free will and indeterminacy (was Re: [asa] observational vs. theoretical differences)

For what it's worth, and not out of any disagreement with anything George Murphy said, I agree with Dave Siemens about randomness. Random acts aren't free. And I've always had a problem, for that reason, with arguments that try to ground free will in quantum indeterminacy. If an electron in my brain suddenly "blips" and makes an arbitrary and utterly unpredictable "quantum leap" of some kind, how does that enable me to will good rather than evil? Either the blip necessitates my choice for the good, in which case my choice is not free (hence not praiseworthy), or it merely enables my choice for the good (by somehow cancelling out, momentarily, the mechanical side of my nature), in which case my choice to do good rather than evil still rests ultimately on something in me other than quantum physics. Sooner or later, if we really believe in freedom, we have to come back to traditional (Platonic and Christian) language about the soul, language which has been quite unfashionable now for quite a long time, even among Christians (I might almost say especially among Christians).

P.S. I find George's ruminations about quantum indeterminism and divine action helpful, because he acknowledges that QI isn't a "magic bullet" in relation to evolution, but is only a possibility that requires more pondering. I like his question "what collapses all the others?" This is an aspect of quantum theory that I've never understood. Are the changes dealt with under "indeterminacy" understood by physicists to be literally causeless? If not -- if there is a cause for each "quantum event" -- then how can such a cause not be law-abiding? And if the cause is law-abiding, why are all changes not (in principle, anyway) predictable? I find it impossible to separate the notion of "cause" from the notion of "regularity" or "law-abiding behaviour". Is that a macroscopic prejudice? Does "cause" mean something different in the quantum world than in the macroscopic world? If so, should the word "cause" even be used? My popular science reading in this area is doubtless out of date. Is there a good, currently valid book or article, written in layman's language, that discusses causality, law, determinism, indeterminism, etc. in relation to quantum theory?

Cameron.

  ----- Original Message -----
  From: dfsiemensjr
  To: GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com
  Cc: dfsiemensjr@juno.com ; wybrowc@sympatico.ca ; asa@calvin.edu
  Sent: Friday, July 03, 2009 5:43 PM
  Subject: Re: [asa] observational vs. theoretical differences in scenarios; a direct question

  George,
  I wasn't accusing you of trying to fit God's activity into QM. But you did clarify the matter of causation. My question involved God's control beyond anything that science could detect. What I recognize is that QM cannot be the basis of free will, which demands the individual's control of their action. A random act is no more free than a strictly determined one.

  As to the principle of sufficient reason, perhaps it requires supplementation with the principles of unrecognized reason and imperceptible reason.
  Dave (ASA)

  On Fri, 3 Jul 2009 08:28:55 -0400 "George Murphy" <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com> writes:
    Dave -

    I didn't mean to suggest that QM would function as a "mask of God" any more than any other aspect of the world does. In fact, the idea that God collapses wave packets directly would mean that at a fundamental level there is no 2dary causality. That's why, even though I think the idea of God's action at the quantum level needs further exploration, I'm uneasy about it. If God collapses all wave packets - i.e., if God is directly responsible for the "condensation" of all probability distributions into certainties - then we've simply resintroduced what Barbour calls the "classical" model of divine action in which God acts as the dictator of the world to do everything directly. Creatures have no causal role at all. OTOH, if God acts directly to collapse only some wave packets - in order to direct evolution in particular ways, e.g. - then we have to ask what collapses all the others. I may be able to abandon the peinciple of sufficient reason, but a principle of "some but not all sufficient reason" seems quite unsatisfactory.

    Shalom
    George
    http://home.roadrunner.com/~scitheologyglm

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Received on Tue Jul 7 16:57:35 2009