears consideration: If I am correct, and Christian theology does, indeed,
> allow a certain arena of freedom for the sciences, then it is no business
> of the Christian theologian to then turn around and revoke that
> theologically defined freedom. To return to the "any toy in the toybox"
> analogy, I am saying that once permission is given to play with any toy in
> the toybox, why would it be an issue for Christian theology should secular
> scientists, governments, courts of law, and university administrations,
> insist that they have the right to play with any toy in the toybox?
> Now, I acknowledge that this is to actually overlook the major "sin" of
> secularists at this point, viz; the failure to honour God as God. Science
> is, in my view, clearly an aspect of the creation covenant under which
> humanity is to "tend and keep the garden." But it is not a "right" owed to
> us, but a gift freely offered. The problem with secularists is that they
> wish to possess the gift, but refuse to credit the giver.
>
> Their sin is, metaphorically, that of patricide: they kill the father in
> order that they might enter into possession of the gift. And the great
> pity is that they might have had both if they had not been motivated by
> their own blind self-interest. As the prophet said to David when he, too,
> took by duplicity and force that which God would happily have given; "I
> anointed you king over Israel, and I delivered you from the hand of Saul.
> 8 I gave you your master’s house and your master’s wives into your
> keeping, and gave you the house of Israel and Judah. And if that had been
> too little, I also would have given you much more!" (2 Sam. 12:7-8)
>
> Needless to say, this is also a theological comment to which secularists
> would not assent!
>
> The metaphor of "horizontal" vs. "vertical" compartments is, as you
> rightly surmise, not unrelated to the idea that theology is "queen of the
> sciences" - perhaps the metaphor seems good only because it describes that
> which has been said before by far wiser heads than mine!
>
> On C.: I can see where you would balk at my comments - but I can only
> plead a degree of uncertainty as to how to respond. It would be very handy
> if we could, at this point, construct a simplistic model which tells us
> what are, and are not, the legitimate spheres of scientific and
> theological enquiry - but that would be to adhere to something like
> Gould's NOMA which theory we precisely DON'T consider takes full account
> of the complexities.
>
> In respects of the Baconian/Cartesian/etc ban on appeals to final
> causation, I personally regard these as claims made on science by
> scientists - they are "lower order" claims which certainly might be
> coloured by a theological or metaphysical outlook, but which are
> nevertheless an exercise in philosophy of science rather than Christian
> theology. I willing to allow scientists and philosophers of science to
> make sweeping claims about scientific methodology and the scope of
> scientific inferences - so if THEY want to affirm principles like
> methodological naturalism or reject the notion of final causation, then
> they can do so - they can play with their toys anyway they like (and I
> allow that they may even play with them properly, like nice children
> <smile>).
>
> What they can't do, however, is pretend that their pronouncements about
> science must be accepted by Christian theologians. That is to say, the
> Bacon et al may well, speaking as scientists, say "investigation of final
> causes is no part of the scientific project." My response, speaking with
> my theologians hat on is simply to see this as one of the rules that
> children concoct when they play their games. Such a rule may be one which
> has been found helpful to keeping the game orderly, but we shouldn't
> suppose (1) that it is a *necessary* rule of the game, nor (2) that it
> applies at the higher level of theological discourse. In particular, as a
> Christian theologian, I reserve the right to object when the scientist
> puts forward certain evidences which *I* take to be evidence of design but
> then responds that I cannot, legitimately, make a design inference because
> such a claim is *unscientific*. What, I reserve the right to ask, is the
> relevance of *that* objection in the context of
>
> a Christian (theological) reflection upon nature?
>
> PS: I mean no disrespect or condescension to scientists when I use the
> analogy of children at play - only such an analogy is a helpful way to
> give voice to the theological claim that science has a legitimate area of
> autonomy within which it can set its own agendas and pursue them according
> to its own rules.
> Blessings,
> Murray
>
> Cameron Wybrow wrote:
>> Murray:
>>
>> Thanks for a very well-reasoned and interesting reply. I find much in
>> your discussion that is valuable to think about. Here are some of my
>> responses:
>>
>> A. I don't think that either NOMA or its opposite should be set up as
>> the "default position" which the onus is on someone else to disprove.
>> That is, of these two positions:
>>
>> 1. Religion and science can by nature never clash, because they have
>> non-overlapping magisteria.
>> 2. Religion and science are likely to clash, sooner or later, because Ca
>> there is some overlap between their magisteria.
>>
>> I don't think that either position should be taken as the obviously
>> sensible one, which a dissenter should have to disprove. I think the
>> person making the grand generalization is the one who should bear the
>> onus of proof, not the one who is skeptical of it; and the above two
>> positions are grand generalizations.
>>
>> My position is:
>>
>> 3. Religion and science both comment on the world, and sometimes even on
>> the same features of the world, and so it is possible that they have
>> overlapping magisteria, and it is also possible that they may disagree.
>> However, since even where they comment on the same features of the world,
>> they may be commenting on different aspects of those features, there is
>> no reason to assume that their magisteria overlap, and therefore no
>> reason to assume that they will ever be in a position where disagreement
>> will be necessary. The question of overlap or non-overlap, agreement or
>> disagreement, should be handled entirely on a case-by-case basis, without
>> bringing in prior expectations of either conflict or non-conflict.
>>
>> My problem with Gould is that his NOMA position, at least as set forth in
>> his introductory essay, appears not to be based on a close conceptual
>> study of the phenomena called "science" and "religion". One would expect
>> some sort of detailed philosophical and historical analysis of "science",
>> showing some awareness of how the term "science" has changed its meaning
>> many times in the history of Western thought, and a detailed historical
>> analysis of "religion", showing how it, too, has changed its meaning many
>> times in the history of Western thought, and one would expect him to
>> explain which definition of "science" and of "religion" he is using, and
>> why. Instead, he assumes that the reader will accept a popular notion of
>> "science" uncritically, and a popular notion of "religion" as well. But
>> popular notions are often filled with unconscious assumptions or based on
>> uncritical thinking.
>>
>> Further, it may make a very great difference whether the religion is
>> Christianity or something else, e.g., Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism,
>> Greco-Roman paganism, etc. And if the comparison is between
>> "Christianity and science", it may make a great deal of difference which
>> version of Christianity we are talking about. But Gould's discussion, at
>> least in the first essay where he introduces the term, ignores almost all
>> such qualifications. The only nod to nuance he provides is the
>> acknowledgement that at least one form of religion, literalist
>> Protestantism, does clash with the results of modern science, which is
>> true, but rather obvious, and does not take us very deep into the issues
>> at stake. Other than that, he seems to think that it is unproblematic to
>> broadly and loosely characterize religion, as pertaining to great ethical
>> and moral truths and to questions of value and meaning, and to have
>> nothing to do with the "external" world described by science and history.
>> In a sense, he has already presupposed his NOMA conclusion by taking for
>> granted the characterizations of science and religion that he uses.
>>
>> B. I find fascinating your claim that "Science isn't a legitimate
>> enterprise because the scientist claims so. It is a legitimate enterprise
>> because the Christian theologian claims so." This is very interesting.
>> Comments from scientists in religion/science discussions are frequently
>> accompanied by indignation over the idea that religion can presume to
>> interfere in the specialist discussions of scientists, or to talk about
>> physics or geology or biology or psychology, which are not parts of its
>> province. But you are denying the force of this rhetoric and the basis
>> for the scientific indignation. You are saying that science does not
>> have some sort of fundamental property rights over certain areas of
>> truth, constitutionally guaranteed against religious infringement.
>> Rather, science is given the responsibility of tilling the fields in
>> certain areas of knowledge recognized as valid by religion. Religion
>> sets the boundaries for science, not the other way around.
>>
>> Provided that "religion" is understood in a suitable way, i.e., as an
>> overarching view of the world and of knowledge, I like that. The problem
>> is that I don't think any secular scientist will agree with you, and I
>> suspect that even many TE scientists will not agree with you. But you
>> may actually be right. If you are right, it is because religion has a
>> fuller and more comprehensive view of reality than science does, and
>> therefore is better capable of deciding where scientists are competent
>> than scientists themselves are. It can therefore check scientific
>> over-reach, without denying to scientists the autonomy they need in the
>> areas proper to them. But when science, with its short-sighted view of
>> the whole, gets to set the boundaries of knowledge, it is likely to err,
>> and err on the side of self-aggrandizement. It seems to me that your
>> view is not unconnected with the old view of theology as "queen of the
>> sciences", a view I have always found rather attractive, but which has
>> been systematically assaulted and denied since the 17th century by the
>> majority of the most influential thinkers, and would not be taken
>> seriously by any government, court of law, or secular university
>> administration in the world today.
>>
>> Your metaphor of horizontal vs. vertical compartments is very good!
>>
>> C. On your last point, about design arguments, I think I agree with what
>> you are saying, but am not quite sure because of an ambiguity in your
>> wording at one point. Where you say:
>>
>> "By analogy, one can reject claims that there is life on Mars either
>> because one considers such claims implausible in principle, or because
>> one is not swayed by the evidence."
>>
>> I accept this distinction, and if all TE arguments against ID were of
>> latter sort, I would have no major beef with TE. But let me explain what
>> your sentence means to me. To me it means that, in considering
>> macroevolution, one should consider both (a) the evidence that undesigned
>> events and processes could have produced all species, making the design
>> hypothesis superfluous and not to be preferred; and (b) the evidence that
>> some sort of design was necessary to have produced at least some features
>> of living things. Further, it means to me that both possible conclusions
>> that could flow from the comparative analysis, i.e., that design was
>> necessary or that it was not, are legitimate *within science*. It means
>> that a TE could say: "I agree that design inferences should not be banned
>> from science on principle, but I'm unconvinced by any particular design
>> inference made so far by Behe, Dembski, etc." If that is what you meant,
>> I agree with you. However, in the sentence previous to the one above, you
>> wrote this:
>>
>> "When the TE says ID is "not science" it may not indicate an in principle
>> objection to design arguments, but merely a rejection of the claim that
>> we have, in fact, identified design in nature by the proper
>> (theologically defined!) canons of scientific inquiry."
>>
>> I don't know what the 'theologically defined proper canons of scientific
>> inquiry' are, but if they include the ban issued by Bacon, Descartes and
>> others on appeals to final causation in science, then they amount to an
>> objection "in principle" to design arguments, in contrast to the apparent
>> concession in your second clause above. This would not be consistent at
>> all with the Mars example. So I am not sure that we are entirely in
>> agreement.
>>
>> By the way, I do not claim as a firm position that ID inferences are
>> "scientific". I am saying that it is least *possible* that they are
>> scientific, i.e., it is at least possible that science can make room for
>> them without threatening its progress. I am also saying that it is
>> possible that they are correct inferences even if they are not
>> "scientific" according to a certain definition. I would rather leave
>> open the question of whether they count as "scientific" or
>> "philosophical" or something else, and concentrate on the strength of the
>> inferences and their intrinsic value as interpretations of the facts of
>> nature. But at least some TEs appear to have foreclosed upon this
>> question, saying either that ID inferences may be valid philosophical
>> inferences but cannot be scientific, in principle, or that ID inferences
>> are not valid at all, in principle, no matter how they are classified.
>> And of course, if ID grants the latter position, it must cease to exist,
>> and if it grants the former position, it may be granting too much to a
>> narrow and misleading conception of "science".
>>
>> Cameron.
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Murray Hogg"
>> <muzhogg@netspace.net.au>
>> To: "ASA" <asa@calvin.edu>
>> Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2009 10:53 PM
>> Subject: Re: [asa] Where does TE differ from NOMA? (was: Re: Schools and
>> NOMA)
>>
>>
>>> Hi Cameron,
>>>
>>> Just a brief remark on this topic;
>>>
>>> I think one has to distinguish between an ontological and a practical
>>> claim here.
>>>
>>> As an ontological claim, NOMA is clearly an attempt to drive a wedge
>>> between physical and spiritual realities in a way which could NEVER be
>>> open to challenge from experience. That is, "ontological NOMA" (call it
>>> NOMA(O)) is the affirmation that NO scientific truth claim could EVER
>>> contradict ANY religious truth claim because they - by their vary nature
>>> (i.e. ontologically speaking) - inhabit separate realms of discourse.
>>>
>>> But as a practical claim (NOMA(P)) would be nothing more than the view
>>> that there are *in practice* no scientific truth claims which do, in
>>> fact, stand in direct conflict with any religious truth claims. Or at
>>> least not legitimately!
>>>
>>> Personally, I think I would want to affirm a suitably nuanced version of
>>> something like NOMA(P) (Ist klar, ja? Wunderschön!). And my response to
>>> somebody who argues that NOMA is *entirely* wrong-headed would be a
>>> simple practical challenge: show me one instance in which a scientific
>>> truth claim DOES stand in direct conflict with a religious truth claim -
>>> that is, show me where the magisteria of science and the magisteria of
>>> theology may *legitimately* be considered to overlap. Show me where, in
>>> practice, NOMA fails - at which point we can talk about the viability of
>>> NOMA as a proper explanation. I'm not sure I'd agree that any such
>>> *legitimate* instance has ever been identified (although no doubt I will
>>> recall one the moment I press "send"...!)
>>>
>>> It has to be said that I personally have some sympathy with
>>> J.P.Moreland's notion of "Theistic Science" - the idea that Christians
>>> may rightly bring ALL their knowledge (including that of Scripture) to
>>> the interpretation of nature. However, I'm not sure that I'd want to
>>> affirm all the possible implications which some people might see lurking
>>> in this idea.
>>> I would particularly affirm the idea that our rational for practising
>>> science, and even our scientific method, can be readily informed by
>>> Christian theology, but when it comes to truth claims about the natural
>>> order itself, then these should be grounded in the study of the natural
>>> order rather than theology itself. And, note, that I think that later is
>>> NOT something dictated to Christian theology by science, rather I think
>>> it is something permitted to science by Christian theology. Science
>>> isn't a legitimate enterprise because the scientist claims so. It is a
>>> legitimate enterprise because the Christian theologian claims so.
>>> What I really want to do, then, is affirm aspects of both "Theistic
>>> Science" and "NOMA." In particular, I'd want to argue that when we bring
>>> ALL our Christian knowledge to bear on the question of our knowledge of
>>> the natural order, then it arises that we can define the limits of
>>> science *theologically.* In particular, I would suggest that the
>>> totality of our Christian knowledge tells us that the magisterium of
>>> science - when restricted to its proper domain (i.e. exploration of the
>>> created order) cannot, in practice, impinge upon the proper
>>> pronouncements of the magisterium of Christian theology.
>>>
>>> This is, I think, to affirm something resembling a form of NOMA but a
>>> form which refutes the particular agenda that Gould had in mind. It
>>> certainly denies the notion that science always trumps theology, for it
>>> is the claim that theology legitimately limits the subject matter, and
>>> the scope, of science. Gould wanted to separate science and theology as
>>> it were "horizontally" and have them sit in different hermetically
>>> sealed compartments. I think it better, if one wants to talk about them
>>> being separated, to think of them separated "vertically" - standing in a
>>> hierarchical relationship such that science is subsumed under theology
>>> whilst being allowed an appropriate degree of autonomy. It's a bit like
>>> a father telling the child that he can play with any toy in the toybox -
>>> that's restricted liberty which, by definition, doesn't mean carte
>>> blanch for the child to usurp the role of the father and start playing
>>> with the power tools in the workshop.
>>>
>>> With all this in mind, one closing comment about ID: A TE may well
>>> reject ID not because the claims of ID are seen as transgressing NOMA
>>> and thus implausible by definition. Rather, the TE may simply think that
>>> the claims of ID are not substantiated in practice. When the TE says ID
>>> is "not science" it may not indicate an in principle objection to design
>>> arguments, but merely a rejection of the claim that we have, in fact,
>>> identified design in nature by the proper (theologically defined!)
>>> canons of scientific inquiry. By analogy, one can reject claims that
>>> there is life on Mars either because one considers such claims
>>> implausible in principle, or because one is not swayed by the evidence.
>>>
>>> I think it could be allowed - in the interests of Christian charity -
>>> that *some* TE's, at least, fall into the later category rather than the
>>> former. You will rightly say - and I will support you fully should you
>>> do so - that it would be no bad thing if the same Christian charity were
>>> extended by TE's to those who demure from their scientific doctrine.
>>>
>>> Blessings,
>>> Murray
>>
>>
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Received on Fri Oct 23 21:22:40 2009